

Vanderbilt Historical Review

An Undergraduate Journal of History

Volume V, Issue I

Spring 2020

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Letter from the Editor

Dear readers,

This edition has been a long time coming. There may someday be future articles written in this very journal analyzing the historical period between our last edition and this one. For me, reading history was at times overwhelming because we were undeniably living history. Each month in 2020 brought unique challenges. In the United States, we saw some of the darkest days in American history brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic and the precarity of our democracy, as highlighted by the 2020 election. We also experienced bursts of pride at the innovation and scholarship by scientists in developing the world's fastest vaccine, at least four times over. My heart swelled with pride at the election of our first female Vice President and the progress she represents to so many.

When I think about this journal, and the collection of stories it contains, I realize that our pieces are all grounded in the power of people. The essays spotlight their subjects, visionaries, both famous and unknown, who shaped the direction of history. Our authors have worked to bring their stories to life, and to share with you their experiences, insights, and impacts. I hope you will see the humanity behind the written words. I want to thank our editors and everyone on staff for helping to create this collection of immersive experiences for you to process and enjoy. I want to especially express thanks to Luis Martinez and Skyler Froese for their unbelievable dedication to the completion of this edition. Luis--thank you for leaning into your love of history to extract the best features of these articles. You have enriched this journal, and I wish you nothing but the best in all future endeavors you pursue.

Finally, I want to give special acknowledgement to the tireless work of healthcare workers and providers, especially the Vanderbilt University Medical Center, which has provided critical support and stability to Nashville and Vanderbilt. The Vanderbilt History Department has given us their full backing, and we are grateful for the educational enrichment and perspective they bring to our lives and university. Thank you for your support. With that in mind, please enjoy the edition.

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A Shared Exodus: Analyzing the Multi-Confessional Consumption of Abraham Ortelius's Map of Palestine

Arman Kassam (Stanford University)

The 1608 Italian edition of *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (“Theater of the World”) towers over the other atlases in the David Rumsey Map Center. It stands fifty-one centimeters tall and thirty-two centimeters wide, is luxuriously bound, and was undoubtedly made for patrons with pretty purses and good connections.¹ Abraham Ortelius first published the *Theatrum* in 1570 after assembling a series of maps that collectively unveiled an increasingly globalized world.² His systematic organization of cartography and ethnography was unlike anything that had been printed before, and today the *Theatrum* is widely considered to be the first modern atlas.³ Demand skyrocketed beyond Ortelius’s expectations. The Antwerp cartographer and his publishers eventually issued forty-seven editions that got progressively more comprehensive, and by the time the 1608 version came out, the number

of maps had grown from a mere fifty-four to a monstrous 166.⁴ Ortelius inserted many of these additional maps based on his antiquarian interests; in 1579, he included an *Additamentum* (*Supplement*) to his atlas with three maps of sacred and profane history.⁵ This addendum eventually received its own section and name – the *Parergon* (fig. 1) – and reached a maximum of thirty-nine maps by 1598.⁶ My inquiry focuses on one of these antiquarian maps, a piece called *Palestinae* (fig. 2) that depicts the Christian Holy Land and the day-by-day journey of Moses and his people as recounted in Numbers and Exodus.⁷ Fascinatingly, the *Parergon* and its contents were consumed and commented on throughout Europe, crossing political, geographic, and confessional lines despite the fact that the same exegetical materials were rarely consumed by Protestants and Catholics alike. Ortelius himself was a Catholic but had plenty of Reformed peers. I seek to understand how the multi-confessional consumption of the *Parergon* informs our interpretation of the map of *Palestinae*.⁸

¹ Abraham Ortelius, *Theatro Del Mondo Di Abrahamo Ortelio: Da Lui Poco Inanzi La Sua Morte Riveduto, & Di Tavole Nuove, et Commenti Adorno, & Arricchito Con La Vita Dell’Autore. Traslato in Lingua Toscana Dal Sigr. Filippo Pigafetta. In Anversa, Appresso Giovanni Bapta. Vrintio, M.DC.VIII. (with) Parergon, Cioe Fuor D’Opera, Et Giusta, Overo Alcune Tavole Dell’Antica Geographia. (with) Nomenclator Ptolemaicus; Omnia Locorum Vocabula Quae In Tota Ptolemaei Geographia*, trans. Filippo Pigafetta (Antwerp: Jan Baptista Vrients, 1608).

² Dirk Imhof, “The Trade in Individual Maps from Ortelius’s *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* after 1612,” *Imago Mundi* 70, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03085694.2018.1382104>; Frans Koks, “Ortelius Atlas,” web page, Library of Congress, accessed December 6, 2019, <https://www.loc.gov/collections/general-maps/articles-and-essays/general-atlases/ortelius-atlas/>.

³ Nabil I. Matar, “Protestant Restorationism and the Ortelian Mapping of Palestine (with an Afterword on Islam),” in *The Calling of the Nations: Exegesis, Ethnography, and Empire in a Biblical-Historic Present*, ed. Mark Vessey, Green College Thematic Lecture Series

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division, 2011), 59, <https://stanford.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=948419&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

⁴ Matar, “Protestant Restorationism,” 68, 59.

⁵ Walter S. Melion, “Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam: Meditation, Vocation, and Sacred History in Abraham Ortelius’s ‘Parergon,’” *The Journal of the Walters Art Gallery* 57 (1999): 49.

⁶ Melion, “Ad Ductum Itineris,” 49.

⁷ The full name of the map is presented at bottom-right: “Palestinae Sive Totius Terrae Promissionis Nova Descriptio Auctore Tilemanno Stella Sigenensi.”

⁸ As far as I know, Pauline Watts has written the only major review of this subject and determined that there is yet to be a comprehensive study of how biblical cartography changed during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Pauline Moffitt Watts, “The European Religious Worldview and Its Influence on Mapping,” in *Cartography in the European Renaissance*, ed. David Woodward, vol. 3, *The History of Cartography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, n.d.), 387.

Before diving into Ortelius's piece, I trace the history of Holy Land maps in the Reformation and discuss how the creators of these maps came from various confessions. I then frame my argument by identifying that, just as Protestants and Catholics produced these Holy Land maps, they also both consumed maps like *Palestinae*.⁹ To understand what made this joint consumption possible, my analysis first turns to the similarities between the Reformed and Catholic interpretations of the map. Specifically, Ortelius' Christian audiences shared an understanding of topography and history. After, I shift focus to the differences between Reformed and Catholic interpretations to suggest that while all Christians may have shared understandings of space and time, their reflections on the Holy Land differed in spiritual significance. Ultimately, we find that Protestants and Catholics drew varied interpretations from the *same* devotional material, suggesting that *Palestinae* offered devotional space for confessional coexistence.

A Brief History of Holy Land Maps

Ortelius's *Palestinae* has roots deep in the Reformation heartland and from the very beginnings of the movement. Elector Frederick, Duke of Saxony, embarked on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1493 with renowned artist Lucas Cranach the Elder. More than a decade after their return, Cranach

crafted a gargantuan woodblock print of a Holy Land map (fig. 3) to commemorate the journey.¹⁰ This map demonstrates the three major characteristics that would come to define biblical cartography for the next century: preference for the Old Testament, presentation of a religious history, and emphasis on the pilgrimage of the Israelites in Exodus.¹¹

From the earliest stages, maps of the Holy Land were identified by Reformers as key didactic tools. Inspired by Cranach's work, Luther demonstrated interest in placing a map of the Holy Land in his New Testament of 1522. Philip Melancthon, working closely with Luther at the time, wrote to Caspar Cruciger that "Luther wanted to include a map of the Holy Land... to allow a better understanding of the text."¹² Though Luther did not end up using the map, Zurich-based publisher Christopher Froschauer did in his vernacular Old Testament.¹³ A group of theologians and publishers followed suit: Jacob van Liesveldt in 1526, Willem Vorsterman in 1528, and Hans Peetersen in 1535, all relying on Cranach's woodcut illustration.¹⁴ A second generation of cartographically-inclined publishers expanded the range and diversity of these pieces.¹⁵ For example, the Geneva Bible of 1560 included maps of Eden, Canaan, the Holy Land in the time of Christ, and the travels of St. Paul, in addition to the original Exodus map.¹⁶ Over

⁹ I have written this essay acknowledging that what the map presents and how the map was consumed differ. I try to emphasize the role of consumption in "Shared Consumption" and "Differences in Consumption," but I acknowledge that I still use what the map presents us to make an argument for consumption. For more on the consumption and circulation of maps, see Matthew Edney's recent book, *Cartography: The Ideal and Its History* (2019).

¹⁰ Pnina Arad, "Frederick III's Holy Land Installation in Wittenberg during the Cultural Transition of the Reformation," *Viator* 48, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 219, <https://doi.org/10.1484/J.VIATOR.5.115321>; August den Hollander, "Biblical Geography: Maps in Sixteenth-Century Printed Bibles from the Low Countries," *Church History and Religious Culture* 99, no. 2

(August 12, 2019): 140, <https://doi.org/10.1163/18712428-09902005>; Arad, "Frederick III's Holy Land Installation in Wittenberg during the Cultural Transition of the Reformation," 233. See also "Cranach as Cartographer: The Rediscovered 'Map of the Holy Land'" by Armin Kunz in *Print Quarterly* (June 1995).

¹¹ Den Hollander, "Biblical Geography," 140.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Catherine Delano-Smith and Elizabeth Morley Ingram, *Maps in Bibles, 1500-1600: An Illustrated Catalogue* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1991), xxii.

¹⁴ Delano-Smith and Ingram, *Maps in Bibles*, xxii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, xxiii.

¹⁶ Justine Walden, "Global Calvinism: The Maps in the English Geneva Bible," *Shaping the Bible in the*

the course of the early Reformation, maps of the Holy Land transformed from a patron's novelty into a visual staple in the Protestant discourse. Catherine Delano-Smith and Elizabeth Ingram attempted to explain this cartographic boom in their seminal 1991 study of thousands of bibles, concluding that the Exodus map's "narrative, with its movement from bondage to salvation" resonated with "Protestants struggling to free themselves from what they saw as the 'Egypt' of a corrupt church."¹⁷ Their thesis was succinct, powerful, and would come to define modern scholarship for a generation: "The history of maps in Bibles is part of the history of the Reformation."¹⁸

Abraham Ortelius probably did not engage with Exodus maps in the same vein as Protestants seeking spiritual salvation from a malicious church. At least ostensibly, the Antwerp mapmaker was Catholic.¹⁹ Ortelius trained as an illuminator of maps at Antwerp's Guild of Saint Luke in 1547 before making contact with the prolific and influential Gerard Mercator.²⁰ Ortelius soon established a business trading antiquarian paraphernalia and even made historical maps of his own that depicted the Roman Empire and Egypt.²¹ After the almost instant success of the *Theatrum*, compiled thanks to Ortelius's connections to humanists and mapmakers from across northern Europe, Emperor Philip II named Ortelius 'his majesty's cartographer' in 1573.²² However, just as the mapmaker ascended the social ladder, Antwerp and the

greater Low Countries underwent seismic political and religious shifts. In 1562, Calvin's influence in the Netherlands began to rise once a "Belgian confession" was translated into Dutch, later becoming binding for Dutch Protestants after the Emden Synod of 1571.²³ Meanwhile, as a religious reformation spread throughout the region, the Habsburg Crown attempted to assert hegemony over the Flemish nobility with plans to "establish a more elaborate – and controllable – Catholic church hierarchy in the region."²⁴ The resulting Dutch rebellion created an era of confessional and political volatility for Antwerp that amounted to spouts of iconoclasm in 1566, the sacking of the city in 1576, and decisive Habsburg retaliation in 1583 and 1585.²⁵ Despite this period of turmoil, Antwerp still remained the largest printing center in the Low Countries, and the *Theatrum* succeeded beyond measure.²⁶ Ortelius's masterpiece was translated into German, French, Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and English, attracting a readership that crossed territorial, political, and religious divides.²⁷

Ortelius crossed a religious divide himself when he based the map of *Palestinae* off of the work of Tilemann Stella, a follower of Melancthon's who devised pieces to "facilitate reading of the Old Testament."²⁸ Placing a Protestant biblical map in the *Theatrum* by an outwardly Catholic author complicates the original claim made by Delano-Smith and Ingram that Reformers had a monopoly on biblical cartography.²⁹

Reformation 20 (January 1, 2012): 188,

https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004229501_010.

¹⁷ Delano-Smith and Ingram, *Maps in Bibles, 1500-1600*, xxiii–xxiv.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, xvi.

¹⁹ René Boumans, "The Religious Views of Abraham Ortelius," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 17, no. 3/4 (1954): 375, <https://doi.org/10.2307/750329>.

²⁰ Joost Depuydt, "Ortelius, Abraham," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, September 23, 2004), 2, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/20854>.

²¹ Depuydt, "Ortelius, Abraham," 2.

²² *Ibid.*, 3.

²³ Euan Cameron, *The European Reformation*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 387.

²⁴ Cameron, *The European Reformation*, 388.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Andrew Pettegree and Matthew Hall, "The Reformation and the Book: A Reconsideration," *The Historical Journal* 47, no. 4 (2004): 794.

²⁷ Pettegree and Hall, "The Reformation and the Book," 794.; Depuydt, "Ortelius, Abraham," 2.

²⁸ Melion, "Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam," 50.

²⁹ Delano-Smith and Ingram, *Maps in Bibles, 1500-1600*, xvi.

Certainly these maps remained key materials for many Protestant bibles, but Ortelius's *Theatrum* demonstrates that sacred geography was important to cartographers of many faiths, not just Reformed theologians.³⁰ Like Ortelius, the Catholic humanist Benito Arias Montano composed an addendum for his Antwerp polyglot bible with maps of Canaan and Israel.³¹ In his study of this addendum, Zur Shalev writes that biblical maps do not necessarily embody a general Protestant ethic, but instead show widespread intellectual interests in sacred geography and humanist erudition.³² Shalev keenly demonstrates that by the late sixteenth century, these maps meandered between confessions because their creators were united by common intellectual values.

Consumption and Audience

The creation of *Palestinae* echoes Shalev's argument for confessional unity by humanism, but Shalev overwhelmingly focuses on the production of maps. What

about consumption? *Palestinae*'s diverse audience may also tell a story of religious unity during the Reformation. At least 8,300 copies of the map were printed and disseminated throughout Germany, France, Spain, Italy, England, and the Low Countries between 1570 and 1640.³³ The piece has been deemed the "prototype for the modern cartography of the Holy Land," and surprisingly, it resisted serious modification between its publications.³⁴ Even though the 1608 Italian *Theatrum* is a distinctively Catholic artifact with its dedication to Pope Clement VIII, its map of *Palestinae* perfectly mirrors those in other vernacular translations of the *Theatrum*, including a 1608 English version.³⁵ With the exception of minor differences in text, typesetting, and coloring, the same holds true for the seventeen other editions of *Palestinae* that I examined.³⁶ In effect, the same map of the Exodus was widely disseminated across a multi-confessional Europe.

To illustrate the religious diversity of this audience with specifics, we can tap into

³⁰ Zur Shalev, "Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition: Benito Arias Montano and the Maps in the Antwerp Polyglot Bible," *Imago Mundi* 55 (2003): 57.

³¹ Shalev, "Sacred Geography," 67.

³² *Ibid.*, 58.

³³ Marcel van den Broecke and Deborah Broecke-Günzburger, "Index of the Plates of Ortelius' *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* by Ortelius (Ort)-Number," *Cartographica Neerlandica*, 2003, <http://orteliusmaps.com/ortindexnumber.html>; Imhof, "The Trade in Individual Maps from Ortelius's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* after 1612." After the death of Ortelius in 1598, his longtime collaborator Jan Baptist Vrients obtained the copper plates to the *Theatrum* and printed new editions from 1602 to 1609. Vrients published both complete atlases and individual maps, many of which slipped into other atlases and collections across Europe. Imhof, 52.

³⁴ Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, *Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 170, <https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203185.001.0001/acprof-9780199203185>.

³⁵ "Theatro Del Mondo - David Rumsey Historical Map Collection," David Rumsey Map Collection, 2019;

Abraham Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum Abrahami Ortelii Antuerp. Geographi Regii. The Theatre of the Vvhole World: Set Forth by That Excellent Geographer Abraham Ortelius*, trans. William Bedwell, 2nd ed. (London: Officina Plantiniana, 1608), Image 248. When citing the English translation of the atlas, I indicate image number as opposed to page number for easier navigation using EEBO. Based on the versions of the map I have observed from 1570-1608, I believe most if not all copies of the map are printed in Latin.

³⁶ Thirteen of these derive from Marcel van den Broecke and Deborah van den Broecke-Günzburger's database project. Out of seventeen *Theatrum* atlases in their collection, thirteen included a version of *Palestinae* (labelled Ort170/171/172). The four atlases that did not include the map were 1571 Dutch, 1595 Latin, 1598 French, and 1602 Spanish editions. It appears that all copies in the collection before the 1595 Latin edition have a different typesetting, include a small compass at mid-right, and have a text other than an excerpt of Deut. 8 in the top-left cartouche (see below). The four other editions I cite as having the map are two 1570 Latin editions in the Library of Congress, a 1574 Latin edition owned by Andreas Donelli, and the first English edition published by John Norton and John Bill in 1606 (see bibliography).

Ortelius's humanist networks. The *Album Amicorum*, a signature book that Ortelius passed throughout his circles, indicates that George Braun (a Catholic antiquarian), Philip Marnix van Sint-Aldegonde (a Calvinist polemicist), and Janus Dousa (an ostensibly Protestant noble) all praised the *Theatrum*.³⁷ Benito Arias Montano also inspired and likely viewed many of the pieces of the *Parergon*.³⁸ William Camden, a staunch supporter of Queen Elizabeth and the first cartographer of the British Isles, probably acquired a copy of the *Theatrum* after receiving a collection of works by Ortelius in 1602.³⁹ A letter from 1630 tells us that Gerardus Joannes Vossius, a humanist scholar of Calvinist origins, also had acquired works by Ortelius.⁴⁰ Publisher information for the atlas may also give us some clues. For example, John Norton and John Bill, committed Protestants, printed the first 1606 English translation of the *Theatrum* and followed up with a 1608 version that included *Palestinae*.⁴¹ In addition, the names of some atlas owners appear on introductory pages, including that of an "Andreas Donelli" who was probably the Catholic scion of a noble Bolognese family.⁴² This glimpse into Ortelius's readership confirms that most of his audience was affluent, led humanist discourses, and most importantly, spanned the confessional spectrum from Catholic to

Anglican to Calvinist. This diversity forces us to consider not only what the map of *Palestinae* meant for its ecumenical producers, but also what it presents about the faiths of its consumers. What were the religious understandings that were powerful enough to bring Protestants and Catholics to the same devotional material?

Shared Consumption

Influenced by the humanist erudition of the day, Protestants and Catholics jointly appreciated how *Palestinae* precisely organized biblical knowledge. The map's epistemology begins with the toponym. It uses these place names to meticulously locate the events of the Exodus on earth (a sacred topography) and in a chronology (a religious history), a framework for thinking about the biblical past that Ortelius's multi-confessional audience agreed on.

Palestinae is composed of toponyms that almost entirely derive from the Biblical text, giving a spatial organization to the world of the Old Testament. In particular, forty-two toponyms trace the route of the Exodus that begins at Raemeses and ends at Jericho, with each toponym and surrounding visual evoking a particular episode from the chronology of Numbers 33. For example, at the sixth encampment, the Elim of "twelve fountains

³⁷ Melion, "Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam"; Abraham Ortelius, *Album Amicorum of Abraham Ortelius* (Antwerp: Pembroke College Library, 1574), <https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-LC-00002-00113/1>.

³⁸ Shalev, "Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition."

³⁹ Wyman H. Herendeen, "Camden, William," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, January 3, 2008), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/4431>; Camden to Pierre François Sweerts, September 7, 1602, in *Early Modern Letters Online*, Cultures of Knowledge, [http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/f6c42fce-0c60-4b72-a20d-29c57794ee3e?sort=date-a&rows=50&mail_recipient-person=http%3A//localhost/person/813ae52e-f87d-4060-ac75-](http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/f6c42fce-0c60-4b72-a20d-29c57794ee3e?sort=date-a&rows=50&mail_recipient-person=http%3A//localhost/person/813ae52e-f87d-4060-ac75-7b0f52910ecf&people=pierre%20Fran%3%A7ois%20Sweerts&baseurl=/forms/advanced&start=0&type=advanced&numFound=6)

[7b0f52910ecf&people=pierre%20Fran%3%A7ois%20Sweerts&baseurl=/forms/advanced&start=0&type=advanced&numFound=6](http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/3ecc9634-8195-4468-877e-bd8d55c80eea?sort=date-a&rows=50&dat_sin_year=1630&dat_sin_month=9&baseurl=/forms/advanced&start=66&type=advanced&numFound=86).

⁴⁰ Vossius to Gerardus Joannes Vossius, September 26, 1630, in *Early Modern Letters Online*, Cultures of Knowledge, http://emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/profile/work/3ecc9634-8195-4468-877e-bd8d55c80eea?sort=date-a&rows=50&dat_sin_year=1630&dat_sin_month=9&baseurl=/forms/advanced&start=66&type=advanced&numFound=86.

⁴¹ Abraham Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (London: John Norton, 1606), <https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/scanned-maps/catalog/44-990088585650203941>.

⁴² Abraham Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum [with] Addiamentum* (Antwerp, 1574), <https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/55263/atlas-theatrum-orbis-terrarum-with-addiamentum-ortelius>.

of waters, and seventy palm trees" is symbolized by a patch of palm trees and pools.⁴³ At the twentieth encampment, where they "camped in the Mountain Sepher," the toponym for Sepher mons levitates above a mountain.⁴⁴ The topography of *Palestinae* provides an exact visual reference for the places articulated by the Old Testament, and much of this spatial precision also derives from the surrounding coordinate plane and the four different scales at bottom-right.⁴⁵ These mathematical trappings suggest that every toponym's scriptural component can be squarely located on earth. *Palestinae* thus offers its audience a precise moral landscape that turns the nebulous and non-visual Holy Land into a tangible space.

Ortelius, his Protestant progenitors, and his audience all celebrate this topographic precision. Georg Braun wrote in his own *Civitates orbis terrarum* that "so powerful is the knowledge of place instilled by the topographer, that he transforms *peregrinus* [traveler] into an *hospes* [native], imbuing the foreigner with all the privileged information held by the local inhabitant."⁴⁶ Braun identifies that the topographer instills a "knowledge of place" that turns distant locations into experienced phenomena, reflecting *Palestinae*'s own exactness. On the opposite side of the confessional spectrum, Nicolas Barbier and Thomas Courteau, the original printers of the maps in the French vernacular bible of 1559, explained that their pieces "would present as if living before the eyes of those who find it difficult to imagine and consider the words [of scripture] by themselves."⁴⁷ Ortelius himself wrote in the opening passages of the *Theatrum* that "*when we*

have acquainted ourselves somewhat with the use of these Tables or Mappes... whatsoever we shall read, these Chartes being placed, as it were certaine glasses before our eyes, will the longer be kept in memory, and make the deeper impression in us."⁴⁸ Barbier, Courteau, and Ortelius all emphasize the sensory consumption of these maps through "the eyes" or "our eyes," a consumption that makes *real* lands out of what is all too distant.⁴⁹ These Protestant and Catholic textual perspectives suggest that there was a unified understanding of topography as a window into reality. Therefore, it is likely that Ortelius's confessionally-disparate readers jointly appreciated *Palestinae*'s precise sacred topography.

From the perspective of religious history, consider that the toponym "Raemeses" exists not only on the coordinate plane, but also on the timeline. Each toponym, and thus the scriptural event associated with the toponym, is situated in a chronology that proves that the miracles of God can be traced back to an exact *time*. Ortelius emphasizes this orderly religious history in the explanatory:

*Canaan, the most ancient name of this country was Canaan, which it tooke of Chanaan the sonne of Cham, whose posterity divided it amongst themselves and first inhabited it. Their names were these, Sidon, Heth, Iebusy, Gergesy, Heuy, Arky, Siny, Aruady, Semary, and Hamathy, Gen.10.15.16.17.18. Every one of these gave his owne name to that part of the country of Canaan, which he enjoied for his portion, and of them mention afterward is made
Gen.13.14.15.23.24.25.27.34.36.38.49.*

⁴³ Num. 33:9. Latin Vulgate, latinvulgate.com.

⁴⁴ Num. 33:23. Interestingly, "Sepher mons" appears twice on the map: once at the encampment "20" and again at a nearby mountain.

⁴⁵ To further aid with locating toponyms, multiple versions of a name (like "Heliopolis" and "Bethsemes") are presented on the map. It also appears that not all locations mentioned in the explanatory are presented

on the map. For example, "Phitom" is nowhere to be found.

⁴⁶ Melion, "Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam," 69.

⁴⁷ Walden, "Global Calvinism," 198.

⁴⁸ Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, 1608, Image 4.

⁴⁹ See Shalev's "Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism, and Visual Erudition," and especially his discussion of Montano's "erudite eyes."

50. Exod.3.13.23.34. Num.13.22.32.
Deut.1.2.3.4.7.20.
Iosu.2.3.5.7.9.10.11.12.13.15.16.17.19.
24...⁵⁰

A sacred history progresses throughout the passage: first comes Cham, then his sons, and then their sons. This clearly delineated history also manifests in the flurry of biblical citations that delineate a progression from Genesis to Exodus to Numbers, and so on. The chronological emphasis that pervades the explanatory one appears on the map in the form of ascending numerals and toponyms along the exodus path. These numerals and toponyms constitute a visualized, logical progression, a characteristic of the map that also separates the piece from most other maps in the *Theatrum*. While Ortelius's world maps might be considered "snapshots" of a moment, this Holy Land map represents the Exodus narrative at different times; "Raemeses" does not exist simultaneously with "Jericho" even though both are projected onto the same spatial plane.⁵¹ The map does not depict a particular moment in Exodus; it depicts the general time of Exodus. *Palestinae* familiarizes the reader with the ebb and flow of a complete sacred history, composed of

individual events that can be exactly located in relation to one another.⁵²

As with *Palestinae*'s sacred topography, Ortelius, his readers, and his Protestant progenitors appreciated this orderly religious history. Shalev writes that Benito Arias Montano followed a "strict historicism" in his *Apapratus Sacer*.⁵³ The Catholic luminary diverged from other works of his time by insisting on the separation between the "Chanaan" of Joshua and the "Chaleb" of the subsequent Israelite settlement.⁵⁴ For Montano, sacred history was arranged precisely and logically for the sake of humanist erudition. Though executed for different reasons, Protestant attempts at affirming scripture's historicity follow a similar logic.⁵⁵ When confronted with arguments against the literal truth of the location of Eden, Calvin published a response in *Commentary on Genesis* that posited that the two "lost" rivers of Paradise – the Gihon and the Pishon – had in fact turned into the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates.⁵⁶ As Justine Walden explains, "Terrestrial paradise really had existed but was simply lost somewhere in the past."⁵⁷ Calvin also buttressed his explanation with a historical map, engaging the reader in the real and chronologically precise events of the past.⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, 1608, Image 247.

⁵¹ Num. 33:3, 33:49. Scripture identifies that Moses and his people departed Raemeses on "the fifteenth day of the first month, the day after the phase" whereas Moses "camped from Bethsimoth... in the plains of the Moabites" at the end of their journey.

⁵² Melion's argument for imaginary pilgrimage follows this line of thought. The reader of *Palestinae* tracks a precise itinerary of "loci" that were previously sanctified by holy men, including Abraham, Moses, and Paul, in a meditative process of reenactment. Melion, "Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam," 49.

⁵³ Shalev, "Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition," 63.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Cameron, *The European Reformation*, 167. The intentions between Montano and Calvin greatly differ. Calvin was concerned not only with affirming the historical validity of scripture, but also interpreting how

God's promise and relations with humankind have changed over time. For Montano, erudition is devotionally fulfilling; for Calvin, erudition becomes the means to support theology. Shalev, "Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition," 11.

⁵⁶ Walden, "Global Calvinism," 199.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 201.

⁵⁸ Delano-Smith and Ingram, *Maps in Bibles, 1500-1600*, xxv-xxvi; Watts, "The European Religious Worldview and Its Influence on Mapping," 388. Justine Walden also writes on how the Marian exiles in Geneva may have projected their own refugee struggles onto maps of the Exodus, locating scriptural history in the formation of their current English Protestant identity. The Exodus map of the Geneva Bible "stood as a talisman of the Geneva group's own recent peregrinations and signaled the exiles' identification with the ancient and embattled, but God-favored community of the Israelites." Walden, 198, 195-196.

Lastly, Ortelius follows this historiographic discourse in the opening passages of the *Parergon*, where he famously wrote that “geography is the eye of history.”⁵⁹ The Antwerp mapmaker decided to separate maps of the *Parergon* from those in the *Theatrum* in 1579, thus clearly demarcating the past from the present.

As expressed by Alexandra Walsham, the conflicts of the Reformation unleashed the “study and writing of sacred history in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe on both sides of the emerging religious divide.”⁶⁰ Textual evidence from the period suggests that two of the values of this historiographic boom – precision and chronology – were prioritized by Catholic and Protestant humanists alike. These shared principles indicate that *Palestinae* offered a sacred history that could be appreciated by readers from every major confession. For both Catholics and Protestants, precisely defining the distant topography and ancient history of *Palestinae* made the Holy Land spiritually and ideologically close. The audience of the map used a common *Christian* epistemology to begin their exegeses.

Differences in Consumption

Catholics and Protestants certainly approached *Palestinae* with a common way of reading the map, but important differences likely qualify this picture of unity. Disparate understandings of iconography, terrestrial sacrality, and imaginary pilgrimage suggest

that Protestant and Catholic readers only shared this Christian epistemology to define the terms of their consumption. The sacred topography and religious history of this epistemology were then conceptualized differently across confessions. To be sure, how one interpreted the map was not absolutely constrained by confession, but differing comments between Ortelius’ Protestant and Catholic audience suggest that confession likely played a role in determining the subjective significance of the biblical cartography.⁶¹

Ortelius’s readers likely approached the map with different understandings of iconography. Some Catholics of the Counter-Reformation preserved and even emphasized religious iconography as devotional material.⁶² Meanwhile, we might also say that visualizations of the Holy Land juxtapose the general iconophobia in Reformed doctrine. Justine Walden points out that the Marian exiles placed maps in the 1560 Geneva Bible despite working in an iconophobic environment, and similarly, the earliest versions of *Palestinae* were produced in a city that was ravaged by the 1566 *Beeldenstorm* only four years prior.⁶³ Philip Marnix van Sint-Aldegonde supported and described the *Beeldenstorm* as divinely-guided; “these events were due... to the manifest providence of God who wanted to show how much He detests and abhors the abominable idolatry committed around these images.”⁶⁴ For Reformers like Marnix, who likely owned

See also Walsham’s “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” especially page 902.

⁵⁹ Melion, “Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam,” 50.

⁶⁰ Alexandra Walsham, “History, Memory, and the English Reformation,” *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 4 (2012): 902.

⁶¹ These are rough generalizations. In reality, we cannot know exactly if one’s confession corresponded to one’s practice, which is particularly seen in Beatrice Groves’s study.

⁶² Marlise Rijks, “Defenders of the Image: Painted Collectors’ Cabinets and the Display of Display in Counter-Reformation Antwerp,” *Nederlands*

Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek (NKJ) / Netherlands Yearbook for History of Art 65 (2015): 62. Iconography is much more complicated in the case of early Lutheranism, which embraced much of the same paraphernalia as the Catholic church. See *Divine Diagrams: The Manuscripts and Drawings of Paul Lautensack (1477/78-1558)* (2014) by Berthold Kress, especially the introduction.

⁶³ Walden, “Global Calvinism,” 197; Cameron, *The European Reformation*, 388.

⁶⁴ Philip Marnix, “A True Narrative and Apology of What Has Happened in the Netherlands in the Matter of Religion in the Year 1566. By Those Who Profess the Reformed Religion in That Country, 1567,” in *Texts Concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands*, ed. E. H. Kossman

copies of biblical maps, these pieces flourished in an environment that was otherwise hostile to a range of aesthetic materials. Reconstructing the interpretive possibilities of *Palestinae* is more complicated than assuming that all Reformers who read the map saw in it as an absolutely neutral tool for contemplation of the religious past, but we can generalize that the map accommodated this doctrinally Reformed interpretation.⁶⁵

The readers of *Palestinae* also likely approached the map with different conceptions of terrestrial sacrality. In most Catholic devotion, the Holy Land reflects a destination for grace-conferring works and, in particular, pilgrimage.⁶⁶ Catholic pilgrimage generally heightened during the Counter-Reformation as sites like Mont Saint-Michel swelled with visitors, confirming that much of Europe still viewed some locations as innately holier than others.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the Holy Land of *Palestinae* may have presented a contradiction to Reformers whose pioneers had condemned the terrestrial sacrality of the world. Luther “disenchanted” the earth when he argued that pilgrimage to a relic site was a fruitless work that contradicted justification by faith alone, and Calvin wrote in a 1544 rebuttal against pilgrimage that “Christ abolished all distinction of places.”⁶⁸

and A. F. Mellink (Cambridge University Press, 1974), 80.

⁶⁵ Zur Shalev, *Sacred Words and Worlds: Geography, Religion, and Scholarship, 1550-1700* (Brill, 2011), 96. In particular, see Shalev’s discussion on Calvin’s interpretation of historical contemplation.

⁶⁶ N. I. Matar and Judy A. Hayden, *Through the Eyes of the Beholder: The Holy Land, 1517-1713*, Islamic History and Civilization (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 10, <https://stanford.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=513467&site=ehost-live&scope=site>. Most pilgrims to the Holy Land at this time were Muslim.

⁶⁷ Elizabeth Tingle, “Long-Distance Pilgrimage and the Counter Reformation in France: Sacred Journeys to the Mont Saint-Michel 1520 to 1750,” *Journal of Religious History* 41, no. 2 (2017): 69, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9809.12385>.

⁶⁸ Martin Luther, “The Babylonian Captivity of the Church,” in *Three Treatises*, ed. James Atkinson, trans.

However, it would be a mistake to claim that the Reformers completely scrapped pilgrimage. As Shalev contends, Calvin primarily criticized the act of worshipping relics but not the contemplation of Christ’s passion at different historical sites.⁶⁹ This reimagining of pilgrimage as an act of contemplation as opposed to grace-conferring devotion surfaces in travelogues from Protestant laity. Shalev, for example, finds the travel account of the Lutheran Leonhard Rauwolf, who practiced “silent prayer and consideration of the historical and spiritual import of the holy places [of Palestine].”⁷⁰ Although some Protestant English pilgrims traveled to the Holy Land and claimed to have experienced the holiness of Jerusalem, many differentiated their travels as “solely spiritual journey[s] modeled on the biblical image of the faithful as ‘strangers and pilgrims on earth.’”⁷¹ The Holy Land of *Palestinae* could be read in a doctrinally Reformed fashion that emphasizes the virtues of biblical history; in turn, the piece could also be read as reflecting on a truly holy space with innate sacrality.

A handful of scholars have also suggested that readers of Ortelius’ maps and similar pieces that feature the Exodus participated in *imaginary* pilgrimages, regardless of the official constraints of their confession.

Charles M. Jacobs, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970); John Calvin, “Articles by The Theological Faculty of Paris,” in *Calvin’s Tracts Relating to The Reformation*, trans. Henry Beveridge, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1844), 96, <https://calvin.edu/centers-institutes/meeter-center/files/john-calvins-works-in-english/Tracts%20Vol.%201.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Shalev, *Sacred Words and Worlds*, 96.

⁷⁰ Shalev, *Sacred Words and Worlds*, 98.

⁷¹ Beatrice Groves, “‘Those Sanctified Places Where Our Saviour’s Feet Had Trode’: Jerusalem in Early Modern English Travel Narratives,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 43, no. 3 (2012): 686, 684. Groves contends that many English protestant pilgrims differed from their Catholic counterparts only in name. These pilgrims would “relate the traditional pilgrim reaction of prayerful joy in the time-honored places, bring home relics, and record the dimensions of the holiest places.”

Melion argues that the maps of the *Parergon* guide their multi-confessional audience to contemplate the peregrinations of Church fathers and therefore take their own “imagined pilgrimages towards salvation.”⁷² Shalev joins Melion by stating that these maps carried this “literal and an allegorical function in both Protestant and Catholic biblical scholarship.”⁷³ In regard to the Exodus map of the 1560 Geneva Bible, Justine Walden writes, “The map supplied the vicarious experience of pilgrimage, another traditional aesthetic-religious experience that Protestantism cast aside,” and August den Hollander argues that via Protestant and Catholic bible maps “each reader could, for example, make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land or Jerusalem.”⁷⁴ This general claim for the rise of shared imaginary pilgrimage has three major drawbacks, the first being that it insinuates that the Reformation created a novel way to engage with scripture. In reality, vicarious pilgrimage had been a staple discourse in Catholic veneration for hundreds of years.⁷⁵ Second, the claim does not take into account the substantial rise in shrine veneration during the Counter-Reformation, which complicates the idea that this joint discourse redefined the shape of pilgrimage.⁷⁶ Third and most importantly, this claim does not correspond to what Protestant and Catholic readers of the *Parergon* say about imaginary pilgrimage. Melion cites Georg Braun and Philip Marnix as discussing imaginary pilgrimage; Braun claims that the topographer of sacred geography “can prepare travelers to familiarize themselves with places they plan to visit” while Marnix “emblemizes the figure of pilgrimage,

turning it into an elaborate *impresa* of his life’s vocation as suppliant.”⁷⁷ Both Braun and Marnix may have imagined a pilgrimage, but Braun’s was an imaginary pilgrimage in preparation for a physical one whereas Marnix’s was solely metaphorical. Montano joins Braun in this regard, having explicitly written that “his own map of Israel was intended to serve as a replacement for pilgrimage for those who could not travel and enjoy the memory of actual places.”⁷⁸ In Montano’s and Braun’s conceptions, imaginary pilgrimage certainly had a historical and contemplative quality, but it is also represented a substitute for the actual rite that would have conferred grace; in Marnix’s conception, the metaphorical pilgrimage stands alone, devoid of a “good work” and primarily rooted in historical contemplation. To say that Catholics and Protestants share a metaphorical pilgrimage does not capture the differences between these imagined journeys.

In all likelihood, the only part of consumption that the readers of *Palestinae* universally shared was a fundamental, humanistic vocabulary of space and time. With these fundamentals, Ortelius’s readers perceived the map at different points along the spectrum of interpretation, not absolutely constrained by the dogma of their faiths, but in many ways guided by them.

Consumption as Coexistence

This balance between shared and separate consumption indicates neither absolute unity nor divided interpretation. Rather, this phenomenon is best described as confessional coexistence. It is not *how* these readers worship that unites them but *that* they

⁷² Melion, “Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam,” 69.

⁷³ Shalev, “Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition,” 67.

⁷⁴ Walden, “Global Calvinism,” 197; den Hollander, “Biblical Geography,” 149.

⁷⁵ Peter Marshall, *Heretics and Believers: A History of the English Reformation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 25. Arad, “Frederick III’s Holy Land Installation

in Wittenberg during the Cultural Transition of the Reformation,” 220.

⁷⁶ Tingle, “Long-Distance Pilgrimage and the Counter Reformation in France.”

⁷⁷ Melion, “Ad Ductum Itineris et Dispositionem Mansionum Ostendendam,” 69.

⁷⁸ Shalev, “Sacred Geography, Antiquarianism and Visual Erudition,” 69.

incorporate the map into their devotional cosmos. Catholics who consumed a truly holy land used the same devotional material as Calvinists who may have believed that no parcel of land is more holy than any other.⁷⁹ If we momentarily turn away from consumption and analyze the map, we can identify how Ortelius's work makes this coexistence possible.

Palestinae allows for varied consumption by not imposing any other fundamental interpretations beyond a common epistemology of space and time, as outlined above. It plays a game of equilibrium, where it says just enough to attract a Christian audience and then remains silent so that interpretive differences have room to exist. This silence can be identified in the fact that the map and its accompanying text do not immediately bear a confessional marker; the piece also deals with the Exodus path, relatively uncontested territory in the Reformation, and comes out of an atlas as opposed to a translation of the Bible.⁸⁰ When incorporating details about the Order of the Holy Sepulcher in his explanatory for the Holy Land, Ortelius went so far as to delete the anti-Lutheran sentiment from the Order's oath.⁸¹ The author also highlights the reader in his crafting of a neutral theater. In the introduction to the *Parergon*, Ortelius writes that he and his contemporaries offer their own arguments for the location of Eden, a debate with confessional significance, but

determines instead that he "willingly give[s] leave to the learned Reader, in his discretion, to take which him pleaseth."⁸² In the language of humanism and its elevation of the self, Ortelius quietly submits the *Parergon* to its readers and their own interpretations. By ambiguity and neutrality, the map facilitates the coexistence of its consumers.⁸³

Conclusion: Consumption as Production

Upon observing the audience of the map and the unifying machinery of the piece, the process of consumption appears less like a one-way digestion of material and more like a dialogue between map and reader. *Palestinae* begins to construct a space for Christian unity that transcends temporal divisions, and by consuming the map, Ortelius's diverse readers participate in this construction. Regardless of the variety of interpretation, each member of the audience engages in a private act of devotion that entails imagining and occupying an idyllic Holy Land.⁸⁴ Employing an excerpt from Deuteronomy 8, the top-left cartouche of the map reminds its diverse audience that every Christian belongs to this space:

The Lord God will bring you into a good land, a land with streams of water into the fields and valleys. A land of wheat, barley, vines, fig trees, pomegranates, olive trees: a land of oil and honey, where without any want thou shalt eat thy bread, enjoy an abundance of all things.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ Calvin, "Articles by The Theological Faculty of Paris," 96. See also Melion and his discussion of Marnix.

⁸⁰ Granted, the atlas did come in overtly Catholic and Protestant versions, but this may have been because the original *Theatrum* and its *Parergon* were highly customizable commodities that could be curtailed to Ortelius's many audiences.

⁸¹ Shalev, *Sacred Words and Worlds*, 100.

⁸² Ortelius, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, 1608, Image 244. For this debate, see Walden or *Mapping Paradise* (2006) by Alessandro Scafi.

⁸³ It is plausible that Ortelius made deliberately neutral pieces in line with the Family of Love. See: Giorgio Mangani, "Abraham Ortelius and the Hermetic

Meaning of the Cordiform Projection," *Imago Mundi* 50 (1998): 59–83.

⁸⁴ Matar and Hayden write that European Christians "emphasized how much they belonged to the land because the Bible of the land belonged to them." Matar and Hayden, *Through the Eyes of the Beholder*, 14.

⁸⁵ Abraham Ortelius, *Palestinae Sive Totius Terrae Promissionis Nova Descriptio Auctore Tilemanno Stella Sigenensi*, Theatro Del Mondo Di Abrahamo Ortelio (Antwerp: Jan Baptista Vrients, 1608), <https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/11403456>. "Dominus deus tuus introducet te in terram bonam, terram rivoꝝ aquarum et fontium, in cuius campis montibus erumpunt fluvioꝝ abysi. Terram frumenti, ordeꝝ, ac vinearum, in qua ficus malogranata, oliveta

Ortelius picks a passage that directs the utopian promises of God onto the reader (“bring you into the land,” “thou shalt”). The implication is that the multi-confessional audience collectively belongs to this land of “oil and honey.”

The consumption of *Palestinae* defines something for the rest of the Reformation. By viewing the map, Protestants and Catholics participated in a collective construction of the past that did not have to end in iconoclastic rebellion nor trials for heresy. Some objects were savvy enough to bridge the confessional divide with the equipment of humanism. Analyzing this equipment reveals that the *Theatrum* is a theater of coexistence, and, more broadly, that our historiography of the Reformation might betray the realities of shared, Christian spirituality. Thinking about consumption also makes us reflect on production with a fresh perspective. Did the *Theatrum*'s creator intend for this unity? Perhaps Ortelius crafted his map as the refuge to all the division that consumed his town, his country, his world. Perhaps he imagined himself not as having *mapped* the migration of spiritual ancestors but as *mapping* a shared exodus.

nascuntur terram olei ac mellis. Ubi absque ulla penuria comedes panem tuum, rerum omnium abundantia perfrueris.” My translation.

Una Patria, Un Caudillo: Nationalist Propaganda in The Spanish Civil War

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This paper tracks the origins and efficacy of Nationalist propaganda during the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Francoist narratives built on established prejudices in conservative Spanish society to alter the story of the Spanish Civil War from one of military rebellion to the defense of Spain. Using violence and simple, propagandistic narratives, Nationalist forces embedded their myths in the Spanish consciousness for nearly forty years. The effects of this coordinated campaign still reverberate in Spain to this day.

Francisco Franco was a general, Prime Minister, dictator, and...film writer? In the year 1941, two years after he had crushed the last pockets of the former Republican government of Spain in a military coup, Francisco Franco wrote the script for the film *Raza*.⁸⁶ A glorified rendition of his own life, *Raza* featured a young army officer who rose to fame by fighting the leftist Spanish government. With roving mobs of leftists mercilessly gunning down innocent priests and heroically portrayed Spaniards, this movie provides unique insights into the narratives that Francoist allies espoused to the Spanish people during and after the Spanish Civil War.⁸⁷ The salacious murders of priests and anarchical portrayal of anti-Franco forces would become key tropes in Francoist propaganda. While the film seemingly exists as a comical piece of stereotypical propaganda, it represents something far more insidious. It is an early representation of Francoists' deliberate reconstruction of the history of the Spanish Civil War to justify a military coup.

The Spanish Civil War was a vicious, fratricidal conflict waged from 1936-1939. It was nominally contested between the Republican faction on the left and the conservative Nationalists on the right, led by the army and General Francisco Franco. In reality, the war was full of ambiguity and shifting sides, with in-fighting between socialists, Soviet-backed Marxists, anarchists, and moderate democrats plaguing the Republican side. The war was sparked by a pre-planned uprising of the army against the democratically-elected, left-leaning Second Republic on July 18, 1936.⁸⁸ After being initially fought to a stalemate by Republican militias, the army's superior firepower allowed them to overrun the countryside. Nazi Germany, seeing an opportunity to test their new weapons of mass murder, sent money, officers, and squadrons from the *Luftwaffe* to give the Nationalists a devastating leg-up in military capabilities. From the end of 1938 to early 1939, the Nationalists seized the last strongholds of the Republic: Barcelona and, finally, Madrid. *Generalísimo* Francisco Franco, *El Caudillo* (The Leader), would preside over Spain until 1975.⁸⁹

The dictatorial government established by Francisco Franco in the aftermath of the war needed to legitimize its existence internationally and quell internal dissent. To this end, it constructed a large-scale propaganda machine that built on themes developed during the war. The government-sponsored narrative recast the actions of the Nationalists as necessary for the salvation of Spain. In this essay, I examine the role of propaganda in propelling the Nationalists to victory. During the course of the war, Nationalist propaganda coordinated under one central theme: their war effort was a new *Reconquista* (Reconquest) of the *Patria*

⁸⁶ Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Franco: The Biography of the Myth* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 103.

⁸⁷ *Raza*, directed by José Luis Sáenz de Heredia (1941, Madrid: Cancillería del Consejo de la Hispanidad), film.

⁸⁸ Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939* (New York: Penguin Press, 2001), 55-56.

⁸⁹ For a summary of the Spanish Civil War, see Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*.

(Homeland) to rebuild traditional Spanish society under one leader, the *Generalísimo* Francisco Franco. The effects of Francoist propaganda on post-war Spain have lingered into the present-day. As a fellow officer told Franco in 1939, “*Las naciones las hacen la espada y la pluma*” (Nations are made with the sword and the pen).⁹⁰ The Francoist regime would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt the veracity of this maxim.

From General to Caudillo

General Francisco Franco Bahamonde was not the original face of the Nationalist rebellion. Among the numerous other leaders, General Mola was the mastermind of the coup, Queipo de Llano was known as the most boisterous, and General Sanjurjo was the accepted figurehead.⁹¹ Fortunate circumstances and Franco’s wily maneuvering saw him quickly position himself as the head of the conspirators. The first stroke of luck was the death of General Sanjurjo in a plane crash, just three days into the coup on July 20, 1936.⁹² This event left the rebellion without a designated leader. At this stage, the rebels controlled much less territory, industry, and men than the Republican government.⁹³ In short, the situation demanded a unified response or all the generals would be rounded up and executed after the collapse of the coup. What ultimately saved the uprising and transformed Franco into the *Caudillo* was his control of the Army of Africa.

The Army of Africa was Spain’s most effective fighting force and responsible for the accession of Franco to leader of the

Nationalist forces. Composed of the most elite units of the Spanish army, the Army of Africa had earned its epithet by serving in the Spanish territory of Morocco. As the commander of this seasoned military force, Franco possessed enormous leverage over the other generals involved in the coup. Without his troops and military equipment, the coup would almost certainly have failed. Franco’s arrival with the Army of Africa between July 28 and August 5 stabilized the rebellion and launched him into national prominence.⁹⁴ On July 29, just over a week after the death of Sanjurjo and one day after the Army of Africa began crossing the Mediterranean, opposition press from Britain was calling Franco the “leader of the Spanish rebels.”⁹⁵ In order to solidify this position as leader of the Nationalists, Franco had to win a defining victory.

The final piece in the Nationalist’s leadership puzzle fell into place with the massive propaganda victory Franco won with the Liberation of the Alcázar. The Alcázar, located in the ancient city of Toledo, was the former residence of Philip II and the heart of Spanish Catholicism.⁹⁶ For both sides, this made it an exceedingly symbolic fortress. Depending on the victor, the battle would either represent a metaphorical destruction of Old Regime Spain or the miraculous survival of God’s divine troops. The Nationalist garrison was encircled and besieged for over two months; by September, Republican press was reporting that their troops were entering

⁹⁰ Jesús Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco: La correspondencia desconocida que marcó el destino de España* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005), 91.

⁹¹ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 63, 95. For more information on Queipo de Llano’s conduct during the war, see Rúben Serém, “A Coup Against Change: Repression in Seville and the Assault on Civilian Society,” in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 115-137.

⁹² “Última hora: El general Sanjurjo, muerto en un accidente de aviación, cuando venía hacia España en aeroplano,” *La Voz*, July 20, 1936, <http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/pdf.raw?query=id:0001043983&lang=en&log=19360720-00000-00010/>

⁹³ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 96.

⁹⁴ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 117.

⁹⁵ James Cockburn, *Cockburn in Spain: Despatches from the Spanish Civil War*, edited by James Pettifer (London: Lawrence and Wishart Limited, 1986), 42.

⁹⁶ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 122.

the Alcázar itself and that victory was assured.⁹⁷

It was then that Franco made a calculated gamble, diverting the Army of Africa from their previous path towards Madrid to march straight to the Alcázar. As Antony Beevor stresses, “The defence of the Alcázar had become the most potent symbol of nationalist propaganda... To be the ‘saviour of the Alcázar’ would make his leadership of the nationalist movement unchallengeable.”⁹⁸ Franco cunningly deduced that, even though it had little military value, the Alcázar would be an irreplaceable propaganda victory to broadcast throughout Spain. On September 30, 1936, just two days after his army liberated the Alcázar, Franco was named “*Jefe del Gobierno del Estado Español... quien asumirá todos los poderes del nuevo estado*” (Leader of the Government of the Spanish State... who will assume all of the powers of the new state).⁹⁹ The propaganda victory at the Alcázar launched Franco to political supremacy for the Nationalists. The Nationalists had found their nation’s leader; they had to convince the rest of Spain that it was their nation, too.

Francoism: Defending the Nation

A primary propaganda strategy for the Nationalists was to position themselves as the defenders of the Spanish nation. One of their first moves was to legitimize themselves by forming a new government, the *Junta de Defensa Nacional de España* (National Defense Committee of Spain).¹⁰⁰ This document’s

diction established the tropes that the Nationalists employed throughout the war. As implied by the name of the government, the Nationalists claimed that they were the victims in the war and fought to protect Spaniards from a foreign (and to Francoist propagandists, communist) invasion. Framing themselves as the “defenders of Spain” ignores the fact that Nationalists were revolting against a democratically elected government but, for the Nationalists, was a necessary justification of their coup.

The language of nationalistic defense would featured heavily in all Francoist propaganda. The first line of the decree forming the government asserts that the Nationalists were fighting for “*la liberación de España*” (the liberation of Spain).¹⁰¹ The Nationalists were promising to free Spain from its alleged oppressors - the Republican government. Moreover, they were fighting for the “...*la salvación de la Patria, a la vez que por la causa de la civilización...*” (the salvation of the Homeland, at the same time for the cause of civilization).¹⁰² The statement explicitly declares that the Nationalists were defending the *Patria*, or the idea of a white, civilized, Catholic Spain returned to its imperial glory. This key facet of Nationalist propaganda was a tool that allowed Nationalists to easily highlight, and dehumanize, people who opposed them. There was no room in this imagined society for people of other races, religions, or political beliefs. In Nationalist propaganda, not conforming to the ideal of a white, masculine (or for women,

⁹⁷ Juan Blanco, “El Alcázar,” *El mono azul*, Year 1, Num. 5, September 24, 1936, <http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/pdf.raw?query=id:0003750272&lang=en&log=19360924-00000-00006/>

⁹⁸ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 121.

⁹⁹ “Sumario: Decreto número 138,” Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 32, September 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1936/032/J00125-00126.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ “Presidencia de la Junta de Defensa Nacional: Decreto número 138,” Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 32, September 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1936/032/J00125-00126.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ “Presidencia de la Junta de Defensa Nacional: Decreto número 138,” *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*.

¹⁰² “Presidencia de la Junta de Defensa Nacional: Decreto número 138,” *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*.

subordinately feminine), Catholic Spaniard was to be against Spain itself.

Citizens in Nationalist-controlled territory during the war were subjected to bombastic radio pronouncements that exhorted the Nationalists' limited, prejudiced vision of Spain. Propagandists appealed daily to Spaniards' nationalistic feelings with messages such as "...los que aspiréis a una Patria grande... ¡aquí! con nosotros" (Those of you who aspire to a great homeland... here! With us).¹⁰³ The idea was to flood their citizens with a simple narrative and hope that the repeated messaging would become a singular truth in the Spanish psyche. The narrative Nationalists peddled was that "true" Spaniards were fighting to defend the "true" Spain. This divisive but, for many conservative Spaniards compelling, rhetoric laid the foundation for dedicated loyalty to the man leading the defense of the Nationalists' perceived version of Spain.

In Nationalist propaganda, defense of the *Patria* soon became equated with loyalty to the *Caudillo*. The combination of Nationalism and loyalty to Franco, called Francoism, produced an effective blend of pathos messaging. Soon after he became head of state in 1936, chants could be heard of "*Una Patria: España. Un Caudillo: Franco*," which quickly morphed into a simply "Franco! Franco! Franco!"¹⁰⁴ The first slogan promoted an idea that the Nationalist vision of Spain would be realized through the leadership of Franco. The shift in rhetoric towards the chant of "Franco!" further radicalized the messaging by displaying Franco and his war effort was representative of the one true Spain. To follow Franco was to support the *Patria* and to deny his leadership was to be an enemy of the *Patria*.

With its clear message, the fight for nationalist Spain as portrayed by a singular leader was a simple but potent weapon for the Nationalist cause. A former Civil Governor of Alicante, Gonzálbez Ruíz, admits to travelling to the Nationalist zone:

...bajo el dominio del general Franco porque hubo un momento en que creí que un Gobierno transitorio, de poderes excepcionales, podría ser beneficioso para mi Patria.¹⁰⁵

...under the dominion of General Franco because there was a moment in which I believed that a temporary government, with exceptional powers, could be beneficial for my homeland.

The idea of the Spanish homeland returning to its previous glory resonated with many Spaniards, including this former governor. Although Ruíz later became disillusioned with the regime and was imprisoned, he was initially attracted to the Nationalist propaganda. The siren call of Francoism, which promised a return to glory for the *Patria* under the indomitable rule of Franco, was the unifying narrative that underpinned Nationalist propaganda.

The allure of Francoism was so strong that it enabled Franco to consolidate all power among Nationalist forces within seven months of his unofficial rise to leader of the Nationalist cause. On April 20, 1937 Franco unilaterally placed all conservative parties, most importantly militant groups such as the Falange and the Carlists, under one party called the Falange Española Tradicionalista de las JONS (Traditionalist Spanish Falange of the National Syndicalist Offensive Junta), to be known as the FET-JONS.¹⁰⁶ This party would work for "*la unidad y la grandeza de la Patria...*" (the unity and the grandeur of the *Patria...*) and would be ruled by one leader,

¹⁰³ Francisco Gonzálbez Ruíz, *Yo he creído en Franco: Proceso de una gran desilusión (Dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla)* (North Manchester: Heckman Bindery, Inc.), 10-11.

¹⁰⁴ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 144.

¹⁰⁵ Gonzálbez Ruíz, *Yo he creído en Franco*, 6.

¹⁰⁶ "Sumario: Decreto número 255," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, número 182, April 20, 1937, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1937/182/A01033-01034.pdf>.

Francisco Franco.¹⁰⁷ Now enshrined as the leader of the Nationalist cause, Franco swiftly worked to publicly assure fealty from other prominent members of the Nationalist rebellion. A letter from Gil Robles, the influential leader of the traditionalist party CEDA, wrote a letter two days after Franco's accession that stated, "...pongo en sus manos toda la organización...a esa deseada unificación" (I put in your hands all of the organization...to this desired unification).¹⁰⁸ The letter was promptly published in all the Nationalist newspapers in Spain as a public display of unity.¹⁰⁹

The only rebel that attempted to reject Franco's assumption of power was the leader of the Falange, Manuel Hedilla. He rejected the official decree of unity and was swiftly arrested on April 25, 1937 and condemned to death for "...subversion against the single command of nationalist Spain."¹¹⁰ As Hedilla sat in jail with his death sentence, he wrote a letter to Franco, pleading that if he were to be released he would be "...al lado de V.E. como siempre estuve, por la Unidad, la Grandeza y la Libertad de España" (...at the side of you [Franco] as I always have been, for the Unity, Grandeur and Freedom of Spain).¹¹¹ In order to spare his own life, Hedilla appealed to Franco using the rhetoric his propagandists promoted. That is, Hedilla swore loyalty to Franco in his fight to free the *Patria*. Hedilla's desperate letter highlights that other conservatives were aware of the Francoists' narratives as early as 1937. Hedilla even ended his letter with the phrase

the common motto of Francoism: "¡Arriba España!" (Arise Spain!).¹¹²

A Catholic Crusade

The reactionary vision of Spain Nationalist forces were seeking to install was grounded in reestablishing a closed social hierarchy.¹¹³ An important foundation of that hierarchy was Catholicism. Under the Republican government, the Catholic Church as an institution and as an organization in local communities had seen a dramatic reduction in powers.¹¹⁴ This primed a Catholic backlash that exploded when the rebellion broke out.¹¹⁵ From the onset of the coup, the bulk of the Church establishment in Spain backed the rebels and helped to reframe the war as a battle against anti-Catholic forces.¹¹⁶ In return, the Nationalists promised a restoration of the Church's authority in Spain. With the Church's backing, Nationalist propagandists could spin their war as a fight to save the Spanish Church from extinction.

Francoists began to speak about the *Patria* and the Church as one, united whole. In August 1936, one Catholic publication printed in all capital letters "*Leer y propagar las publicaciones católicas es obligación de todo buen ciudadano*" (To read and spread Catholic publications is the obligation of all good citizens).¹¹⁷ The concept of proper Spanish citizenship was equated with being a Catholic in Nationalist ideology. As Franco himself proclaimed in a decree, they had been fighting for:

¹⁰⁷ "Sumario: Decreto número 255," *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

¹⁰⁸ Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 62.

¹⁰⁹ Palacios, 61.

¹¹⁰ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 255.

¹¹¹ Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 67.

¹¹² Palacios, 67.

¹¹³ Helen Graham, "Writing Spain's Twentieth Century In(to) Europe," in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 3.

¹¹⁴ Helen Graham, "Reform as Promise and Threat: Political Progressives and Blueprints for Change in

Spain, 1931-6," in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 82.

¹¹⁵ Graham, "Reform as Promise and Threat," 82.

¹¹⁶ Maria Thomas, "Twentieth-Century Catholicism: Religion as Prison, As Haven, As 'Clamp,'" in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 35.

¹¹⁷ "Al Lector," *La Cruzada Católica*, no. 43, August 5, 1936, <http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/issue.vm?id=0005352270&search=&lang=en>

...el sagrado depósito de la tradición española, tenazmente conservado a través del tiempo, con su espiritualidad católica, que fue elemento formativo principal de nuestra nacionalidad...¹¹⁸

(...the sacred deposit of the Spanish tradition, persistently conserved throughout time, with its Catholic spirituality, that was the principal formative element of our nationality...)

For Francoists, if the Civil War was a defense of the Patria, and thereby of Spanish nationality, then it was a defense of Catholicism as well. According to Michael Richards, this rhetoric allowed the Nationalists to meld nationalist and Catholic discourse into one, ultraconservative message.¹¹⁹ The implication was that if one considered themselves a true Catholic, and therefore a true Spaniard, they would back Franco's government. Tellingly, the official party of the FET-JONS slogan was *Por el imperio hacia dios* (For the Empire towards God).¹²⁰ The new Spanish Empire that Franco promised to erect was intertwined with its brand of hardline Catholicism. That meant that for Francoists, attacks on the Church were attacks on the Patria itself.

The trope of the persecuted Church became a significant theme in Francoist propaganda. During the war, approximately 7,000 religious members were murdered in the Republican zone.¹²¹ These murders were

inexcusable acts, but the Franco regime seized upon them to paint all members of their Republican enemies as anti-Catholic murderers.¹²² From 1937 onwards, Nationalist propaganda routinely exaggerated assaults perpetrated against Catholic orders.¹²³ Propagandists then connected this violence to the secularizing efforts of the Second Republic to project anti-Catholicism as a driving principle for Republican fighters.¹²⁴ The plight of the Catholic Church, as the Francoists presented to the world, became a rallying point for Nationalist troops.

Franco and his followers seized their portrayal of Republicans as anti-Catholics to link them to the traditional bogeymen of Spanish society. In Nationalist propaganda, to be a Republican was to be either a Freemason, a communist, or a Jew, the frequent rhetorical targets for prejudicial, conservative Spaniards.¹²⁵ The Francoist propaganda machine weaponized this hatred of non-Catholics by fabricating a tale of a Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy to overthrow the government, which only the timely intervention of the Nationalist coup prevented.¹²⁶

Not for the first time in Spanish history, the primary target of propagandistic slander was the Jewish community. Men such as the loutish Queipo de Llano were soon promulgating that the Civil War had become the "war of western civilization against world Jewry."¹²⁷ Antisemitism became both a unifying credo for the disparate Nationalist forces and a common byword for any group

¹¹⁸ "Gobierno del Estado: Decreto 255" Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, número 182, April 20, 1937. <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1937/182/A01033-01034.pdf>.

¹¹⁹ Thomas, "Twentieth-Century Catholicism: Religion as Prison, As Haven, As 'Clamp,'" 46.

¹²⁰ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 255.

¹²¹ Thomas, "Twentieth-Century Catholicism: Religion as Prison, As Haven, As 'Clamp,'" 36.

¹²² Thomas, 37.

¹²³ Thomas, 37.

¹²⁴ Thomas, 37.

¹²⁵ Thomas, "Twentieth-Century Catholicism: Religion as Prison, As Haven, As 'Clamp,'" 36.

¹²⁶ Isabelle Rohr, "Productive Hatreds: Radical Segregationist Discourses and the Making of Francoism," in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 103.

¹²⁷ Charles Aronsfeld, *The Ghosts of 1942: Jewish Aspects of the Struggle for Religious Freedom in Spain 1848-1976* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 44.

opposing the coup.¹²⁸ Building on centuries of antisemitism in Spain, Nationalist propaganda labelled distinct Republican factions such as Basque and Catalan separatists, government officials, women, and Soviets with the terms “Jew” or “Jewish”.¹²⁹ Despite there being only 6,000 Jewish residents in Spain in 1936, Nationalists alleged that they were responsible for Spain’s recent decline in international prominence and needed to be “purged”.¹³⁰ Nationalists coupled deep-rooted Spanish suspicion of Judaism with their militant Catholicism to falsely portray the Civil War as a gallant defense Christian Europe against Soviet-inspired Judaism.¹³¹

The portrayal of the Civil War as a second *Reconquista* was one of the most deeply-embedded and persuasive propaganda tools for Nationalists. As early as October 8, 1936, the former Prime Minister of Spain wrote to Franco imploring him to make this war “...*la providencial misión de realizar una segunda Reconquista de la Patria*” (...the providential mission to carry out a second Reconquista of the homeland).¹³² The culmination of the propagandists’ virulent antisemitism and exultation of Spain’s imperial past was to brand this military coup as a second *Reconquista* of the Spanish *Patria*. When Franco unified the entire bando nacional, he retained the *Yugo y Flechas* (Yoke and Arrows) as one of the symbols of the FET-JONS.¹³³ The *Yugo y Flechas* was a well-known symbol of Ferdinand and Isabella, the monarchs during the original *Reconquista*. This symbol represented the unity their marriage brought to Spain and the martial prowess that

conquered the final Islamic kingdom on the Iberian peninsula in 1492. For Francoist propaganda, the *Yugo y Flechas* demonstrated the unity Franco hoped to bring to Spain through military force. By 1937, Nationalist propaganda books were not referring to the war as a Civil War but only as “*la actual reconquista*” (the current Reconquista).¹³⁴

The Nationalists repurposed the imagery of the original *Reconquista* to frame their own actions with *Reconquista* themes familiar to Spanish society.¹³⁵ In the place of the *conquistadores* were the Nationalist soldiers; instead of the Moorish invaders, there was the Jewish-backed government; and instead of Ferdinand and Isabella, there was the all-powerful, uniting figure of Francisco Franco. Franco characterized the actions of the Nationalists as necessary cleanses of a barbaric invader in Spanish society, just like the *Reconquista* retook Catholic Spain from the Moors. The rhetoric of the *Reconquista* spawned conversations on reviving the Inquisition, a system of political and religious oppression that existed from 1492-1834.¹³⁶ Nationalist forces utilized the language of the Inquisition to justify atrocities against their Republican enemies.¹³⁷

Violent Ends

The Francoist Reconquista frequently used terror as psychological propaganda. In Sevilla, Queipo de Llano excused the slaughter of soldiers and civilians en masse by labelling them as foreign, communist invaders.¹³⁸ Under Queipo de Llano’s

¹²⁸ Rohr, “Productive Hatreds,” 102.

¹²⁹ Rohr, 101-105.

¹³⁰ Rohr, 101-102.

¹³¹ Graham, “Writing Spain’s Twentieth Century In(to) Europe,” 4-5.

¹³² Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 55.

¹³³ “Hablar de la Falange es nombrar a España. Unidad, unidad, unidad,” The Visual Front: Posters of the Spanish Civil War from UCSD’s Southworth Collection, accessed November 6, 2018.

<https://library.ucsd.edu/speccoll/visfront/newadd21.html>.

¹³⁴ Luis de Armiñán, “Excmo. Sr. General D. Antonio Aranda Mata: General Jefe de la División de Asturias,” from the collection *Héroes de España: Siluetas biográficas de las figuras más destacadas del movimiento salvador* (Ávila: Imprenta Católica y Enc. Sigirano Díaz, 1937), 9.

¹³⁵ Rohr, “Productive Hatreds,” 102.

¹³⁶ Rohr, “Productive Hatreds,” 99.

¹³⁷ Rohr, 105.

¹³⁸ Serém, “A Coup Against Change,” 122.

command in Sevilla, the Army of Africa wantonly threw grenades into houses and its soldiers indiscriminately stabbed men, women, and children in the name of purging Marxists from the city - even though the victims were almost entirely civilians.¹³⁹ Propaganda had dehumanized Nationalists' fellow Spaniards to the extreme that their soldiers were willing to massacre civilians. In addition, the extreme violence acted as its own form of terror propaganda. Francoist repression cautioned Spaniards to submit to Nationalist domination.

Nationalist violence became a concerted effort to reform Spanish society by eliminating dissidents and keeping the general population obedient to Francoist myths. For Nationalist leaders, the destruction of thousands of supposed traitors was the necessary fire that would allow the shoots of a new Spanish empire to grow. For example, in the town of Huelva there was a 90% correlation between voting for a left-wing party in the 1936 election and being murdered by the Francoist *Reconquista*.¹⁴⁰ As Isabelle Rohr insightfully notes that the physical violence imposed by the bando nacional was "...controlling and disciplining."¹⁴¹ Nationalist troops tried to eradicate all Republican forms

of thinking. Aside from the full-scale massacres previously described, Nationalists systematically assassinated political and military leaders to silence the most influential Republican voices.¹⁴² The campaign of violence helped to establish Francoist propaganda as the only publicly acknowledged narratives.

The censorship of alternative narratives augmented the propagandistic effects of terror to foster a culture of silent capitulation. The Nationalists' Declaration of War detailed specifically how a person would be charged with subversion of the state if they failed to adhere to Nationalist propaganda.¹⁴³ Nationalist troops seized all forms of public communication in conquered territory and placed them under the jurisdiction of the Junta de Defensa.¹⁴⁴ This meant private radio programs were immediately declared illegal.¹⁴⁵ Every publication was to be reviewed by a censor and every meeting or rally without previous approval was banned.¹⁴⁶ Nationalists burned books by the hundreds and purged libraries of all dissenting materials.¹⁴⁷ In fact, any criticism of a state, military, or governmental action that could be seen as disobedience could result in arrest.¹⁴⁸ A person who spreads anti-Nationalist information,

¹³⁹ Serém, 122.

¹⁴⁰ Francisco Cobo Romero, "Los precedentes mediatos e inmediatos de la Guerra civil en Andalucía. Fractura social, polarización política y violencia en el mundo rural andaluz durante el primer tercio del siglo XX," in *Guerra Civil: Documentos y Memoria*, eds. Dolores de la Calle Velasco and Manuel Redero San Román (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2006), 237.

¹⁴¹ Rohr, "Productive Hatreds," 106.

¹⁴² Glicerio Sánchez Recio, "La causa general. Sistematización de la represión franquista," in *Guerra Civil: Documentos y Memoria*, eds. Dolores de la Calle Velasco and Manuel Redero San Román (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 2006), 134.

¹⁴³ "Hago Saber," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2)

¹⁴⁴ "Artículo Octavo," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de*

España, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2)

¹⁴⁵ "Artículo Noveno," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2)

¹⁴⁶ "Artículo Sexto, Artículo Séptimo," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2)

¹⁴⁷ Rohr, "Productive Hatreds," 106.

¹⁴⁸ "Artículo Segundo," Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2).

without exception, “*se considerarán como rebeldes... y serán perseguidos en juicio sumarísimo*” (will be considered rebels... and will be persecuted in a summary trial).¹⁴⁹ Under threat of violence, like Nationalist troops demonstrated in Sevilla, Francoist propaganda became the only official form of truth in Spain.

The acquiescence of crucial Spanish institutions was critical to the success of suppressing free speech. The Catholic Church in Spain consistently parroted Nationalist propaganda. The Bishop of Salamanca boasted in 1939, “*Teníamos un mundo de enemigos en contra, dentro y fuera de España... pero Dios en su Providencia Divina nos deparó un Caudillo de fe indomable, inteligencia preclara y ánimo esforzado*” (We had a world of enemies against us, inside and outside of Spain... but God in his Divine Providence offered us a leader of unbreakable faith, illustrious intelligence, and zealous spirit).¹⁵⁰ Even the judicial system in territories held by the Nationalists legitimized Francoist propaganda. As early as 1936, the judiciary in Valladolid declared that “*...Desde el momento en que el ejército se alzó en armas el 17 de julio último, adquirió de hecho y derecho el poder legítimo...*” (From the moment that the army rose up in arms last July 17, they acquired by right and might legitimate power).¹⁵¹ Nationalist propaganda presented by the military, the Church, and the judiciary created a deceptively convincing narrative to show to the outside world.

Propagandists worked to keep foreign powers that were potentially sympathetic to the Republican cause out of the war. Britain and France agreed to a pact of non-

intervention with Germany and Italy - who blatantly ignored it to aid the Nationalists - to prevent the Europeanization of the conflict.¹⁵² Due to its proximity and democratic character, the Nationalists were determined to ensure that the United Kingdom remained neutral. In Britain, Franco’s propaganda was hard at work to sway public and governmental opinion. In 1937, the ambassador to the United Kingdom wrote directly to Franco to inform him of a meeting the ambassador had with King George VI.¹⁵³ The goal of these talks was to “*...destruir la atmósfera creada por la propaganda roja, exponer nuestra causa y ganar la simpatía de mis interlocutores...*” (...to destroy the atmosphere created by the red propaganda, to explain our cause, and to win the sympathy of my listeners...).¹⁵⁴ The Francoists recognized that establishing their own narratives in the upper echelons of the British government was crucial to preventing British intervention in the conflict.

Francoist propaganda targeted British citizens, especially journalists, to engender sympathy and increase the pressure on British officials to remain neutral. The *Daily Mail* published a photo of Republicans using a Catholic statue as target practice and decried it as “*...an outrage which has no parallel in the photographs published...*”¹⁵⁵ The Nationalist narrative of defending Christendom resonated with the typically conservative *Daily Mail*. Authors favored by the British cabinet popularized the fanciful Jewish-Soviet scheme to destabilize Spain that Nationalists deceitfully continued to spew.¹⁵⁶ Francoist propaganda succeeded in penetrating the highest segments of British society. Aided by

¹⁴⁹ “*Artículo Quinto*,” Administración: Gobierno Civil de Burgos, *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España*, Número 3, July 30, 1936, <https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1936/003/J00009-00010.pdf> (2).

¹⁵⁰ Sánchez Recio, “La causa general. Sistematización de la represión franquista,” 136.

¹⁵¹ Sánchez Recio, “La causa general. Sistematización de la represión franquista,” 134.

¹⁵² Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 132-133.

¹⁵³ Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 70.

¹⁵⁴ Palacios, 70.

¹⁵⁵ Photo taken in August 1936 in Madrid by the Associated Press of Great Britain, Ltd. From *Shots of War: Photojournalism During the Spanish Civil War*, accessed December 12, 2018, <https://library.ucsd.edu/speccoll/swphotojournalism/m629-f02-19cln.html>

¹⁵⁶ Cazorla Sánchez, *Franco*, 90..

other factors, the British never entered the war.

Nationalist propaganda was a key component in the rebels ultimate victory over the Republican forces. Citizens terrified of being next to wind up in a mass grave were willing to, at the very least, tacitly accept the Nationalists' narratives.¹⁵⁷ The coordinated messaging, backed by the real threat of violence, helped Franco to compete on the rhetorical battlefield as his troops achieved a total victory on the ground. By early 1939, France and Britain had recognized the Francoist government and Franco himself had been congratulated by Adolf Hitler and the deposed Spanish King, Alfonso XIII.¹⁵⁸ The Nationalists were successful in driving the narrative surrounding the Civil War because Franco unified his forces, developed a propaganda discourse that elevated his own status and demonized the enemy, worked in tandem with the other Spanish institutions, and was productive abroad.

Post-War Propaganda: Repressing the Past

Nationalists continued to use propaganda narratives established during the Civil War to excuse violence in the post-war period. The Declaration of War, first issued in 1936, persisted until 1948 (and in some intransigent regions, 1951!)¹⁵⁹ Nationalists continued to carry out extrajudicial imprisonments and murders long after the war officially ended because, legally, the country remained in a state of war.¹⁶⁰ The result was a pervasive aura of fear and

suspicion in Spain through the 1940s. As one citizen lamented:

Life here is unbearable: one cannot talk, there is no freedom of expression or feeling since they 'liberated' us; this is a prison...the police presence is massive...and that's without mentioning the executions...People are executed daily on the pretext that they are reds, separatists, freemasons, anarchists, communists, republicans.¹⁶¹

In the decade following the Civil War, people were expected to speak and behave only in the ways condoned by Francoist censors. Propagandists also encouraged people to actively report suspicious characters.¹⁶² This only added to the atmosphere of terror that Franco created in his new regime.

The system of state-sponsored murder Franco constructed after the Civil War attempted to eliminate the memory of a Republican Spain.¹⁶³ Forms of terror were frequently deployed to make an example of public dissenters. The most appalling device of this was the frequent use of the garrote. This abominable form of execution, involving the slow tightening of an iron collar around the prisoner's neck, was used in executions until 1974.¹⁶⁴ When deciding who would be executed that day, Franco calmly drank his post-meal coffee and would sometimes write "*garrote y prensa*" (garrote and press coverage) next to certain victims' names.¹⁶⁵ The garrote became so associated with his regime that a movie called *El verdugo* (The Executioner) was released in 1963.¹⁶⁶ In the film, even the titular

¹⁵⁷ Graham, "Writing Spain's Twentieth Century In(to) Europe," 17.

¹⁵⁸ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 386. To see the letter to Franco honoring him with the letter, see Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 87-88.

¹⁵⁹ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 418.

¹⁶⁰ Marco, "States of War: 'Being Civilian' in 1940's Spain," 160.

¹⁶¹ Marco, "States of War: 'Being Civilian' in 1940's Spain," 174. For more details, see Note 1 on 174.

¹⁶² Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 408.

¹⁶³ Cobo Romero, "Los precedentes mediatos e inmediatos de la Guerra civil en Andalucía. Fractura social, polarización política y violencia en el mundo rural andaluz durante el primer tercio del siglo XX," 237.

¹⁶⁴ Rohr, "Productive Hatreds," 106.

¹⁶⁵ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 406.

¹⁶⁶ *El verdugo*, directed by Luis García Berlanga, (1963; Madrid: Naga Films and Zebra Films), film.

executionary is repulsed by the garrote and desperately tries to avoid using it to kill a prisoner.¹⁶⁷ That a movie was made about the garrote demonstrates how it became a symbol of fear, repression, and government barbarity in the Spanish consciousness. Franco's terror regime was a systematic government attempt to change the collective memory of its populace through force and fear.

In addition to repressing criticism through fear tactics, Francoist propaganda actively attempted to reconstruct the history of the Civil War through a Francoist lens. The regime's state propaganda reinvigorated narratives developed during the conflict. For instance, propaganda strove to recast Franco as the savior of Spain. A documentary celebrating the end of the Civil War opens with the words "*El camino de la paz: Guerra de Liberación*" (The path to peace: The War of Liberation).¹⁶⁸ The film posits that the Nationalists freed Spain from the yoke of a communist government and returned the country to glory. The film exalts Franco's victory through military might, with a shot at a military parade focusing on the *Caudillo* surrounded by gigantic signs that read, "FRANCO FRANCO FRANCO".¹⁶⁹ This parade reflected an earlier parade thrown just after the end of the Civil War.¹⁷⁰ Following that ceremony, the King of Spain bestowed upon Franco la Real y Militar Orden de San Fernando (The Royal and Military Order of Saint Fernando) to celebrate the "...caudillo que tan brillantemente salvó a España..."¹⁷¹ He was framed in propaganda as the icon responsible for the liberation of Spain who

would ensure Spaniards' continued freedom from the horrors of communism.

After the war, Francoists continued to use the alleged threat of Judeo-Marxism to justify the dictatorship's methods. The same documentary that lauded Franco's "*Victoria que recobraba una Patria*" (Victory that recovered a Patria) displayed "*escenas de la ocupación de Guadalajara, por los marxistas procedentes de Madrid...*" (Scenes from the occupation of Guadalajara, by the Marxists coming from Madrid).¹⁷² Francoists became convinced that communism was a mental state, with a professor of psychiatry studying the "*psiquismo del fanatismo marxista*" (psychology of Marxist fanaticism).¹⁷³ The regime resorted to grotesque methods to combat this alleged mentality, stealing 12,043 children from their mothers for reeducation and purging the bourgeois professions.¹⁷⁴ The regime attempted to train Spaniards' from a young age to believe the myth of Francoist salvation from invading Marxism.

The onset of the Cold War necessitated the acceptance of Francoist propaganda by the Western world. As World War II dragged on into 1943, Franco understood that his Nazi allies, whom he had implored to let him join the war, were on the verge of collapse.¹⁷⁵ In an attempt to recast his support of the Axis Powers, Franco wrote an extraordinary letter to Winston Churchill. In it, he warned because of "*el poder insidioso del bolchevismo, debemos tener muy en cuenta el hecho de que el debilitamiento o la destrucción de sus vecinos aumentará considerablemente la ambición y el poder de Rusia*" (the insidious power of Bolshevism, we should keep close in mind the fact that the

¹⁶⁷ *El verdugo*, 1963.

¹⁶⁸ *Spanish Civil War 1930-1939*, in British Pathé Digital Film Collection, <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/spanish-civil-war-4>.

¹⁶⁹ *Spanish Civil War 1930-1939*, in British Pathé Digital Film Collection, <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/spanish-civil-war-4>.

¹⁷⁰ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 401.

¹⁷¹ Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 97.

¹⁷² *Spanish Civil War 1930-1939*, in British Pathé Digital Film Collection, <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/spanish-civil-war-4>.

¹⁷³ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 407.

¹⁷⁴ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 407; Marco, "States of War: 'Being Civilian' in 1940's Spain," 163.

¹⁷⁵ Beevor, *The Battle for Spain*, 417-418

weakness or destruction of its neighbors will increase Russia's ambition and power considerably).¹⁷⁶ This explicit attempt to play on the fear of communism was effective. The Western allies - notably The United Kingdom, France, and The United States - elected to not invade the Spanish dictatorship and instead ignored Franco's fascist ties.¹⁷⁷ Franco seized the initiative to proclaim himself the first defender of Europe from communism.¹⁷⁸

Francoist propaganda decrying communism was one of the principal reasons the Western Allies, crucially the United States, continued to support Franco's regime in the years following World War II. Propagandists positioned Spain as part of the new Western order fighting the specter of communism. As one Francoist poster alleged, "*Cerebros y brazos Europeos preservan a Europa del Bolchevismo*" (European brains and arms preserving Europe from Bolshevism).¹⁷⁹ For decades, this strategy was effective abroad. Bernard Knox, an American enlistee for World War II, told an army doctor that he had been wounded fighting for the government in the Spanish Civil War. The doctor's snarling reply was "You mean the Goddam Reds."¹⁸⁰ Here was an American army doctor disdaining a man currently signing up to fight fascism because he had fought fascism in the past! This evidenced the cumulative, and convincing, effect of Franco's propaganda. After subduing the domestic front, Franco successfully presented to the world his new Spain as one

that had taken on the trial of communism and won.

The repercussions of Franco's domestic stranglehold on the truth, and Western leaders' complicity in their geopolitical strategy, are still palpable in contemporary Spain. The binary Franco created, where anyone who disagreed with his version of being "Spanish" was an enemy of Spain, has lingered to this day.¹⁸¹ This message, while a lie, was much easier to swallow than the complex reality of the Spanish Civil War.¹⁸² Francoist propaganda is still circulated in conservative media circles in present-day Spain.¹⁸³ A recent effort to have Franco's body exhumed from a memorial honoring the dead of the Civil War, the *Valle de los Caídos* (Valley of the Fallen), took years and needed a government bill and Supreme Court ruling before it was finalized.¹⁸⁴ 45 years after the death of Franco, certain segments of Spanish society still cling to the myths of Francoism.

I once lived just outside Toledo, that city of Franco's great propaganda victory in 1936, and took the bus into the city center every day. I would pass the Infantry Academy located across from the city daily. Inscribed in huge letters on the building's façade is the Francoist phrase "*Todo por la Patria*" (Everything for the *Patria*). Across Spain, there are reminders just like this of Spain's dictatorial past. However, more people are discarding the myths of Francoism. There is an organization exhuming victims of the

¹⁷⁶ Palacios, *Las cartas de Franco*, 220.

¹⁷⁷ Graham, "Writing Spain's Twentieth Century In(to) Europe," 6.

¹⁷⁸ Graham, "Writing Spain's Twentieth Century In(to) Europe," 6.

¹⁷⁹ "El Suelo de Europa Alimenta a Todos sus Pueblos," *Legiones y falanges*, no. 28, March 16, 1943, 2. <http://hemerotecadigital.bne.es/issue.vm?id=0053240542&search=&lang=es>

¹⁸⁰ Bernard Knox, "Premature Anti-Fascist," from *Modern American Poetry Collection*. [<http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/scw/knox.htm>]

¹⁸¹ Thomas, "Twentieth-Century Catholicism: Religion as Prison, As Haven, As 'Clamp,'" 42.

¹⁸² Julián Casanova, "Disremembering Francoism: What is at Stake in Spain's Memory Wars?" trans. Linda Palfreeman and Helen Graham in *Interrogating Francoism: History and Dictatorship in Twentieth-Century Spain*, ed. Helen Graham (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2016), 208.

¹⁸³ Casanova, 205.

¹⁸⁴ BBC Mundo, "Francisco Franco: 3 claves para entender las razones de su exhumación del Valle de los Caídos en España (y a dónde lo trasladaron)," *BBC News*, October 24, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-50144938>.

regime, having brought peace to 1,337 souls through 2014.¹⁸⁵ The younger generations of Spain were born after his death, and hence after the dismantling of his diabolically thorough propaganda tools. Spain's remembrance of the Civil War is far from rehabilitated, but a continued acknowledgment of the lies behind Francoist propaganda will help ensure that Francoism is consigned to the past.

¹⁸⁵ "Exhumación e Identificación de las Víctimas de la Guerra Civil Española y la Represión Franquista," *Asociación para la recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*, accessed December 1, 2018,

<http://memoriahistorica.org.es/que-es-la-asociacion-para-la-recuperacion-de-la-memoria-historica-armh-2000-2012/>.

Ostpolitik's Critic and Champion: The Role of Henry Kissinger in Shaping West Germany's Eastern Policy

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Acknowledgements Special thanks to Professor Steven Press for teaching me about Cold War Germany in Spring 2019, as well as to Dr. Niall Ferguson and Alice S. Han for inspiring my interest in diplomatic history and for generously giving me access to their archival materials on Henry Kissinger.

The expansion of East-West relations under the direction of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt posed a serious challenge to the diplomatic leadership of the United States. Ostpolitik, Brandt's new policy of rapprochement with East Berlin and Moscow, sparked a mixture of alarm, suspicion, and envy during the Nixon presidency, just as French President Charles de Gaulle's search for a more independent foreign policy had increased transatlantic tensions during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The bluntest criticism of Ostpolitik came from Henry A. Kissinger, who had recently left academia to take the job of National Security Advisor to Nixon. This point alone is puzzling. Why was Kissinger, a champion of Cold War détente, wary of its European counterpart? Kissinger feared that Ostpolitik raised the specter of German nationalism, jeopardized the Western Alliance, and complicated the building of superpower détente. He anticipated a future in which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) might become neutral or, in the worst case scenario, pivot eastward towards the Soviet Union. According to his understanding of international politics, the Soviets wanted to expand their sphere of influence into Western

Europe and would exploit any opportunity to isolate the United States from its allies.

However, when the White House faced a crisis of confidence in U.S.-West German relations in the early 1970s, it decided to bury its criticism and champion Brandt's course of action. Though they agreed that the Germans' diplomatic approach was problematic, Kissinger convinced Nixon that through back-channel negotiations and American participation in European détente, he could constrain Brandt and slow down the accelerated pace of Ostpolitik, aligning it more closely with U.S. foreign policy goals. Thirty years later, during the unveiling of Brandt's portrait at the German Historical Institute, Kissinger would exult in the glory of the Eastern policy, commending it as "a tremendous achievement of Brandt [who] dared to raise the question of German national interests, attempted to relate them and indeed succeeded in relating them to the common interests of the West."¹⁸⁶

Central to the Nixon administration's reversal of course was Kissinger's historical thinking about Germany and personal development from a scholar into a statesman. Examining the academic scholarship of a former National Security Advisor is admittedly unusual, but only because no other had come into office with an absorbing interest in the problem of German unity nor thought of himself as "a historian more than a statesman."¹⁸⁷ In the case of Kissinger, decades of intellectual reflection as a professor of international relations at Harvard University informed the direction of Nixon's Germany policy. This paper traces Kissinger's response to Ostpolitik from his initial reservation to his eventual embrace, revealing how he resolved the tension between superpower détente and intra-European Ostpolitik and maintained the strength of the

¹⁸⁶ Henry Kissinger, "Statement on the Occasion of the Unveiling of a Willy Brandt portrait by Johannes Heisig," (German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C., March 18, 2003).

¹⁸⁷ Bernard Gwetzman, "The Gloomy Side of the Historian Henry A. Kissinger," *New York Times*, April 5, 1976.

Atlantic Alliance. While the years 1969-72 mark only a sliver of Kissinger's eight-year tenure in government, they reveal how the newly-appointed statesman brought his academic ideas into the political arena. Establishing his career in the White House, Kissinger naturally fell back on his scholarship to guide his diplomacy.

Intellectual strategist

Since his graduate days at Harvard, Kissinger had been fascinated with the court diplomacy of nineteenth-century Europe. While most of his peers wrote on contemporary political trends and obsessed over the threat of nuclear catastrophe, Kissinger immersed himself in diplomatic history. He studied how key individuals from that era "transcended" – to use one of his favorite verbs – the bounds of bureaucracy and crafted a strategy based on the equilibria of geopolitics.¹⁸⁸ He was convinced that they could offer lessons to contemporary strategists and policymakers, writing in the preface to his dissertation, "I have chosen for my topic the period between 1812 and 1822 partly, I am frank to say, because its problems seem to me analogous to those of our day."¹⁸⁹ After earning his graduate degree in 1954, Kissinger remained at Harvard as a faculty member in the Department of Government and served as an associate director of the Center for International Relations. In his vast oeuvre of over ten thousand pages of text, nearly every one of his books and articles begins by setting a foreign policy crisis or question in its deeper historical context.¹⁹⁰ But unlike most historians, Kissinger's craft was "impressionist," "presentist," and "prescriptive" – as Jeremy Suri describes – making him well-suited to the role of a

foreign policymaker, whose job is to craft a coherent policy based on a sophisticated understanding of the complex forces at work in the international system.¹⁹¹ Keeping one eye always on the foreign policy world, the Harvard professor seemed poised to "transcend" his own limits and practice the rules of international diplomacy.

The eventual strategist behind Nixon's foreign policy shared some noteworthy similarities to his German counterpart. Kissinger and his family left the Bavarian city of Fürth for New York in 1938, the same year Brandt lost his citizenship for fleeing the Nazi regime and escaping to Norway. And just as Kissinger came to admire his adopted country, Brandt learned from the social democratic ideas spreading through Scandinavia, a region that claimed to have found a middle road between socialism and capitalism. When Brandt returned to Germany after the Second World War, he concluded his stint in journalism and entered politics. Like Kissinger, his political rise was meteoric. He became governing mayor of Berlin in 1957 – where he witnessed the erection of the Berlin Wall – and served as foreign minister in 1966. After two failed attempts, his social democratic party finally won enough votes in 1969 to form a coalition government with the Free Democratic Party. The start of Brandt's chancellorship coincided with the appointment of Kissinger as National Security Advisor in 1969. Their emergence on the political stage in West Germany and the United States explains, to a significant extent, why 1969 was the year that determined the course of détente. Above all, Kissinger and Brandt shared a deep understanding of Germany's historical trajectory. They were conscious of Germany's past and sharply

¹⁸⁸ Mario del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Cornell University, 2010), 46.

¹⁸⁹ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

¹⁹⁰ Hal Brands and Jeremi Suri, *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 22.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 23.

focused on its present, although they approached the question of German reunification from different vantage points. Kissinger took the traditional view that West Germany had to adhere to the Atlantic Alliance to achieve unification, and would only risk isolating itself by conducting an autonomous policy. Brandt, on the other hand, took a revisionist view.

Brandt's revisionist approach

Brandt's predecessors in the Fifties and Sixties had opted to ostracize the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and threatened to cut off diplomatic ties with any country that recognized the socialist regime in defiance of its Hallstein Doctrine.¹⁹² However, this confrontational stance failed to increase the prospect of unification, making West Germans impatient with the rigidities of the Cold War, frustrated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and increasingly afraid of nuclear war. West European bilateral negotiations with the USSR had already begun when French President Charles de Gaulle visited Moscow in 1966, but they accelerated in pace and expanded in scope under the direction of Brandt. The new chancellor abandoned Bonn's outdated isolation campaign and spearheaded a period of détente with the Eastern neighbours.¹⁹³ He wanted to expand the existing contacts – which were limited to the Pass-Agreement, some forms of trade, and clandestine deals to secure the release of prisoners – in order to nurture the human connection in East-West ties and return his

country to a state of peace and autonomy from the superpowers. In Brandt's first policy declaration issued in October 1969, he recognized East Germany by its formal name, a symbolic measure that paved the way for concrete improvements in the lives of East Germans.¹⁹⁴ His government went on to establish diplomatic links with countries that recognized East Germany, sign treaties with Eastern European states, and end the sterile and costly rivalry with the GDR.

Brandt's political confidant within the SPD and Secretary of State, Egon Bahr, played an instrumental role in multiple negotiations with the Soviets. Bahr wanted to break away West Germany's involvement in the Cold War to avoid it becoming a battleground between the two superpowers and make it part of a neutral security zone in Central Europe.¹⁹⁵ As wits have remarked, the Germans' two greatest fears were that the United States would not defend from the Soviets, and that the United States would, turning Europe into the next battlefield for the superpowers.¹⁹⁶ Together, Brandt and Bahr postponed the original goal of Ostpolitik for another more tactful agenda. "Reunification," Bahr said in his famous Tutzing speech in July 1963, would not be a single act, but "a process involving many steps and many stations."¹⁹⁷ He suggested that the best way forward was to create change through closer political cooperation with East Germany on the grounds that "*kleine Schritte sind besser als keine*" (a pun in German for 'small steps are better than none.')

¹⁹² The Hallstein Doctrine constrained East Germany's ability to secure diplomatic recognition outside the camp of socialist countries.

¹⁹³ Bonn was the capital of West Germany from 1949 to 1990. Following reunification, Berlin became the capital of the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany.

¹⁹⁴ Statement by Willy Brandt before the Bundestag, Bonn, October 28, 1969. *United States-Department of State, Documents on Germany 1944-1985* (Washington: Department of State, Department of State Publication 9446, 2015).

¹⁹⁵ Egon Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit* (München: K. Blessing, 1996).

¹⁹⁶ M.E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 12.

¹⁹⁷ Egon Bahr, "Change through Rapprochement" [Wandel durch Annäherung], Speech delivered on July 15, 1963 at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, *German History in Documents and Images*, Vol. 9, Two Germanies, 1961-1989. (German Historical Institute: Washington, D.C.).

The Soviets, under the direction of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and his Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, were intrigued by the prospect of dealing with a left-leaning government in West Germany for the first time since the 1930s.¹⁹⁸ An agreement directly between the capitals, Bonn and Moscow, presented an opportunity to exclude the United States from the resolution of a major Cold War issue and, in the process, drive a wedge in the transatlantic relationship between West Germany and the United States. The timing was opportune, as the USSR was reorienting its foreign policy, including opening negotiations with the People's Republic of China over a series of border clashes in 1969. Securing Brandt's acceptance of the post-war borders in Europe could relieve pressure on both fronts at the same time, countering any leverage Washington might get from improving relations with China.

Kissinger's reservations about Ostpolitik

The Nixon administration held deep-felt reservations about the new government in Bonn and the direction of its Eastern policy. That became apparent from its very first meeting with the new West German government in October 1969. Bahr announced that the FRG would henceforth exercise a greater deal of self-reliance and would not inquire every two months into whether the Americans "still love us." Kissinger replied, "Thank God," but internally the White House was anxious about the Federal Republic acting as a "more independent ally of the US."¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless,

Brandt had strategically sent Bahr to meet with Kissinger, rather than the Secretary of State William Rogers, to create a confidential channel of communication between the diplomats. It was one of several backchannels Kissinger ran to bypass the Department of State. Once out of office, Kissinger explained his preference for conducting diplomacy in private to a reporter at *Der Spiegel*: "There are just some things that I think you have to do in secrecy."²⁰⁰ It also gave the Germans the feeling of being in a privileged position, obliging them to keep the White House "meticulously informed" about developments.²⁰¹ As Brandt admitted during his visit to Washington in April 1970, "Kissinger's interest in our Ostpolitik was lively but not untinged with skepticism. I gained the impression – one which occasionally recurred in later years – that he would rather have taken personal charge of the delicate complex of East-West problems in its entirety."²⁰² Two months later, Kissinger confirmed Brandt's suspicions in a frank conversation with the German undersecretary of state Paul Frank: "Let me tell you something. If there is going to be a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, then we will carry it out."²⁰³ From these conversations, it is clear that Kissinger preferred détente to take place through bilateral negotiations so that he could control (and take credit for) its development.

However, a more complete explanation for this preference for superpower détente over regional détente comes from Kissinger's theory of geopolitics. According to Stanley Hoffmann, one of his most incisive critics and contemporaries at

¹⁹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), chapter 13.

¹⁹⁹ Note from Egon Bahr to Willy Brandt, October 1, 1969. Gottfried Niedhart, "Ostpolitik," *1968: The World Transformed*, ed. Caroline Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (Washington, D.C: German Historical Institute, 1998), 180.

²⁰⁰ Henry Kissinger, "Ich habe Bismarck studiert und bewundert," *Der Spiegel*, July 31, 1978.

²⁰¹ Henry Kissinger, "Memorial Remarks for Egon Bahr," September 17, 2015, Henry A. Kissinger website,

<https://www.henryakissinger.com/remembrances/memorial-remarks-for-egon-bahr/>.

²⁰² Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 284.

²⁰³ Frank Paul, *Entschlüsselte Botschaft: Ein Diplomat macht Inventur* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 287.

Harvard, Kissinger had a “manically bipolar” foreign policy. The real danger, therefore, was selective détente in Europe, whereby the Soviet Union would offer different concessions to NATO states to loosen the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and undermine American leadership in Europe. The USSR would be particularly eager to make the United States appear to be an obstacle to calming tensions. So while Kissinger favored a détente line (despite facing critics that compared the policy to 1930s appeasement), he opposed intra-European détente. For him, superpower détente developed logically from a bipolar view of international relations, whereas regional détente signaled the onset of a multipolar system in which the bargaining power was distributed among several countries, threatening the U.S.-Soviet hold on power and European stability. This assessment challenges Jeremy Suri’s analysis of the scholar-turned-statesman, which argues that détente was part of Kissinger’s plan to convert the Cold War struggle into a multilateral set of Great Power negotiations.²⁰⁴

In fact, Kissinger fiercely resisted the transition to a multipolar world, as he believed it would undermine the influences and privileges of the United States, which he had been appointed to defend. “It is in our interest,” he remarked in 1973, “to keep the present world going as long as possible.” The published version of Kissinger’s doctoral dissertation, *A World Restored*, also reveals his preference for a bipolar status quo. The book chiefly comments on the post-Napoleonic order in Europe, but the Cold War lies in the subtext. The principal players in the narrative are the Austrian foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, who built an order stable enough to span a century of relative peace from Napoleon’s defeat at

Waterloo in 1815 to the outbreak of the First World War (interrupted only by the brief Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71). In his description of Metternich’s achievement in constraining Napoleon, Kissinger writes, “its skill did not lie in creativity but in proportion, in its ability to combine elements it treated as given.”²⁰⁵ Deft diplomats, rather than revolutionaries, confront the world as it is. Kissinger – steeped in nineteenth-century political history and balance of power theory – opened a dialogue with the Soviet Union and China not to overcome the Cold War, but to manage and even preserve it.

Specifically, Kissinger sought to maintain what he considered to be the “legitimate order” because it contained the USSR and limited chaos and conflict to the periphery.²⁰⁶ As Coral Bell defines it, superpower détente was “a mode of making the contest less dangerous, moving it back from the nuclear brink.”²⁰⁷ By defining it here as a “mode”, Bell underlines the essential point that détente did not imply an end to the contest for diplomatic influence. So long as the United States and the Soviet Union considered the system to be legitimate, they could compete for influence all they liked, but the world would remain free of mayhem and “revolutionary chieftains.” Consequently, the essential task of the statesman according to Kissinger was to maintain an orderly international system through a display of strength. “It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle international disputes if there is ‘good faith’ and ‘willingness to come to an agreement,’” Kissinger wrote. To play détente right, the United States had to act from a position of strength and avoid the appearance of weakness. Ostpolitik’s chief shortcoming, by contrast, was that it made the West look vulnerable.

²⁰⁴ Brands and Suri, *The Power of the Past*, 29.

²⁰⁵ Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 82.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁰⁷ Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 6.

Kissinger on the German Question

Previous West German governments, especially under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer (1949-63), treated the East with hostility and centered the nation firmly in the west. Critics at the time called the Federal Republic “an almost totally compliant satellite of the United States,” but Kissinger admired its steadfast resolve.²⁰⁸ In his estimation, “the great strength of Adenauer was that he had a great concept and he did not deviate or maneuver, he kept steadily on course.”²⁰⁹ By contrast, Kissinger was disappointed with the present German leaders, who he believed lacked clarity of thinking in their foreign policy.²¹⁰ He was particularly suspicious of Brandt’s social democrats (after years of center-right leadership in the post-war nation) because he worried that they might become “so engaged in their Eastern policy that their commitment to West European unity may decline.”²¹¹ Kissinger was alert to this danger because he refused to interpret German reunification independently of the Cold War context. “As with Vietnam, so with Germany,” Niall Ferguson writes in the authorized biography of the statesman, “in either case, a unification that ended up producing an enlarged Soviet satellite had to be resisted.”²¹²

Kissinger became wary about resurgent German nationalism now that the Federal Republic was independently articulating and deciding on its foreign policy. With the relaxation of the German Question could come the re-emergence of the German

Problem. In an interview with the German newspaper *Der Spiegel* a year out of office, he argued that Ostpolitik underscored the “historical danger” that Germany presents. With its central position in Europe, it could always “operate a completely separate and special policy” that would inadvertently “conjure up all the problems it had sought to avoid.”²¹³ The nation’s new self-confidence rang alarm bells in the White House. In less scrupulous hands, Kissinger wrote, Brandt’s Ostpolitik could turn into “a new form of classic German nationalism.”²¹⁴ Raising further concern, the Social Democrats began to depict themselves as the truly national party by claiming to reunite Germany through first recognizing the reality of its division. The most influential German newspapers *Der Spiegel* and *Die Zeit*, in turn, portrayed the center-right parties – The Christian Democrats (CDU) and its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CSU) – as separatists who used the rhetoric of unity but practiced the policy of permanent division. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger’s like-minded confidant on the National Security Council, warned: “If the political argument between German parties became increasingly over which was the greatest nationalist – or the greatest traitor – it would be a most unpleasant return of a 40-year-old tragedy.”²¹⁵ A German-born Jew, Sonnenfeldt shared Kissinger’s fatalism about German politics. Overall, the aspects of Ostpolitik that most worried Kissinger were unintended consequences, revealing his tendency to

²⁰⁸ Alistair Horne, *Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 113.

²⁰⁹ Memo of conversation between Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Kissinger, June 22, 1972. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121982>.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Visit by Willy Brandt’s Emissary, Egon Bahr,” October 20, 1969, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, 103.

²¹² Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger: 1923-1968: The Idealist* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 703.

²¹³ Kissinger, “Ich habe Bismarck studiert und bewundert.”

²¹⁴ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 409.

²¹⁵ Memo from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger on Sonnenfeldt’s trip to Germany and candid conversation with Berndt von Staden, October 16, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 684, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. VII, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d128>.

speculate about the long-term ramifications of present policy on geopolitics.

Excessive contacts with the East and the negotiation of a series of Eastern treaties in quick succession seemed to revive old fears that Germany would revert to wavering between East and West. It appears that historical memory of the Rapallo Treaty, in which the German pendulum swung eastward, cast a shadow on Kissinger's impressions of German foreign policy. Signed in 1922 between Soviet Russia and the Weimar Republic, the Rapallo Treaty restored diplomatic relations between the countries and renounced their territorial and financial claims against each other. The "comrades in misfortune," as Winston Churchill referred to Russia and Germany, had been excluded from the Versailles settlement and established clandestine military cooperation, which continued until Hitler came to power. Russia's separate deal with Germany symbolized for the Western powers "the ultimate act of perfidy... a nefarious secret dealing."²¹⁶ As early as 1965, while pondering the problems besetting the Atlantic partnership, Kissinger wrote that "a so-called Rapallo policy – a change of fronts toward the East" remained a possibility if Germany felt its national aspirations were being thwarted by the Alliance.²¹⁷ "From Bismarck to Rapallo," he elaborated in his memoir, "it was the essence of Germany's nationalist foreign policy to maneuver freely between East and West."²¹⁸ In the years since the Second World War, American and German policy had countered this destabilizing tradition by grounding the Federal Republic firmly within the Western sphere of influence, including within the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. Kissinger's years of studying

European history had evidently cautioned him against German-Russian collaboration.

Aside from these historical considerations, Kissinger's unease naturally stemmed from fears that Ostpolitik would upstage the Nixon administration. The White House would not stand on the sidelines while the Germans and Soviets engaged in promising dialogue and took charge of Nixon's proclaimed "era of negotiations." Kissinger wanted to lead détente and take credit for securing peace, to be the "indispensable broker" between the opposing regimes. "When Nixon asked about his political future he was really seeking confirmation of his indispensability," Kissinger recalled in his memoir.²¹⁹ "With respect to Europe he expected to hear me reaffirm the article of faith of his political apprenticeship: that American leadership remained central."²²⁰ Since Kissinger's job as a foreign policymaker was to reassert American leadership, he could not let the Germans be the driving force behind transforming East-West relations from confrontation to negotiation.

East-West reconciliation

Naturally, Brandt's conciliatory approach to the East raised concerns in Washington about his commitment to the Western alliance, but he did not seek to replace the Westpolitik of his predecessors with Ostpolitik. Indeed he understood that negotiations would only be successful if Germany remained firmly orientated in the West. His main objective was to treat East Germany as a neighbor rather than a satellite state. In March 1970, Brandt met the Prime Minister of the GDR Willi Stoph in Erfurt, a city close to the border. Even though no

²¹⁶ Angela E. Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 7.

²¹⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), 211.

²¹⁸ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 409

²¹⁹ Brands and Suri, *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft*, 28.

²²⁰ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 382

major agreement resulted, the fact that the leaders of a divided Germany had met and talked and were greeted by thousands of East German cheers was a major success in diplomatic symbolism (see fig. 1).

Moreover, the majority of West Germans supported Brandt's emphasis on improving inter-German dialogue rather than taking a principled stand on reunification, as the results of the 1972 election (which saw an unprecedented 91 percent turnout) indicated. With a slightly more comfortable parliamentary margin, Brandt was able to reach a more substantial agreement with the GDR this time. The Basic Treaty, concluded in December of that year, granted de facto legal recognition to the GDR, recognizing "two German states in one German nation."²²¹ Permanent legations, rather than embassies, were opened in both Germanies to underline the unique nature of relations. This development paved the way for the recognition of both Germanies as full members of the United Nations in September 1973. Even while they made breakthroughs with the East, the Social Democrats remained anchored in the West through their continued commitments to NATO and West European integration and their back-channel communications with the Nixon administration.

What Kissinger failed to appreciate was that Brandt's government was making a deliberate effort not to repeat Germany's historic folly. Its ambitious foreign policy may have recalled Germany's historic behavior, but in reality it set out to confront its dark past. With his unstained record, Brandt marked a break with the compromised pasts of his predecessors, including former Nazi party member Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger. He wrote

in his memoir *My Life in Politics* that he wanted to represent a new German nation that was "liberated" rather than "conquered."²²² He departed from his predecessors' stance of "benevolent ignorance" by approaching Germany's past with honesty and realism.²²³ In contrast to Chancellor Adenauer – whose government failed to purge former Nazis from public life and resisted the extension of the statute of limitations against Nazi war criminals – Brandt intentionally confronted Germany's dark past by acknowledging the division of Germany, accepting the post-war borders, and attempting to atone for German crimes.

During a state visit to Poland in December 1970, he fell to his knees before a memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising (see fig. 2). The iconic image – widely circulated within the international press – received criticism from segments of the parliamentary opposition for shaming the nation. But Brandt's moving act represented an attempt to grapple with Germany's past. There are two German words for reconciliation, *Versöhnung* and *Aussöhnung*, one has emotional depth while the other conveys a practical aspect. Brandt's pursuit of reconciliation reflected both meanings because he combined moral imperative with pragmatic interest. "I never forget in all this that it was Hitler's 'Greater Germany' that brought about such unspeakable misery, above all to Eastern Europe," he wrote.²²⁴ Just as Kissinger's foreign policy drew on his historical training, Brandt's case for reconciliation with Poland was inspired by history. Both statesmen steered a foreign policy course that was propelled by the force of the past.

²²¹ "The Basic Treaty" [Grundlagenvertrag], December 21, 1972, *German History in Documents and Images*, Vol. 9, Two Germanies, 1961-1989 (German Historical Institute: Washington, D.C.).

²²² Brandt, *My Life in Politics* (New York: Viking, 1992), 250

²²³ Carole Fink and Bernd Schäfer, *Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 270

²²⁴ Brandt, *People and Politics*, 183.

Furthermore, in the Moscow treaty of August 1970, West Germany and the USSR renounced the use of force and declared the existing borders in Europe to be “inviolable” (*unverletzlich*).²²⁵ The agreement recognized the 1945 Oder-Neisse border between Poland and the GDR, and thus conceded the loss of most of old Prussia and Pomerania. That Bonn forswore its nationalist claims in return for intangible gains – the easing of inter-German contacts and an approved political atmosphere – reflects the government’s deep convictions to normalize relations between the two states. In fact, renouncing its right to self-determination reflected a new form of German nationalism that was a far cry from classic German nationalism, which aggressively expanded its territory. German nationalism in this period, best described as an increased self-confidence in the Federal Republic’s ability to direct foreign policy, was not the aggressive chauvinism that had characterized Germany’s behavior in the first half of the twentieth century. By the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, West Germans were no longer chanting “Deutschland über alles,” a version of the German national anthem prized by the Nazis, but “détente über alles.”²²⁶

Change of Plan

Ultimately, Kissinger set aside his skepticism and supported Brandt’s course of action. The change in attitude was prompted by the leaking of a number of reports by anonymous sources or low-ranking officials throughout 1970 citing White House reservations about Ostpolitik. For example, an article in the German newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* alleged that Helmut Sonnenfeldt

(known as “Kissinger’s Kissinger”), was visiting Germany because a major disagreement had arisen over the Berlin negotiations. The story was spurred on by Horst Ehmke, head of the chancellery in Bonn, who claimed that the Soviets had made progress on the Berlin proposals, but the Americans were stalling because they opposed Ostpolitik. After his meeting with Brandt and Bahr in October 1970, Sonnenfeldt denounced the article as “wholly wrong.”²²⁷ However, his true feelings about Ostpolitik came out in a private conversation with Berndt von Staden, who headed the Political Department of the German Foreign Office and would later serve as Ambassador to the United States in 1973-79. Sonnenfeldt confessed, “I saw a fundamental problem in the evident contradiction between Soviet and German interpretations of what was being done.”²²⁸ The Soviets believed the negotiations would recognize the status quo and endorse Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, whereas the West Germans thought improving their relationship with the East and making life more bearable for their neighbors would change the status quo. Two months later, *The New York Times* reported that Bonn and Washington were on the verge of a crisis due to a “constellation” of leading American officials raising alarms about West German attempts to seek normal relations with the Communist Bloc.²²⁹

Independent of criticisms from the White House, the U.S. media also voiced objections to Ostpolitik. Considering the exploits of German militarism over the twentieth century, the status quo did not seem so bad to American journalists. The left-leaning magazine *The Nation* described the

²²⁵ “The Moscow Treaty,” August 12, 1970, *German History in Documents and Images*, Vol. 9, Two Germanies, 1961-1989, (German Historical Institute: Washington, D.C.).

²²⁶ Josef Joffe, “The Myth of Deutschland über Alles,” *Foreign Policy*, November 5, 2009, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/05/the-myth-of-deutschland-uber-alles/>.

²²⁷ Memo from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, October 16, 1970.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ David Binder, “Strain in U.S.-Bonn Relations Reported,” *New York Times*, December 20, 1970.

superpowers as “watching developments with interest – and a certain trepidation,” while *The National Review* (a center-right magazine more representative of the views of the Nixon administration) had an even more negative reaction.²³⁰ It depicted Brandt as a spineless politician under the spell of “radicals” who wanted to appease the East and make Germany a neutral party in the Cold War. The article warned that Ostpolitik would ultimately erase the line between the free world and totalitarian regimes, destroying Western defense and risking Soviet penetration of Europe.

At times Nixon and Kissinger did not want to conceal their concerns about the potentially divisive consequences of Ostpolitik. In his essay on this subject, Holger Klitzing writes that while they were “embarrassed by such leaks,” they treated them as “convenient ways for conveying messages to Bonn that the White House could not utter in public.”²³¹ Nevertheless, the press leaks and news reports damaged Brandt’s confidence in U.S.-West German relations and put the relationship on the verge of a crisis, forcing the Nixon administration to reconsider its response to the German Question. Before apprehensions permanently damaged bilateral relations, Kissinger stepped in and advised some double-talk: the United States should be agreeable to Ostpolitik in public while maintaining private misgivings out of concern for its relationship with West Germany. Consequently, when Brandt visited Washington in April 1970, looking visibly worried about America’s response to Ostpolitik, Kissinger offered his reassurances. He explained that the White House did indeed have reservations, but that it would not attempt to change the basic course of

Ostpolitik. He also offered to comment on the specific terms of his negotiations with the East. Brandt was relieved to leave Washington with a public endorsement of his overall policy, having garnered one from the other Western allies.

To “mute the charge” that the White House did not fully support Ostpolitik and complete the reconciliation, Kissinger urged Nixon in July 1970 to receive the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. For the President not to receive Scheel would be interpreted as a “serious affront” by the West German government and “in their eyes it would expose the lack of genuine US support at a time when it is most needed,” according to Kissinger. Scheel was also the chairman of Brandt’s small coalition partner, the Free Democrat Party (FDP), which had suffered in the recent German election. Negotiations with the Soviets were a thorny issue within the FDP and some members of the party left over it. Kissinger advised Nixon that the United States has no interest in “wrecking the German coalition – however fragile it is – because a CDU/FDP alternative would be no more sturdy at the moment.” It is clear from this memo that stability in German politics remains one of Kissinger’s foreign policy priorities, though he had to work hard to convince Nixon, who scribbled in the margins of the memo, “I do not agree. Any non-socialist government would be better.”²³²

The National Security Council subsequently clarified its renewed policy towards Germany in November 1970. The memorandum stated that one of the United States’ principal objectives was “to counteract any impression in the FRG that our longer term commitment to the western alliance is in

²³⁰ “The Two Germanys: A Beginnings,” *The Nation*, April 6, 1970; Norbert Muhlen, “Willy Brandt Turns East,” *The National Review*, June 30, 1970.

²³¹ Holger Klitzing, “The Nixon Administration and Ostpolitik,” in Fink and Schaefer, *Ostpolitik, 1969-1974*, 86.

²³² Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, July 17, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NSC Files, Country Files, Europe, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. V. Secret, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d100>.

doubt.”²³³ Nevertheless, Kissinger urged Nixon to limit official endorsement of Ostpolitik to general support for the improvement of the Federal Republic’s relations with the East. He advised the President to avoid approving specific West German actions lest the United States be held responsible for German negotiations ending poorly.²³⁴

The Atlantic Alliance

Though it might seem that the reversal in the Nixon strategy towards Ostpolitik was a hurried response to press leaks, it was informed by years of reflection on the Atlantic Alliance by his national security advisor. Kissinger came to view Brandt’s revisionist policy as “inevitable” — an adjective he repeats multiple times in his memoir to explain his reluctant backtracking — because the White House was unable to offer a viable alternative for resolving the German problem.²³⁵ Derailing Brandt’s agenda would require a massive intervention in West German internal politics that could jeopardize the transatlantic alliance and alienate America’s allies. It was not worth taking a risk that could so easily backfire. Had the Nixon administration attempted to sabotage Ostpolitik, it would have also played into Soviet hands by creating further disunity within NATO. Thus, Kissinger decided to cooperate in a course to which the West Germans were already committed. The best way to maintain stability within Europe was not to oppose Ostpolitik, but to support and control it.

Kissinger was also conscious of the domestic debates within West Germany over

its Eastern policy and cautious of stirring further tensions in the country. Conservative circles in the country, which were using the White House’s skepticism to bolster their attack on Brandt, argued that Ostpolitik betrayed the Constitution, which explicitly expressed a commitment to work towards German reunification by accepting the permanent division of the nation.²³⁶ The leader of the opposition, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), even moved a vote of no confidence during Brandt’s chancellorship, which was lost by a mere two votes. Rainer Barzel accused Brandt of tolerating the wave of “anti-Americanism” sweeping West Germany and, in an interview explaining his party’s position at the time, said “I was ready to agree to the truth of Brandt’s *modus vivendi*...but we were not ready to renounce the German right to self-determination, which Ostpolitik now entailed.”²³⁷ Kissinger, as we have seen, shared many of these concerns, but did not want to promote internal instability in Germany nor see the Grand Coalition collapse.

For the sake of the Atlantic Alliance as well, Kissinger reasoned that it was more important to work with Brandt than against him. Since 1945, relations between the United States and Germany had been based on a security partnership, which guaranteed the FRG an existence independent of the Soviet Union and the United States its leading position in Western Europe. With the German question on the international agenda, the diplomatic cooperation between the two states had to be as close as possible. “The stark fact was that if America was intransigent, we risked being isolated within the Alliance

²³³ National Security Decision Memorandum 91, “United States Policy on Germany and Berlin,” November 6, 1970. Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, virtual library, (https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_091.pdf).

²³⁴ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 530.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, 410, 529, 531

²³⁶ Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 23, 1949. Vol. 8, Occupation and the Emergence of Two States, 1945-1961. *German History in Documents and Images*, Vol. 9, Two Germanies, 1961-1989, (German Historical Institute: Washington, D.C.).

²³⁷ David Binder, “Anti-U.S. Charges Stir Bonn Debate,” *New York Times*, April 6, 1973; Rainer Barzel, “Kritik an Brandts Ostpolitik,” *Zeitzeugenportal*, August 12, 2011.

and pushing Europe toward neutralism.”²³⁸ Kissinger’s commentary here suggests that the combination of selective détente and American passivity would bring about what he most feared: a Germany absorbed by its own nationalist aims. He had noticed a temptation among European leaders to appear as the peacemaker or “arbiter of a final settlement,” an ambition which encouraged dangerous conciliatory and superficial gestures towards the Soviets, which he believed undermined the possibility of the allies developing a concrete and common policy. Such a course is “suicidal for the West” and would “stimulate distrust within the Alliance,” Kissinger wrote in *The Troubled Partnership* in 1965, anticipating his reaction to Ostpolitik.²³⁹ Kissinger’s eventual endorsement of West German foreign policy demonstrated to Bonn and the rest of Europe that the United States considered Germany to be the linchpin of the transatlantic alliance.

Leveraging Détente

When the Nixon administration gave its support to Brandt’s remarkable course in early 1970 “without enthusiasm but not without confidence,” Kissinger resolved to give Ostpolitik a constructive direction by linking it to other diplomatic issues to gain bargaining power.²⁴⁰ This foreign policy tactic, known as triangular diplomacy, gave West Germany more leverage in its negotiations with the Soviets. Since the Federal Republic did not have the bargaining tools to conduct Ostpolitik “on a purely national basis,” Kissinger strengthened its negotiation power by providing it with support from the United States. “If Ostpolitik were to succeed,” Kissinger reasoned, “it had to be related to other issues involving the Alliance as a whole; only in this manner would the Soviet Union

have the incentives for compromise.”²⁴¹ Kissinger linked Ostpolitik to the separate US-Soviet negotiations over Berlin as well as courted China. In this way, Brandt’s initiative became advantageous to US diplomacy.

Washington played a key role in the Four-Power agreement that put an end to decades of tension over Berlin, a city isolated a hundred miles deep in Communist territory and vulnerable at all times to blackmail. Its road, air, and rail links to West Berlin were vulnerable to harassment by the Soviets and East Germans, interruptions that were insignificant on their own yet which together denied residents freedom and safety. Sympathizing with the plight of West Berliners, Kissinger recalled that they were unable to travel to East Berlin or even use a telephone service. He understood that the Berlin issue threatened to thwart Brandt’s political goals. His government held a thin majority in the Bundestag, and it was evident that it could not survive a contentious debate on the Eastern treaties without a solution to Berlin and inter-German problems. Moreover, the Western allies were at a significant disadvantage when it came to negotiating Berlin’s status separately because of the city’s military vulnerability. As Werner Lippert writes, “with both the West Germans and Soviets poised to make a deal, everything hinged on the Americans.”²⁴²

Kissinger planned to defend Berlin by linking its freedom to other Soviet concerns.²⁴³ Since a Berlin agreement required the approval of all four victorious powers, Kissinger was able to step to the fore. From then on, Kissinger wrote, the Germans and the Soviets realized that “linkage to Berlin was our ace in the hole,” and that they needed Washington’s support to resolve the stalemate.²⁴⁴ The USSR wanted a European

²³⁸ Kissinger, *The White House Years*, 403.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 531.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 410

²⁴² Werner D. Lippert, *The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik: Origins of NATO’s Energy Dilemma* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 91.

²⁴³ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 405.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 531.

Security Conference, but the United States was able to halt its progress as one of the occupying powers by demanding the Soviets first make progress on the Berlin issue. By making U.S. participation in a European Security Conference conditional on Soviet concessions on Berlin and the intra-German negotiations, Kissinger had blunted the Soviet strategy of selective détente. Emphasizing, if not exaggerating a little, the role of Washington, Kissinger wrote in his memoir that in this moment “we had harnessed the beast of détente,” although additional pressure from the Brandt government and the Western allies also helped to secure an agreement on Berlin.²⁴⁵

The four wartime Allied powers, represented by their ambassadors, signed the Four Power Agreement (also known as the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin) in September 1971. The U.S. Ambassador to West Germany, Kenneth Rush, rejoiced: “The bureaucrats have been foiled...[the agreement] contains virtually everything we hoped to get under our maximum demands.”²⁴⁶ He reported to Kissinger that Bahr was “in ecstasy” and pledged to give Rush “any present I would name.” He ended his letter congratulating the President and Kissinger for their “invaluable help” in resolving the post-war crisis over Berlin.²⁴⁷ While the remark reflects the usual flattery an ambassador might express to his seniors, Rush was right that without Kissinger’s intervention via linkage, the Soviets would not have taken the agreement seriously. Previously, Kissinger had worried that Ostpolitik would give the Soviets “the whip hand over German and European policy.”²⁴⁸ With the Four Power Agreement settled, Brandt’s Ostpolitik enjoyed success after

success. Nixon, employing similar imagery to his advisor, grudgingly conceded that “West Germany was no longer the Soviet Union’s whipping boy.”²⁴⁹

In another episode of linkage, the Nixon administration combined Ostpolitik with its planned opening to China to compel the Soviets into negotiating on a wider range of East-West issues. 1972 was a milestone year for Nixon’s détente policy. His presidential trip to China in February of that year was a sensation. The Soviets watched with palpable discomfort as Nixon and Mao embraced and saluted each other’s flags. It also helped that Brandt had already made overtures toward Moscow. Consequently, when Nixon visited Moscow in November, he was able to use the “China card” against the Soviets, who were now on the defensive. The escalation of Soviet military costs with the decline of those in the United States forced Moscow to be more cooperative and conciliatory toward Washington. Journalists reported a “change in atmosphere,” sensing a turning point in the Soviet position on the previously stalled Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks, and the onset of a “new equilibrium.” A date was set for a summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev the following year.

When Brandt met Nixon at the President’s residence in Florida in December 1971, the Chancellor noted that Germany had an interest in normalizing relations with China, as the countries already had a substantial amount of economic trade. Nixon replied that he would “plumb Chinese attitudes with respect to the Federal Republic” during his visit to Beijing in a week’s time, an offer that Brandt welcomed.²⁵⁰ Prime Minister Zhou Enlai told Kissinger he thought the

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 534

²⁴⁶ Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger Regarding the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin, August 19, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives II, White House Files, NSC, Box 59,

<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116218>.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 529.

²⁴⁹ Lippert, *The Economic Diplomacy of Ostpolitik*, 96.

²⁵⁰ Meeting with Chancellor Brandt on Wednesday, December 29, 1971 at 9:30 a.m., The President's

reason “the West Berlin question was resolved so quickly was because of China and the US coming closer.” He astutely pointed to the fact that immediately after the announcement of Nixon’s upcoming trip to China, Gromyko went to East Berlin to talk about the negotiations and to make quick concessions. Through linkage, the Nixon administration had strengthened the Allies’ bargaining position against the USSR, making the Soviets more responsive to their demands. It was a mark of Kissinger’s diplomatic prowess that he was able to synchronize Ostpolitik and détente, even though his initial skepticism had warned him to do otherwise.

Coordinating foreign policies

Coordinating superpower and East-West German détente policy was no easy feat, as the geostrategic positions of the United States and West Germany clashed. The United States saw détente as a bilateral affair, whereas West Germany saw it purely in the European context. In the interest of cooperation between the two German states, West Germany preferred multilateral links as a way to avoid being caught up in a global confrontation between the superpowers, whereas the Nixon administration sought to buttress a bilateral status quo that it believed guaranteed European stability and American power. Even though Washington and Bonn disagreed about the scope of détente and its immediate and long-term aims, both sides were convinced that the Germans and Americans depended on each other. Speaking at Bahr’s memorial service in 2015, Kissinger remembered fondly that despite their disagreements they went on to “collaborate closely on behalf of a policy that reconciled the hopes of Willy Brandt with the geopolitics of Richard Nixon.”²⁵¹

With linkage as his winning tactic, Kissinger skillfully coordinated superpower détente with the unfolding of Ostpolitik. So what began as a West German initiative evolved into a multilateral enterprise to safeguard Berlin. “Synchronizing the Four-Power efforts, the German bilateral efforts with the Soviet Union, and America’s bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union,” Kissinger said, “produced a wondrous diplomacy.”²⁵² The global agenda of Nixon and Kissinger allowed Bonn to pursue its Eastern policy with the endorsement and backing of the United States. Of the four powers engaged in Berlin, the United States alone had the leverage to offset and resist Soviet pressures on the city. Kissinger thus spotlighted the essential role the U.S. played as protector and leader of the Alliance. In part thanks to his intervention, Brandt was able to continue Adenauer’s legacy of anchoring the Federal Republic firmly in the West, while normalizing relations with the East. Ultimately, Kissinger’s revised strategy succeeded in merging Brandt’s Ostpolitik with American détente policy, an achievement that exemplifies the Nixon administration’s linkage strategy. His support helped channel it in a direction compatible with Atlantic unity and Western cohesion. In hindsight, dovetailing the two initiatives anticipated the German-American cooperation that, twenty years later, would help to bring about reunification.

Ultimately, Ostpolitik catalyzed the process of America’s contacts with the Soviets and the Chinese, encouraging East and West to curtail its dangerous confrontations. Its legacy was also influential in determining the stance future American presidents would adopt over the German question. This time, what influenced them in considering the vital role Germany would play in the changes in Eastern Europe was not the burden of the

Residence, Key Biscayne, Florida, 29 December 1971. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President,

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v40/d336>.

²⁵¹ Kissinger, “Memorial Remarks for Egon Bahr.”

²⁵² Ibid.

German past, but the amount of trust modern West Germany had accumulated. In October 1989, addressing the German people, President George H.W. Bush celebrated their new beginning. He expressed no fear of a united and sovereign Germany as previous policymakers had done. Instead, he spoke of Germany and the United States as “partners in leadership.”²⁵³ Contrary to Kissinger’s predictions, Brandt’s reconciliation with the East demonstrated to the Western powers that Germany could sincerely confront its past.

Conclusion

While there are naturally differences between Kissinger’s scholarship and the foreign policy of the Nixon administration, there was a broad alignment between Kissinger’s approach to Ostpolitik and his academic vision of transatlantic relations. To take a final example that reveals the National Security Advisor’s shortcomings and strivings, he claimed as an academic in 1965 that an Atlantic policy required the United States to yield a measure of autonomy in its foreign policy, chiding previous administrations in the immediate post-war years for dealing with their European partners “paternalistically” and with a “certain self-righteousness.” As a result, he continued, “the United States and Europe have too often conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured in America.”²⁵⁴ However, in government, Kissinger joined the political elite in guarding U.S. foreign policy against European encroachments in the Atlantic arena. Having little faith in the autonomous initiatives of European allies – be they Ostpolitik, integration, or democratic projects in Southern Europe – he often tried to take them into his own hands. In Ostpolitik’s case, Kissinger expressed

considerable frustration about the Germans independently conceiving a foreign policy agenda and expressed little shame in conveying his true opinions. Nevertheless, once he realized that West Germany would increase contacts with the East with or without the consent of their Western allies, Kissinger embraced the “inevitable” and ceded considerable power to his German partners in formulating an Eastern policy. His attempt to coordinate superpower détente with the unfolding of Ostpolitik reaffirmed his fundamental convictions about the Atlantic Alliance by resisting German attempts to emancipate themselves from their dependence on the United States.

Except for Presidents, no twentieth-century statesman commands as much attention from scholars, policymakers, and the general public as Kissinger. The main explanation, of course, is his sustained influence on foreign policy. But Gaddis Smith offers another compelling reason why Kissinger has particularly intrigued academics: He creates a challenge for the scholarly mind “of relating philosophy to action, of discovering in Kissinger’s writings the meaning of what he did in government.”²⁵⁵ In this paper, Kissinger’s journey from the halls of Harvard to the corridors of power does not signify the idealist becoming a realist, or even the philosopher becoming a prince, as Kissinger himself humored during his swearing-in as Secretary of State (see fig. 3). He was already a geopolitical strategist at Harvard, albeit an armchair strategist. Instead, his eight-year tenure in government marks his development into a strategist as well as a tactician. In a crucial passage towards the end of his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger assesses the Austrian foreign minister Metternich as doctrinaire, yet devious, “a mediocre strategist but a great tactician.”²⁵⁶ For Kissinger,

²⁵³ George H.W. Bush, “Address to the German People on the Reunification of Germany,” October 2, 1990, <https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-901002.htm>.

²⁵⁴ Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, 6.

²⁵⁵ Gaddis Smith, “Kissinger and the Meaning of History,” Review of *Kissinger and the Meaning of History*, by Peter W. Dickson, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979.

²⁵⁶ Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 299.

Metternich's admirable quality was his tacticalness. However, "the lack of inspiration underlying Metternich's strategic conception is, for Kissinger, a fatal defect," as Niall Ferguson writes.²⁵⁷ Like any good historian, Kissinger did not model himself on his subjects; he learnt from them. Thus, what appears in the statesman's early years in the White House is both inspired strategy as well as tactic. His guiding philosophy of the world order complemented his calculated diplomacy. No wonder Kissinger's geopolitical maneuverings come across, to admirers and critics alike, as both philosophical and cunning.

²⁵⁷ Ferguson, 302.

Declarations of Loyalty: The Japanese American Struggle to Prove their Loyalty in the Days Following the Attack on Pearl Harbor

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Introduction

“A Jap is a Jap.”²⁵⁸ These words by General John DeWitt created a sense of fear within the United States over the actions of Japanese Americans. These people of Japanese ancestry, both citizens and legal immigrants, were scrutinized and monitored as if they were criminals. Although the government argued that the attack on Pearl Harbor justified these precautions, the extra monitoring, inappropriate restrictions, and eventual forced internment clearly violated their rights. The internment of Japanese Americans, a drastic measure taken to keep West Coast Japanese communities under watch, has been studied significantly in recent years. These studies cover different aspects of the Japanese internment, from the U.S. government’s actions to form these camps and transport the Japanese to the Japanese American struggle for reparations in the years after their release. Despite the volume of recent research, historians rarely discuss the struggles of Japanese communities between the attack on Pearl Harbor and their internment. Looking into these struggles gives a better sense of who the Japanese Americans were and what they tried to accomplish. With these struggles, the Japanese Americans had support from the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), a civil rights group founded in 1929 dedicated to the advancement of the Japanese American people.²⁵⁹ This paper focuses on the efforts taken by the Japanese Americans through the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) in an attempt to prove their loyalty to the United States.

The JACL’s actions were significant

because they show the lengths that Japanese Americans were willing to go in order to protect their families and friends. In addition, these actions add deeper meaning to the injustices of the internment camps. Two aspects of the JACL’s program will be discussed to better understand what they were trying to accomplish. First, the JACL and Japanese community’s drastic actions reflecting what they believed would best show their loyalty to the US; second, the actions taken by the JACL to protect their families and community showing who the Japanese were as a people and the dedication they had to one another even in times of great distress. This is significant as it leads to a deeper understanding of the Japanese Americans’ actions after the attack on Pearl Harbor and changes how their actions are viewed. The current view of Japanese Americans during WWII is that they were mostly compliant when making the journey from their homes into the camps, and this view substantiates their reputation as a model minority – a group that follows the orders of the government in order to achieve better societal success in terms of economic standing and social status. This connotation of being a model minority is that they have a better social and economic status when compared to other minorities. It also implies that they passively follow laws and accept injustices that are imposed on them. Further research reveals the Japanese community’s true intent and can dispel the myth by showing that they were simply acting in the best interests of their families and communities.

Historiography

The majority of research regarding the Japanese internment during World War II focuses on its causes, the conditions within the internment itself, and the struggle that those interned faced in the search for

²⁵⁸ “John DeWitt,” John DeWitt | Densho Encyclopedia, accessed October 16, 2020, https://encyclopedia.densho.org/John_DeWitt/.

²⁵⁹ Japanese American Citizens League, “JACL,” Japanese American Citizens League, accessed October 16, 2020, <https://jacl.org/about/>.

reparations.²⁶⁰ Even when the focus was on Japanese communities before the internment, historians looked more closely at individual stories rather than at the patterns of actions Japanese Americans took as a whole.

The Japanese American struggle for proper reparations was a major point of contention in the years following the internment. This fight did not begin immediately after the internment; it started in the 1970s during Jimmy Carter's presidency. With Carter's support for redress, groups began to speak out about their injustices and eventually their demands came forward in 1988 as House Resolution (H.R.) 442. H.R. 442 requested "a U.S. government apology, a \$1.5 billion trust fund, a \$20,000 stipend to each internee, a review of criminal convictions associated with the refusal to comply with internment procedures, and possible pardons."²⁶¹ The Japanese saw these as modest requests to compensate them for the time spent interned away from friends and their home. Conversely, President Ronald Reagan stood against the financial reparations since he believed it would go against his policies of fiscal conservatism, and he believed that enough had already been done to apologize, such as the termination of the executive order creating the internment.²⁶² Reagan feared any loss of support that could stem from breaking with his policies, but also feared the loss of Japanese American support. Luckily, he was willing to compromise. He vetoed the resolution but finally approved the measure at the end of the presidency, partly to ensure that his time in office was remembered fondly.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Lynn Thiesmeyer, "The Discourse of Official Violence: Anti-Japanese North American Discourse and the American Internment Camps." *Discourse & Society* 6, no. 3 (1995): 319-52; Timothy P. Maga, "Ronald Reagan and Redress for Japanese-American Internment, 1983-88." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1998): 606-19; Gerald Stanley, "Justice Deferred: A Fifty-Year Perspective on Japanese-Internment Historiography," *Southern California Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (1992): 181-206; Bill Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet*

Another large part of the historiography on the Japanese American internment has centered around the actions taken by the U.S. government before the internment. Bill Hosokawa discusses this in his book *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*. This book contains a section on the events between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese internment. Within this section, Hosokawa discusses the U.S. government's actions, especially the Tolan Committee.

The Tolan Committee, headed by Representative John Tolan (D – CA), was created by Congress in order to look into the issue of forcing the West Coast Japanese to evacuate their home and relocate to other areas before enacting the internment orders.²⁶⁴ This committee gave hope and support to Japanese Americans as it promised that they would be heard. As the committee proceeded, many Japanese Americans had a chance to speak and discuss their loyalty. In the end, the hearings proved ineffectual and did little to help the Japanese Americans' case due to local support of the internment. Many local residents came to speak in favor of the evacuation idea, often citing fear of disloyalty and violence from the Japanese.²⁶⁵ They opposed Japanese organizations, such as language schools and athletic clubs – saying that they led to militarism and loyalty to the Japanese emperor. Both claims were later proven false.²⁶⁶ The various hearings held throughout California, Oregon, and Washington were later seen by historians as a cover of false hope as the committee's decisions did not affect the decision already made to evacuate the Japanese Americans.²⁶⁷

Americans (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2002).

²⁶¹ Maga, "Ronald Reagan and Redress," 607, 610.

²⁶² Maga, "Ronald Reagan and Redress," 610.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 615, 617.

²⁶⁴ Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*, 284.

²⁶⁵ Hosokawa, *Nisei: The Quiet Americans*, 291-292.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 289, 295.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 291.

Hosokawa's research shows the vast amount of prejudice that the Japanese Americans faced right before their internment and how they had no way to show their true values due to unfair laws and regulations. Although this research has explained the events of that time in detail, the focus remains on the government's perspective. The research only briefly discusses the actions that the Japanese Americans took and usually wrote them off as attempts that did not count for much. When it discusses the Japanese American side, it tends to focus on the dissidents, and even this research came years after the interment period. All of these factors point to a gap in the historiography between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the internment. The actions of Japanese groups during the time is given little attention as researchers are more interested in the actions of the U.S. government than those of the affected.

This paper will attempt to fill in the holes in the current historiography. To do so, it will focus on the JACL's actions to prove their loyalty and protect the Japanese community from governmental and community prejudice and violence in the days leading up to their internment. From their perspective, by proving their loyalty, they would be able to lessen the government's fears of their allegiance. These actions, although often overlooked, are important to the discourse of internment, since focusing on the JACL's actions give Japanese Americans a more complex and complete narrative that has rarely been acknowledged. By focusing on these actions, this paper will present Japanese-Americans as more than just a people who passively accepted what they were told to do. It will portray them as a group who, although accepting the injustices placed upon them, did so in order to protect their community from

further harm. This will lead to a greater understanding of what the Japanese went through, debunking the model minority myth.

The JACL and Loyalty to the United States

The Japanese Americans are often viewed as willingly accepting their internment in World War II. Much scholarship shows the Japanese communities as complacent throughout this time; instead of fighting back, they are viewed as having peacefully followed orders. The Japanese Americans, through organizations such as the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), took many efforts to prove their loyalty to the U.S. government after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Instead of removing themselves entirely from the discussion of their loyalty, the JACL and the Japanese Americans played an active role in attempting to convince the U.S. government that they were loyal citizens and that the internment was unnecessary. Looking at the actions of the local JACL chapters in Seattle and Los Angeles gives a better sense of Japanese American resistance, separating them from the idea of the model minority.

Local chapters of the JACL made many efforts to prove their loyalty to the U.S. government. These took on different forms, but were all meant to prove that Japanese Americans were not a threat and supported the U.S. cause in the war. The JACL believed that supporting the war effort would avoid internment and help the U.S. In pursuit of these goals, the Los Angeles chapter of the JACL created an "Anti-Axis Committee." This committee, whose goals and policies were distributed via pamphlet throughout the Japanese communities in Los Angeles, was designed to take the necessary actions to prove Japanese loyalty.²⁶⁸ Their policy goals included statements such as "In this time of

²⁶⁸ Translation of Leaflet: Southern Federation Japanese American Citizens League "Anti Axis Committee," December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council, Minutes

of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection 2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles.

emergency, we look forward to full cooperation with the policy of the Federal, State and local governments,” and “To insure the prosecution of the war and victory for America, we endeavor to unite and coordinate the activities of all Japanese American citizens and of alien residents.”²⁶⁹ The JACL thought it best to address the government’s fears of Japanese Americans betraying the U.S. and leaking information to Japan. By indicating they would cooperate with the government, the JACL tried to relieve fears that the Japanese Americans would rebel and cause trouble along the West Coast. The committee’s statement on the uniting and coordinating of Japanese Americans was meant to show the government that they were being monitored and therefore lessen fears of leaking information. Although this statement did not prevent the internment, the committee created an organization for Japanese Americans to support one another during this time.

The Anti-Axis committee planned to supervise the press and news that was released regarding the Japanese communities.²⁷⁰ The committee went further than simply monitoring the information published within Japanese American newspapers. It extended to monitoring which books by Japanese authors would be sold. This limited the works that could reflect negatively on the Japanese American communities. One example of this was the committee recommending that all bookstores in the area remove works by Mitsuru Toyama.²⁷¹ Mitsuru Toyama was a Japanese nationalist and head of the Black Dragon Society—a right wing nationalist

group in Japan. His books promoted nationalist views and supported Japanese military expansion. The Anti-Axis committee hoped that removing his books from shelves would limit his influence on the community and lessen the fear of younger generations harboring nationalist thoughts, which the government might use to promote internment. Through this the JACL showed they were against Toyama’s views, further proving their dedication to the U.S.

The JACL and the Anti-Axis committee developed Japanese American image in the press further by appearing on radio broadcasts themselves. The JACL sent both first generation (Issei) and second generation (Nisei) Japanese-Americans to a radio program on January 12, 1942 in order to describe their situations and tell their stories of coming to and living in America.²⁷² Primarily intended to relieve the government and local residents’ fears regarding the local Japanese Americans, this program gave a chance for listeners throughout Los Angeles, many of those most affected by the attack on Pearl Harbor, to hear firsthand what Japanese Americans’ lives were like. The radio program was also an opportunity for the Japanese Americans to demonstrate their dedication and loyalty to America. The Issei representative discussed how his children, “Prattled in English, and though we could not understand quite all they said, we rejoiced that at least by virtue of their birth, they could become a part of America.”²⁷³ This showed listeners that Japanese immigrants wished for their children to be loyal citizens of the U.S. and did not want to risk hurting the prospect

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Translation of Leaflet: Southern Federation Japanese American Citizens League “Anti Axis Committee,” December 1941.

²⁷¹ Report from Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings Held During the Week of December 22, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection

2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles.

²⁷² Radio Script of Program Presented by the Anti-Axis Committee over KFWB, Sunday, January 12 1942, 5:45 PM, January 1942, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection 2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles.

²⁷³ Ibid., 2.

of a happy life. The Nisei also showed their dedication to the American cause by saying, “We formed the Anti-Axis Committee and pledged ourselves to do our share in the fight against the fascist aggressor. We joined in the drive against ruthless aggression.”²⁷⁴ By using a radio program in this way, the JACL hoped to show their dedication to the government, and also hoped to gain sympathy and compassion from listeners and to convince them of Japanese American loyalty.

The Seattle Chapter of the JACL also took steps to prevent the impending Japanese internment. One of its primary methods was to submit a report to the Tolan Committee—a House Committee in charge of hearing arguments for and against the mass removal of Japanese Americans.²⁷⁵ This report was designed to show the assimilation of the Japanese into American society. To do this, the JACL provided facts on how much the Japanese Americans contributed to society. It paid special attention to details regarding the amount of farming efforts and community services its members provided and the success of the Japanese children. The report showed that the Japanese Americans were providing approximately \$3,120,205 of value to the farm industry in the Western Washington district.²⁷⁶ With these numbers, they hoped to show how necessary the Japanese population was for the area. They tried to show that if the internment were to go forward losing such a large amount of income would be detrimental to the area’s economy. The report also placed a focus on the achievements of Japanese American

children in public schools. It discussed how they were doing well in schools saying, “Within the past 21 years, 27 American-born Japanese have been either valedictorians or salutatorians of the nine Seattle high schools.”²⁷⁷ It also discussed their good behavior, saying, “Juvenile court and police records show that the American-born Japanese rarely, if ever, are in difficulty with the law in spite of the fact that most of them come from Seattle’s economically depressed areas.”²⁷⁸ These statements were intended to show the assimilation of the Japanese children in the Washington area. By showing their good grades and behavior, the JACL argued that the Japanese residents did not intend any harm and simply wished the best for their communities.

The Seattle JACL also attempted to oppose the internment by offering their own plan. In April of 1942, James Sakamoto of the Seattle JACL wrote to Frank Bell, the U.S. Commissioner of Fisheries, discussing a plan to create a “model community” of Japanese in the Moses Lake area of Washington.²⁷⁹ In this plan, Sakamoto states that the Japanese “desire to practice the lessons in democratic living which they have learned to love in their present homes,” and that there would be no need to worry as, “Everything will be under strict military supervision.”²⁸⁰ Through these words, Sakamoto showed that the Japanese were committed to American values and relieved the fear that the Japanese would rebel if given their own society. If this plan were accepted by the Tolan Committee, it would

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 4.

²⁷⁵ “Tolan Committee,” Tolan Committee | Densho Encyclopedia, accessed October 16, 2020, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Tolan_Committee/.

²⁷⁶ Report submitted to Tolan Congressional Committee by the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) on the topic of the Japanese community and the evacuation process, February 28, 1942, February 1942, Japanese American Citizens League, Seattle Branch Records, Accession No. 0217-006, Box 18/Folder (Reports), University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Seattle. 18.

²⁷⁷ Report submitted to Tolan Congressional Committee by the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) on the topic of the Japanese community and the evacuation process, February 28, 1942, 11.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 11.

²⁷⁹ James Sakamoto letter to Frank Bell about establishing a “model community” of Japanese evacuees in the Moses Lake area, April 9, 1942, April 1942, Japanese American Citizens League, Seattle Branch Records, Accession No. 0217-006, Box 18/Folder (Outgoing Correspondence), University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Seattle. 1.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 2.

have been a preferred alternative to the internment camp. Instead of being placed in what was essentially a prison, the Japanese, although still under surveillance, would continue their lives through work and schools in a community of their own.

Although it was not the typical form of resistance, both the Los Angeles and Seattle chapters of the JACL took efforts to push back against the Japanese internment. These actions focused on convincing the government that the Japanese Americans were loyal. Whether they did this through reports, declarations of loyalty, or radio broadcasts, Japanese communities were fighting for what they believed. By doing this through simple and non-violent means, it allowed the Japanese to not bring further suspicion upon themselves, which was important as they were under a large amount of scrutiny and any movements seen as out of line would have encouraged prosecution and internment. Although the efforts did not work, they show that the Japanese Americans were not silently obeying orders. They were not acting as the model minority and doing as told, but actively tried to change the opinions of the government and the public to protect their communities. By passively cooperating instead of resisting, they were able to avoid further prosecution and constraints placed on their community.

The JACL and Protection of Community

Loyalty to one another is an important value in Japanese culture. During the time between Pearl Harbor and internment, Japanese Americans were facing large amounts of discrimination from the government and from the public. During these times, they relied on the Japanese

²⁸¹ Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Bulletin no. 142 urging members not to violate the new restrictive policies directed at members of the Japanese community in an effort to test their legality, April 7, 1942, April 1942, James Y. Sakamoto Paper, Accession No. 1609-001, Box 10/5, University of Washington Libraries, Special Collections, Seattle. 1.

American community and the JACL to ensure that everyone stayed safe. An analysis of the actions that the JACL chapters of Los Angeles and Seattle took in protecting their communities shows that this opposition to internment was done to ensure community safety, which does not align with the idea of a model minority passively accepting injustices.

The Los Angeles and the Seattle chapters of the JACL both took the protection of their community seriously. In order to ensure that the community stayed safe, the JACL sent out many recommendations and rules for the Japanese American community to follow. The Seattle chapter took special attention in encouraging its members to follow the posted curfews and travel restrictions for Japanese Americans by the government, even though it severely affected what they could do and where they could go. The Seattle chapter, aware that many of their members may wish to push back against these questionable restrictions, released a statement stating “National Headquarters is unalterably opposed to test cases to determine the constitutionality of military regulations at this time.”²⁸¹ This was to ensure that the Japanese citizens would not try to fight these regulations. Even though the regulations appeared to be unjustified, the JACL realized that pushing back against them would make matters worse. It addressed these concerns in their bulletin, saying, “Should we challenge their right to pass such regulation as the five mile travel limit and the curfew restrictions, we might be damned as fifth columnists who are attempting to sabotage the military plans and to embarrass the government at a time when a united front is essential.”²⁸² Attempts to fight against the regulations would make the Japanese

²⁸² Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Bulletin no. 142 urging members not to violate the new restrictive policies directed at members of the Japanese community in an effort to test their legality, April 7, 1942, 1.

Americans appear as a radical group fighting against the American effort, potentially resulting in greater scrutiny and suspicion against them, thus giving the government more reason to send them to internment camps. Even though the government created unfair rules against Japanese Americans, following them was better than being labeled as a radical group.

Although Japanese Americans were encouraged to follow the rules set by the government, some still decided to go against them. One of the most prominent instances of this was the case of Fred Korematsu. Korematsu, a resident of Oakland, California, had plastic surgery to change the shape of his eyes and changed his name to Clyde Sarah.²⁸³ Although he is seen by many activists as a hero for going against the government's unfair orders, much of the Japanese American community disagrees.²⁸⁴ To some Japanese Americans, he is seen as a dissident who put the community at risk. Shig Naito, a Nisei resident of San Leandro, California, puts this feeling into words. When asked about his feelings regarding a local high school's campus being named after Korematsu, he said, "I'm pissed. My father went along with orders and there isn't a school being named after him. Where's his building?"²⁸⁵ As the actions of the JACL show, Japanese Americans were mostly worried about the protection and safety of their communities. Those who threatened that safety were shunned by the rest of the community.²⁸⁶

The Los Angeles chapter of the JACL created committees in order to ensure the

community's well-being. The main committees were dedicated to protecting the Japanese Americans' safety at home and at work. The primary committee was known as the Family Welfare Committee and was in charge of, "[Coordinating] all the resources available and [taking] care of needy families."²⁸⁷ This included securing jobs for those who lost them, providing food and housing for those in need, helping to educate the public, and preventing discrimination.²⁸⁸ These efforts improved the conditions for many in the Japanese American community. One of the most important aspects that it was able to help with was jobs. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many Japanese Americans lost their jobs due to fear and discrimination. As a result, the JACL created an employment committee which kept a list of those who needed jobs, kept in contact with local employment opportunities, and provided funds to help those searching for employment with application and transportation fees.²⁸⁹ The help the JACL provided allowed many families to maintain a stable income and comfortable life.

The JACL also tried to protect children in school and to make sure they were treated fairly. This took place through a committee of secondary school students and the closing of Japanese language schools. The committee of secondary school students, referred to as the Education Committee, was formed to have "boys in different secondary schools to be on the watch of any possible violence or discrimination."²⁹⁰ If seen, the boys would relay the information to the JACL

²⁸³ "Fred T. Korematsu Lifetime," Korematsu Institute, <http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/fred-t-korematsu-lifetime>, accessed March 22, 2019.

²⁸⁴ Shig Naito, "Interview with Shig Naito," interview by Mason Medeiros, October 13, 2011.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Anti-Axis Committee Meeting December 10, 1941, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection

2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles. 2.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 1.

²⁸⁹ Minutes of the Meeting of the Anti-Axis Committee Held on December 20, 1941, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection 2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles. 2.

²⁹⁰ Anti-Axis Committee Meeting December 12, 1941, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the

who would then take it up with school officials. This let students voice complaints against their school while staying free of suspicion. It also ensured that the schools would not be able to get away with discrimination and unfair punishments, putting student's minds at ease. The Japanese language schools produced a new challenge for the JACL. The knowledge that the schools were teaching the Japanese language created a suspicion that the students were also being taught Japanese militarism and nationalism. Because this led to criticism and negative effects, the JACL decided to shut these schools down.²⁹¹ Doing so alleviated some of the suspicions of the Japanese-American children, leading to a more peaceful school life.

These actions show how dedicated the Japanese Americans were to their communities. Regardless of what was going on around them, they supported one another resulting in strengthened bonds that further helped them work through the difficult time. These actions also show that the Japanese Americans were not fully complicit while the U.S. government was planning on interning them. They did not overtly strike out against the government, but not because they were acting as a model minority. Instead, they knew that following orders and acting peacefully would be the best way to maintain a peaceful and stable life. All of this prevented further restrictions and harm on them in an already troubling time.

Conclusion

The JACL's actions between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese internment (which took full effect in February through April of 1942) represented values that

the Japanese Americans held close. These values, such as loyalty, dictated what they did throughout this troubling time. While the Japanese Americans could have fought more forcefully against the unfair regulations placed on them, they focused on the actions they could take to prove their loyalty to the U.S. government and protect their communities. The JACL chapters throughout the West adopted many of these measures.

Unintentionally, through the peaceful and subdued forms of their actions, the Japanese American community created an idea that the Japanese were acting as a model minority and simply accepting whatever happened to them instead of standing up for themselves. The actions discussed, from the suggestion of internment alternatives to the formation of welfare committees, show that the Japanese Americans were subtly resisting while protecting their communities, and not just peacefully accepting.

This research reveals a time period that is often overlooked in modern historiography. The actions that a people take in times of distress often reveal aspects of their character and values that are otherwise hidden. This analysis reveals not only what the Japanese Americans held important to their communities, but it also reveals the social message that they tried to push – that they were peaceful and beneficial members of society. These documents used in this paper were preserved in collections as they add details to the Japanese American story and to the internment history of America. Each document shows a dedication to their community, to protecting the Japanese-American way of life, and to their continued presence. This message is important as it kept their community together during a rough time

Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection 2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles. 2.

²⁹¹ Anti-Axis Committee Meeting December 13, 1941, December 1941, JACL Anti-Axis Committee of the

Southern District Council, Minutes of the Anti-Axis Committee Meetings December 8-27, 1941, Collection 2010, Box 301, UCLA Library Special Collections, Los Angeles. 2.

and can do the same in today's tumultuous environment. It also adds an extra layer of depth to the Japanese Americans, whose actions to protect themselves from internment are now a greater aspect of the internment historiography.

Incarcerated Care-Givers: Japanese Healthcare Workers as the Negotiators and the Negotiated At the Heart Mountain and Tule Lake Camps, 1943

Sarah Jho (Yale University)

In a November 1943 transcript titled “Conference with Evacuees”, a non-physician spokesperson named George Kuratomi presented the grievances of Japanese physicians and nurses to the administrative committee of Tule Lake Detention Center.²⁹² Tule Lake Detention Center was one of ten Japanese internment camps that operated between 1942 and 1945 under Executive Order 9066. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in retaliation for the Japanese Empire’s bombing of Pearl Harbor, creating so-called “exclusion zones” in the West Coast that forced 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans from their homes to internment camps in the interior of the United States under the guise of national defense.

Executive Order 9066 is now widely remembered as the product of what Supreme Justice Robert Jackson called the “ugly abyss of racism”. However, the 1944 Supreme Court case (*Korematsu v. United States*) that upheld the executive order’s constitutionality was only officially challenged in 1983 when a California district court found that the government’s legal team had intentionally suppressed reports from the FBI that Japanese Americans posed no military threat to the United States.²⁹³ Five years later, internment survivors’ right to reparations for unjust incarceration was finally recognized with the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.

²⁹² Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, “Conference with Evacuees, Tule Lake Center”, November 1, 1943.

²⁹³ United States Courts, “Facts and Case Summary—*Korematsu v. U.S.*”, accessed October 8, 2020, <https://www.uscourts.gov/educational->

The Tule Lake Detention Center’s November meeting was convened after a group of boys heavily beat Dr. Pedicord, the Chief Medical Officer of the camp.²⁹⁴ Community organizer Kuratomi passionately petitioned the ad-hoc committee of administrators—which included the visiting War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) Director, Dillon S. Myer—for the immediate removal of Dr. Pedicord and the rest of the White hospital staff.²⁹⁵ Kuratomi cited Dr. Pedicord’s record of undermining the authority of Japanese physicians in the camp in favor of White medical staff, who exhibited a racialized attitude of neglect toward the Japanese patients.²⁹⁶ Kuratomi argued that this neglect had already cost lives and that without proper measures, would continue to place the health of the camp’s incarcerated at great risk:

“There are many cases such as that to prove the inefficiency and indifference of Caucasian doctors in this hospital. It was decided by the evacuee doctors in this center that if such doctors are to stay in this Center and more or less see people die from day to day, they cannot stand to see such a thing exist. So it was decided last night to ask the resignation of each and every Caucasian doctor and each and every Caucasian nurse who feels so superior that some of them believe they know more about medicine than the Japanese doctors who have had big practices and lots of responsibility. It has been said that some of the Caucasian doctors employed here don’t even have licenses to practice medicine.”²⁹⁷

Kuratomi’s compelling testimony included graphic accounts of neglect that had occurred

resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-korematsu-v-us.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁹⁵ Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, “Conference with Evacuees”, 15.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

in the weeks leading up to Pedicord's beating, such as a stillborn birth caused by the White staff's inappropriate administration of morphine and the extreme pain endured by two appendicitis patients whose requests for medical attention and transportation to a better-equipped hospital were denied by White medical staff.²⁹⁸ In spite of the urgency of Kuratomi's account, Myer's first instinct was to protect the authority of the WRA by admonishing Kuratomi for speaking on the basis of demands: "As I told you before, we can't operate on the basis of demands. We are always willing to have criticisms and suggestions, but not demands."²⁹⁹ In response to Myer's non-sequitur, Kuratomi chose to succinctly acquiesce: "These are the criticisms by the evacuee nurses and doctors," and returned the committee's attention to the matter-at-hand by calling up a patient who provided testimony on his two-year-old nephew who had passed away earlier that morning due to untreated severe burns.³⁰⁰ Despite the negotiations' initial focus on the plight of inadequate healthcare in the camp, Kuratomi eventually re-directed the WRA administration's attention to a greater array of camp grievances.

Kuratomi's tactical strategy during the negotiations at Tule Lake is one example among similar strategies utilized at the other nine internment camps. These negotiating strategies often featured Japanese physicians and their healthcare concerns as the opening arguments to a broader discourse of protecting Japanese and Japanese American rights under Executive Order 9066.

In this paper, I investigate how Japanese healthcare workers leveraged their position as medical professionals, despite efforts to limit their authority, to support camp reform movements. Japanese physicians did not form the helm of advocacy movements in the camps; instead, they aligned

themselves with non-physician organizers who leveraged Japanese doctors' authority to lend credence to advocacy moments in the camps. At Heart Mountain camp, Japanese healthcare workers assisted reformative anti-draft movements in the camps by supporting hospital strikes led by non-essential personnel while continuing to provide the basic care needed by the sick and elderly. At other times, their indirect testimony about the government's medical neglect was effectively utilized by non-physician organizers to make more sweeping demands about resource allocation and labor rights, as by Kuratomi at Tule Lake Camp.

My paper begins with a detailed discussion about the historical context in which Japanese healthcare workers provided medical services before and during WWII, and offers theoretical tools to understand two case studies. I discuss two cases: the October 1943 beating of Dr. Pedicord at California's Tule Lake Camp and the June 1943 hospital walk-out at Wyoming's Heart Mountain Camp. These two case studies are notable because they describe times of conflict between Japanese health care workers and their overseeing White staff, and because they offer insight into the inherent challenges of acting as a care-provider and advocate within carceral settings. In the case of Japanese internment, the complexities of carceral medicine were further complicated by the xenophobic nationalism of WWII and internal factionalism among Japanese incarcerated patients. Through my paper, I elucidate how Japanese healthcare workers creatively worked under conditions of incarceration to advocate for higher quality care for their patients while consolidating their professional legitimacy. In doing so, I provide a historical means of reflecting upon related, though distinct,

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 14-15.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 15.

³⁰⁰ Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, "Conference with Evacuees", 16.

contemporary prison abolition or reform movements involving healthcare workers.³⁰¹

Japanese Physicians: Performing Industrious Care-Giving before and after World War II

American politicians were more than willing to utilize anti-Japanese rhetoric to emphasize the necessity of Executive Order 9066 to a largely receptive White American public. Shortly after the passage of Executive Order 9066, a December 1942 Gallup survey asked Americans: “Do you think the Japanese who were moved inland from the Pacific coast should be allowed to return to the Pacific coast when the war is over?”. Only 35% of the American public responded that the detainees should be allowed to return to their homes after the war. Of the 48% who responded “No”, 63% believed Japanese and Japanese Americans should be deported out of the United States. A stunning 10% responded that the best course of action would be to “leave them where they are [in the camps]—under control”, underlining the WWII-era’s entrenched culture of mistrust of Japanese Americans.³⁰² For these supporters, the loyalty of ethnically Japanese people—even those who were second-generation (*Nissei*) Japanese Americans and thus born and raised as U.S. citizens—was inherently suspect due to their race alone rather than based on any factual evidence of demonstrated espionage against the United States. Anti-Japanese rhetoric also drew upon a longer Western tradition asserting the

intrinsic superiority of the West to the East due to irreconcilable, intrinsic differences in the people of the two hemisphere’s temperament, values, and biology. This so-called “Orientalizing” mentality otherized people of Asian descent, and propped up exclusionary immigrant legislation like the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act as well as alien land and anti-miscegenation laws that circumscribed the civil rights of Asians.³⁰³ Asians were caricatured as the “Yellow Peril” or the “Oriental Hordes”—conniving and opportunistic immigrants who infringed upon the interests of “worthy” White American citizens.³⁰⁴ The stereotypical Asian body was likewise conceptualized as an unhygienic, deviant, and emasculated “other” to the clean and virtuous White body, justifying draconian measures for their surveillance and segregation from White Americans.³⁰⁵ The U.S. propaganda machine focused its anti-Asian tropes into vicious anti-Japanese messaging as the Japanese Empire consolidated its power in the early twentieth century and later when the Japanese Empire joined the Axis Powers.³⁰⁶

White Americans’ racialized suspicions of Japanese Americans included the Japanese professional class in the United States, and shaped the pre-WWII lives of Japanese American students and professionals in the medical field. Although admissions policies by American universities were not openly disclosed, oral histories and demographic data from before WWII suggest that universities systematically excluded

³⁰¹ Scott A. Allen *et al.*, “Physicians in US Prisons in the Era of Mass Incarceration,” *International Journal of Prison Health* 6 no.3 (2010): 100-106, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3204660/>. During the COVID-19 Pandemic, healthcare workers and collectives such as Training in the Time of Coronavirus and The Collective for Residents’ Rights led advocacy movements and teach-ins on prison reform and abolition. Efforts included the decongestion of prisons through early release programs, improved transitional care, and the decriminalization and de-policing of mental health issues.

³⁰² Art Swift, “Gallup Vault: WWII-Era Support for Japanese Internment,” Gallup, last modified August 31, 2016, <https://news.gallup.com/vault/195257/gallup-vault-wwii-era-support-japanese-internment.aspx>.

³⁰³ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).

³⁰⁴ Masakazu Iwata, “The Japanese immigrants in California agriculture,” *Agricultural History* 36, no.1 (1962): 25-37.

³⁰⁵ Said, *Orientalism*.

³⁰⁶ Andrea Chronister, “Japan-bashing: how propaganda shapes Americans’ perception of the Japanese,” (MA diss., Lehigh University, 1992).

minorities, including Asians, from enrollment.³⁰⁷ From an oral history by Dr. Shigeru Hara, medical schools on the West Coast generally accepted no more than two students of Asian descent into each class regardless of their GPAs or other academic qualifications, despite the high concentration of Asians residing in the West Coast.³⁰⁸ As a result, Dr. Shigeru Hara and his Japanese peers applied to medical schools in the Midwest and the East Coast where admissions were perceived to be more welcoming, but they still struggled to obtain hospital privileges upon obtaining their degrees due to racial discrimination by White patients who refused to be treated by Japanese professionals.³⁰⁹ In response, many Japanese American physicians opened private practices where they treated a mostly Japanese clientele.³¹⁰

The discrimination against Japanese American healthcare workers, like Dr. Shigeru Hara, continued during the internment era. The domestic labor shortage caused by the drafting of medical professionals for overseas war efforts incentivized the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) (and later, the WRA, after internal reshuffling in 1942) to recruit Japanese physicians and nurses to provide medical services at the camps. The Japanese health professional community's bilingualism and unprotected enemy status during WWII made the Japanese an ideal source of exploitable and low-cost care-giving at the camps.³¹¹ Japanese healthcare workers received minimal financial payment for their work, and their roles as physicians and nurses did not preclude them from being forcibly relocated and interned like the rest of their peers. However, as essential staff within the bureaucratic apparatus of the camps, Japanese medical personnel commanded a locus of

relative power that drew from their medical expertise and their professional indispensability to both their White supervisors and their fellow Japanese incarcerated.

The USPHS and WRA required Japanese physicians and their families to move to assigned camps and had them organize the health facilities where they would later reside as incarcerated.³¹² The camps—with their shoddy infrastructure, minimal staffing, and frequent dust storms—were ill-equipped for the care of thousands of incarcerated.³¹³ Two infamous camps included Heart Mountain Detention Center in Wyoming and Camp Tule Lake in California: the former known for its youth-led anti-draft efforts and related hospital strike and the latter for its incarceration of Japanese American political “dissidents” who had responded in the negative to two questions on the so-called 1943 “loyalty questionnaire” by the WRA. These questions (in simplified terms) asked if *Nissei* would be willing to serve on combat duty wherever ordered and whether they would swear unqualified allegiance to the United States.

The U.S. Government’s “loyalty questionnaire” and the day-to-day surveillance of the camps demonstrate how the intimate thoughts and actions of Japanese Americans—including their physicians—were forcibly subjected to the bleak scrutiny of a mistrustful public. Although Japanese American healthcare workers provided intimate care—such as first vaccinations or delivery of a child—for patients behind the barbed wires of the camp and the closed doors of the hospital, these intimate relationships between patients and providers were under constant surveillance. As

³⁰⁷ Naomi Hirahara, *Silent Scars of Healing Hands: Oral Histories of Japanese American Doctors in World War II*, (Fullerton: California State University, 2004), 19-20.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Hirahara, 1.

³¹¹ Gwenn M. Jensen, “System Failure: Health-Care Deficiencies in the World War II Japanese American Detention Centers,” *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 73, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 623.

³¹² Jensen, “System Failure.”

³¹³ *Ibid.*

incarcerates working for the camps' administration, Japanese American health workers provided medical care under surveillance not only by armed camp guards, but also by White head nurses, doctors, and administrative staff appointed by the WRA. Japanese health care workers thus faced an exceptionally fraught "dual loyalty" problem to both their employer and oppressor—the United States government that kept them detained and the population they attempted to serve. The camps also sanctioned the presence of reporters from local newspapers to report on the camp's activities as well as social scientists from the WRA's Community Analysis Section, which was established in 1943 by anthropologist John F. Embry to conduct field research on the camps.³¹⁴ As has been noted by scholars of carceral history, the prison—despite its connotations of boundedness—is "permeable" to people, visitors, and ideas that flow in and out of its boundaries³¹⁵; likewise, Japanese internment featured zones of contact among Japanese American healthcare workers, their White counterparts, incarcerated patients, and outside visitors, including news reporters. These zones of contacts constituted a nexus of public intimacies that relayed information about Japanese professional legitimacy in the White-dominated medical profession to the public, and also about whether Japanese Americans would be considered worthy citizens in the American society they would foreseeably re-enter after the war.

It is also important to note that Japanese American health workers were severely underpaid for their work in order to

underscore their complicated positionality in the power dynamics of the camps. Their very low monetary compensation—no matter how effectively they performed their medical duties—re-emphasized their "master role" as detainees rather than as fully autonomous physicians within the camps and influenced their participation in camp protests. In her oral history interview, Dr. Masako (Kusayanagi) Miura recollected her feelings of immense frustration when she discovered that she would not receive equal pay grade wages for her administration of medical services while being interned at Manzanar camp. Dr. Miura noted that instead, "[Once you] got in, you're nothing but an evacuee."³¹⁶ Likewise, a White nurse from Heart Mountain Camp remembered how her pay was \$1,800 per year, whereas the Japanese doctors and nurses who worked at the same hospital were paid \$228 per year.³¹⁷ Another estimate based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census's *Statistics of the United States* places the average income of physicians with a private practice outside of the camps at \$4,441 per year—representing a loss of 93% of income each year for Japanese physicians detained at the camps.³¹⁸

Despite their inequalities in pay and treatment compared to their White counterparts, Japanese healthcare workers resourcefully served their patients—as evidenced by their patients' laudatory remarks about their medical care. In the *Heart Mountain Sentinel*, a newspaper written and edited by the incarcerated at Heart Mountain Camp, the camp's hospital was praised as the largest and best equipped hospital in the state of Wyoming.³¹⁹ This proclamation was

³¹⁴ Peter T. Suzuki, "Anthropologists in the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans", *Dialectical Anthropology* 6, no. 1 (August 1981): 23.

³¹⁵ Regina Kunzel, *Criminal Intimacy: Prison and the Uneven History of Modern American Sexuality Actions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 225-238.

³¹⁶ Hirahara, 40.

³¹⁷ Velma Kessel, "Remembering the Heart Mountain Hospital," *Remembering Heart Mountain: Essays on Japanese American Internment in Wyoming*, 187.

³¹⁸ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957: A Statistical Abstract Supplement*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960).

³¹⁹ *The Heart Mountain Sentinel*, December 31, 1942, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. <https://lccn.loc.gov/sn84024756>.

remembered more than forty years later by Nurse Velma Kessel, who had served as a registered nurse supervisor at the camp from 1942 to when it closed in 1945.³²⁰ The interned writers' celebration of the Heart Mountain Camp's medical capabilities demonstrated rightful pride at the infrastructure that the interned physicians had resourcefully built up at the site, but their remark also normalized the camps in the eyes of uninformed readers outside of the camps. High-quality care-giving could divert attention away from the unsavory aspects of Japanese detainment. Japanese American health workers' assertions of their high quality of culturally competent care—often made in order to advocate for better supplies and increased decision-making autonomy—were susceptible to being co-opted into the government narrative about the practical necessity of the camps. Thus, a healthcare-centered narrative of Japanese internment could promote and normalize the government-propped illusion of the camps as being benign, care-giving institutions.

The choice by the Japanese staff of the *Heart Mountain Sentinel* to praise its hospital arose from their general sense of gratitude rather than to praise the WRA. For example, for monolingual Japanese patients, the linguistic accessibility and sense of camaraderie afforded by fellow Japanese physicians provided a sense of comforting continuity from their provider relationships before the camps when they visited Japanese practitioners. These patients often made their gratitude known through notes of appreciation published in the *Sentinel*, as documented in various Christmas issues of the publication.³²¹ The image of the heroic Japanese physician gained further appeal

because the physicians lived under the same conditions of detention as the people they served. Without a strict spatial or cultural boundary demarcating the physician's office and "the real world", an internee-physician's experiential knowledge reached beyond strictly medical care to advocating for community-based concerns, such as keeping families intact throughout camp reorganizations, as well as a greater understanding of the undercurrents of political unrest among the greater incarcerated population.

This is not to say that some Japanese American patients and doctors did not willingly seek the approval of the WRA. Many Japanese performed their industrious citizenship to the United States government through their utilization of the healthcare system. Combatting stereotypes of the immigrant body as unclean or barbaric, Japanese incarcerated may have utilized performances of rationality and self-care to assert their roles as rightful citizens in the United States while in the camps. For example, Japanese American mothers in the camps helped craft a narrative that Japanese mothers were "good mothers" (and thus, good American citizens"), by attending well-baby clinics run by the USPHS in high numbers. Ruth E. Hudson, a USPHS public health nurse who worked in the camps, stated in her booklet "Health for Japanese Evacuees" that "interest in [well-baby clinics] has been so marked that in two districts we have had to hold another conference later in the week. The success of the child health conference is demonstrated by the monthly attendance—165 as compared with 25 in the treatment clinic [outside the camps]."³²² These statistics do not capture the severe

³²⁰ Velma Kessel, "Remembering the Heart Mountain Hospital," in *Remembering Heart Mountain: Essays on Japanese American Internment in Wyoming*, ed. Mike Mackey (Powell: Western History Publications, 1998), 187.

³²¹ *The Heart Mountain Sentinel*, December 31, 1942, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. <https://lccn.loc.gov/sn84024756>.

³²² Ruth E. Hudson, Public Health Nursing Booklet titled *Health for Japanese Evacuees*, November 1943, Robert T. Obi Papers, National Japanese American History Society Collection, Washington, D.C.

health-related deficiencies in the camps. However, these numbers do indicate that public health education initiatives served as a political incentive for incarcerated to assert their humanity and industrious citizenship. By performing compliance to expectations set by the USPHS and WRA regarding proper motherhood—attendance at well-baby clinics—Japanese mothers asserted their rights to citizenship by portraying Japanese Americans as positive hearths to future citizens of the United States.

Turning specifically to roles that Japanese physicians played in negotiations of the Tule Lake and Heart Mountain incidents, Japanese physicians clearly served as important resources for their patients and their bureaucratic administrators in the camps by providing life-saving care. More importantly, the Tule Lake and Heart Mountain Camp case studies also show the degree to which Japanese physicians offered indirect assistance to camp reform through their very status as seemingly impartial professional figures in the camp community. The medical testimonies of skilled Japanese health care workers enabled camp reform by *allowing* non-physician Japanese organizers to fold medical concerns into more broadly sweeping calls-to-action that were more palatable to camp administrators. As such, Japanese physicians served as vehicles through which internee community organizers made greater demands of the administration and by extension, the government responsible for their internment.

Tule Lake

Tule Lake Detention Center was unique among the internment camps because

it was a segregation camp for “political dissidents”, or those who had responded “no” and “no” to the WRA’s two-question loyalty questionnaire. Thus, they were detained in a militaristic atmosphere with well-armed guards who used beatings and the camp’s “bullpen” stockade to instill order and fear among the detainees.³²³ Therefore, when a group of Japanese boys severely beat Dr. Pedicord in 1943, the camp’s residents had already been politically bristling against the White administrators for their mistreatment of incarcerated. After Tule Lake’s new designation, 6,500 incarcerated had been transferred to other camps, 12,000 additional incarcerated had moved in, and at its peak, the camp contained close to 18,700 prisoners and was “overcrowded, and ripe for tension and dissension.”³²⁴

George Kuratomi, the selected spokesperson for the conference between the Japanese “Negotiation Committee” and WRA administrators, was one of the incarcerated who had been transported to Tule Lake from another camp for perceived disloyalty. According to a WRA report recommending George Kuratomi’s transfer from Jerome Camp to Tule Lake, Kuratomi’s loyalty to the United States had been called into question after acting as a leading community organizer within a Buddhist repatriate group at Jerome Camp.³²⁵ When he and his fellow organizers departed for Tule Lake, the report describes how “they were heroes when they left” with “a large group gathered to say goodbye—yelling ‘banzai.’”³²⁶ The report described Kuratomi as possessing “facility in expressing himself in English”³²⁷ with great intellectual interest in “the American form of Government”³²⁸; for Kuratomi, the report

<https://digitalcollections.usfca.edu/digital/collection/p15129coll10/id/1104>.

³²³ Richard D. Rinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 137–144.

³²⁴ Hirahara, 98.

³²⁵ “Report on Jerome to Tule Lake transfer, George Kuratomi,” n.d., Analysis and Procedures Section, War

Relocation Authority, Japanese American Digitization Project, California State University, Fullerton, CA. <https://cdm16855.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16855coll4/id/6088>

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

speculated, incarceration may have served as “the last step in his break with America.”³²⁹

For Kuratomi, the incarceration of Japanese Americans revealed the degree of the U.S. government’s sophistry to its Japanese citizens despite the government’s supposed regard for democratic rights to freedom. Kuratomi was particularly equipped to serve as a spokesperson for Japanese American internees due to his fluency in English and his community organizing experiences since his days in Tule Lake. With his keen understanding of camp dynamics, Kuratomi recognized the utility of leveraging medical expertise in order to deliver his critique on the camp’s conditions and the United States’ failed responsibilities to its Japanese American citizens.

Using medical expertise as the centerpiece of his arguments, Kuratomi leveraged a sense of humanitarian and scientific legitimacy to other grievances among the general incarcerated population, such as the poor quality of food and the suspected sale of food originally intended for the internees on the black market. Other grievances included the WRA’s use of strikebreakers. Earlier that year, Tule Lake’s incarcerated farm-workers had organized a strike to protest their low wages, preventing the harvest of three hundred acres of vegetables. The WRA responded by recruiting strikebreakers from other camps at \$1 an hour, compared to the \$16 a month that the Tule Lake internees had been paid prior to the strike.³³⁰

In this way, an initial conversation that had been centered on the discord between Japanese physicians and the White medical staff was used to generate deeper dialogue about Japanese citizenship in the United States. Kuratomi opened the discussion with a statement relating the humanitarian treatment

of internees to United States democratic principles: “We want to ask you today that we be treated humanely today that we be treated humanely from [*sic*] this Government. If such conditions are allowed to continue to exist the democratic quality of the United States will be greatly injured.”³³¹ Later, Kuratomi questioned how two tons of food had been taken from the Tule Lake warehouse—a warehouse used to feed the camp’s residents as well as to store surplus destined for other Japanese internment camps. He noted how various halls at Tule Lake had not received their share of goods that were to be distributed, resulting in the loss of “many items such as milk and eggs are absolutely necessary for the growth of children.”³³² After leading with a point on health, Kuratomi once again generated a follow-up that connected healthcare to a larger political project, asking if the missing food had been utilized to feed the American military: “Is there any truth to the report that the farm products here have been sent to the Army or the Navy?”³³³ Together, Kuratomi’s progression during his questioning provides insight into the camp’s efforts to navigate their complicated relationship to the United States government and to notions of their own rights as U.S. citizens. Kuratomi’s line of questioning about the distribution of the camp’s food to the U.S. military does not paint a simplistic picture of a Japanese American’s selfish refusal to “support the troops”—a time-honored and emotionally laden symbol of patriotism. Rather, Kuratomi’s progression of logic—from praising the American democratic system, to noting the inhumane conditions of the camp, to the feeding of the American troops with camp supplies—offers a complex story of a targeted population that has been rendered incapable of proving patriotism without inviting severe detriment to their very

³²⁹ Ibid., 1.

³³⁰ Hirahara, 98.

³³¹ “Conference with Evacuees,” Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, 3.

³³² Ibid., 18, 20.

³³³ “Conference with Evacuees,” Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, 7.

³³⁴ Ibid., 2.

survival. The government's failure to protect its ethnically Japanese citizens—first through the very establishment of the camps and now, the failure to properly feed its detainees—made voluntarily sending the literal fruits of camp labor to the troops a medical and civic impossibility for the Japanese.

Knowing that Dr. Pedicord had requested for Army troops to instill camp order after he was beaten by the teenage boys³³⁵, Kuratomi provided assurances that camp order would be maintained: "First of all we want you to know that we understand our position and status in here. We do not want to commit any riots or conduct ourselves in a disorderly manner."³³⁶ However, Kuratomi noted that the frustrations that led to the beating of Dr. Pedicord drew from the same issues he had presented (non-violently) at the conference, stating, "They [the boys] will stop everything if we shall continue to talk this over."³³⁷ Kuratomi finally presented the internal factionalisms and nuanced opinions held by incarcerated within the camp, by emphasizing that the designation of Tule Lake as a catch-all segregation camp had led to friction between people who wished to return to Japan, those who protested the United States government's use of incarceration while remaining loyal to the country, and those who had simply responded to the WRA loyalty questionnaire in a way that would coincide with the responses of their family members in order to keep families together.³³⁸

In contrast, non-Japanese coverage of the proceedings reflected a narrower understanding of the nature of the beating that betrayed an anti-Japanese bent. According to a 1973 oral history interview

with Ruth E. King, a newspaper correspondent at Tule Lake for Oregon's *Klamath Falls Herald and News*, King recounted how a "group of [radical] belligerents went into the hospital...[where] there were some Japanese doctors, but [where] the staff administration was white... and tore down the American flag, raised the Japanese flag over the hospital, and beat up a doctor by the name of Dr. Pedicord."³³⁹ As a local correspondent permitted into Tule Lake Camp, King wrote feature articles, attended Japanese functions, and contacted the staff of the *Herald and News* by telephone daily of the activities that she had observed at the camp.³⁴⁰ Despite Sherry self-identifying herself as "sympathetic" to the Japanese incarcerated, her ignorance of their grievances about Dr. Pedicord and the strikebreakers suggest the nationalistic lens through which Japanese expressions of dissent were perceived in the camps.³⁴¹

Heart Mountain

At Heart Mountain, Japanese physicians and nurses assisted negotiations with the camp administration in a different way. The Heart Mountain hospital walk-out took place over the span of five days between June 24 and 28 of 1943, and involved about a third of the hospital's staff.³⁴² An estimated 102 workers led by ambulance drivers, telephone operators, the sanitation department, and the X-ray department participated in the walk-out, while strictly medical staff—such as physicians and nurses—were "conspicuously absent" from

³³⁵ Ibid., 4.

³³⁶ Ibid., 2.

³³⁷ Ibid., 2.

³³⁸ Conference with Evacuees," Community Analysis Section, War Relocation Authority, 2.

³³⁹ Ruth E. King, "An Interview with Ruth E. King conducted by Sherry Turner on August 28, 1973," in *Japanese American World War II Evacuation Oral History Project Part V: Guards and Townspeople: Volume 2*, ed.

Nora Jesch and Arthur Hansen (Fullerton: California State University, 1993), 421-446.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Louise Fiset, "The Heart Mountain Hospital Strike of June 24, 1943," in *Remembering Heart Mountain: Essays on Japanese American Internment in Wyoming*, ed. Mike Mackey (Powell: Western History Publications, 1998), 110.

the walk-out.³⁴³ In this way, physicians and nurses continued to support camp residents, while facilitating the ability of other hospital workers to issue their demands. A contemporary historical analysis of the walk-out by Lousie Fiset diminishes the aims of the walkout, stating that interviews with the walkout's participants revealed the walkout had been poorly organized, with its aims and leadership structure unclear apart from a general sense of "anti-Caucasian" sentiment directed at the White head nurse, Anna Van Kirk.³⁴⁴

In contrast, Frank T. Inouye, who was interned at Heart Mountain, remembers the Heart Mountain walk-out as a more deliberate political action based on anti-draft movements in the camp after the United States permitted *Nisei* to leave the camps only if they enlisted in the war effort.³⁴⁵ Further, the historical archive suggests the multiple ways that Japanese physicians advocated for greater autonomy for Japanese healthcare workers within Heart Mountain while refusing to disrupt their delivery of medical services to their patients. For example, a petition dated February 13, 1943, was organized by three Japanese doctors by the names of Suski, Ito, and Hanaoka that carried three hundred signatures calling for the removal of the previous head nurse, Graham, for being "antagonistic, abusive, and dictatorial beyond reason."³⁴⁶

As autonomous subjects, a number of forces contributed to how Japanese health care workers were constituted as effective negotiating tools at Tule Lake and Heart Mountain in 1943. The actions of Japanese health care workers may have been mediated by a "dual loyalty" problem in which they simultaneously were loyal to the camp administration and to their interned patients—two populations whose objectives

and values were often at odds. Further, Japanese physicians needed to protect both their interests as incarcerated members of the camp population. For example, operating under the assumption that incarceration would one day end, Japanese physicians who left their private practices or hospital positions for the internment camps may have been cognizant of their need to maintain a relatively apolitical position during their time in the camps in order to peaceably continue their medical practices after incarceration. The presence of the WRA and the Community Section meant dissidence would be carefully documented, potentially limiting opportunities—like hospital privileges and home ownership—after incarceration. Further, Japanese physicians were also susceptible to surveillance by fellow incarcerated. At camps like Tule Lake, the incarcerated population of "dissidents" actually encompassed people possessing a multiplicity of conceptions and expectations about allegiance to the United States and Japan. As a result, the possibility of mistakenly causing ire among the base of a future clientele may have circumscribed more radical displays of political work among Japanese physicians. Multiple oral histories by Japanese physicians who served during World War II remark on how patients they had treated in the camps later sought them out across great distances to access their trusted care.³⁴⁷ Children of the once-incarcerated, such as Sacramento resident Eucaly Shirai, remembered how their parents venerated doctors who had treated them during times of vulnerability in the camps. Shirai recollected how her parents' generation would commonly travel more than 150 miles from Sacramento to Fresno to have Dr. Hashiba, a Tule Lake Camp doctor, to perform their operations after the end of the war.

³⁴³ Ibid., 111.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Frank T. Inouye, "Immediate Origins of the Heart Mountain Draft Resistance Movement," ed. Mike

Mackey (Powell: Western History Publications, 1998), 122-123.

³⁴⁶ Fiset, "The Heart Mountain Hospital Strike," 106.

³⁴⁷ Hirahara, 101.

Instead of seeing their less visible leadership in the camps' negotiations as evidence of a shirking of "duty", the historical archive instead suggests that Japanese health care workers positioned themselves in favorable comparison to the White medical staff to emphasize their competency in comparison to their often undertrained and negligent White counterparts. Thus, their long years of medical practice, degrees from American institutions, and demonstration of culturally competent care may at once be seen as self-protective measures, as well as fodder for greater advocacy efforts that were utilized by community organizers. Even if Japanese healthcare workers did not materialize as the camps' most vocal advocates of reform, Japanese physicians and health care workers acted as valuable negotiating tools: the idealized character of the heroic "evacuee physicians" acted as a means of negotiation that combated anti-Japanese stereotypes during World War II through banalizing Japanese excellence, bringing greater saliency to the Japanese's non-medical concerns, and throwing the shortcomings of the WRA into sharp relief.

**The Imperial Public at War: The
Burgeoning of Civil Society during the
Russo-Japanese War**

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At the dawn of the twentieth century, the Empires of Russia and Japan vied for hegemony in East Asia. From February 1904 to September 1905, the Russo-Japanese War greatly impacted the political landscape, cultural production, and civil society in both of the belligerent nations. This clash of powers is remembered by historians today as a “total war”: a conflict that alters and strains “every aspect of a nation’s economic, cultural, and political life.”³⁴⁸ In Russia, the war coupled with the broader 1905 Revolution directly exacerbated social unrest. Russia suffered severe defeats in the Siege of Port Arthur, the Battle of Mukden, and the Battle of Tsushima Strait, and ultimately, the Japanese Empire declared victory via the Treaty of Portsmouth. But when peace finally came in September 1905, the terms of the treaty were deemed highly unfavorable by the Japanese citizenry. Civilian protests emerged on a scale previously unknown to Meiji Japan. In Russia and Japan alike, the war sparked criticism of imperial governance and invigorated civil society.

Today, some academics believe that war inevitably leads to an expansion of government regulation and control over the populace. In his 1994 book *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*, historian Bruce Porter asserts that “a government at war is a juggernaut of centralization determined to crush any internal opposition that impedes the mobilization of militarily vital resources. This centralizing tendency of war has made the rise

of the state throughout much of history a disaster for human liberty and rights.”³⁴⁹ *War and the Rise of the State* describes a “ratchet effect,” in which the wartime empowerment of the government is maintained into the postwar period.³⁵⁰ Moreover, he argues war has a deleterious effect on the establishment of civil society.³⁵¹ This paper seeks to further refine Porter’s argument, and assert that wartime mobilization and expansion of government control are not always successful in uprooting civil society. In the case of the Russo-Japanese War, the Romanov and Meiji regimes sought to bolster their domestic influence with propaganda and through legal measures, but ultimately public discontent with the war effort created an opening to air grievances against each state. In the wake of the war, Russian and Japanese civil society strengthened as centralized control faltered. Prominent intellectuals and artists publicly rebuked the state, support for governing officials cratered, and the upheaval surrounding the war set a clear precedent for future episodes of public resistance.

Civil society is defined in this paper as a network of citizens and non-governmental institutions engaged in collective action. The Russo-Japanese War serves as a case study to demonstrate the interplay between civil society and war. Porter discusses the Russo-Japanese War in *War and the Rise of the State*, but his argument does not consider the growth of civil society that took place during the conflict. Porter states that “prior to World War I the accumulated strains of industrialization were contained and managed by political systems . . . Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the Russian revolution of 1905 and the introduction of parliamentary reforms by Nicholas II.”³⁵² This

³⁴⁸ John Steinburg, “Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?”, *The Russian Review* 67, no. 1 (January 2008): 3.

³⁴⁹ Bruce Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), xv.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

³⁵¹ Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, 219.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 156-157.

argument exemplifies top-down history, in that it emphasizes political actors in government rather than the larger social network that engendered change in late Imperial Russia. Porter implies that Tsar Nicholas II wholly subverted civil society through legal reforms, which was not the case. Moreover, Porter does not mention the social impacts of war in Japan. To add to the broader argument, the historiography of the “Era of Popular Violence” pioneered by Andrew Gordon shall be examined to shed light on civil resistance in the late Meiji era. Additionally, the celebrated scholar Iriye Akira declared in 2007:

“the Russo-Japanese war should be examined not simply as a conflict between two national entities represented by their respective governments and armed forces, but also an episode in an evolving story of non-state affairs. These relations were developing at the turn of the twentieth century just as surely as interstate affairs. This story would not be comprehensible within the framework of imperialism, nationalism, or regionalism unless these, too, were seen as phenomena involving non-state actors.”³⁵³

In accordance with Akira’s view, this paper seeks to fill a gap in the historiography of this conflict by assessing the impact of the war on popular violence and unrest in civil society.

The seeds of the Russo-Japanese War were planted upon Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese War. The 1895 Treaty of

Shimonoseki effectively ended the Sinocentric international system that had prevailed in East Asia since the classical era, and Japan assumed the role of regional hegemon. The treaty nominally granted independence to Korea, but Japan quickly attempted to assert dominance in the region by stationing economic and political advisers in Seoul to oversee reforms.³⁵⁴ The treaty also ceded Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and the highly geostrategic Liaodong Peninsula in Southeastern Manchuria from the Qing Empire to Japan. This territorial shift was a major change in the status quo, and Japan’s newfound regional hegemony disconcerted three preeminent European powers: France, Germany, and Russia. These states banded together in a diplomatic intercession known as the Triple Intervention, and only six days after the Treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed, pressured Japan to renounce its claim to the Liaodong Peninsula and its geostrategic city of Port Arthur.³⁵⁵ Russian influence crept across East Asia, and became increasingly pervasive as the tsar sought closer ties with the Joseon dynasty in Korea. Tensions between Russia and Japan continued to swell, and came to a head in 1898 when Tsar Nicholas II secured a leasehold over “Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent waters” around the Liaodong Peninsula.³⁵⁶ The Japanese citizenry was irate. Indeed, the cession of Manchurian territory to Russia prompted many Japanese citizens to call for a more chauvinist foreign policy and for the government to seek revenge.³⁵⁷

In the years leading up to the conflict, Japanese citizens became increasingly vocal in supporting war against Russia. During the first Sino-Japanese War, the Meiji government pioneered an efficacious system of

³⁵³ Iriye Akira, “Introduction,” in “The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero,” *History of Warfare* 49, no. 2 (December 2006): 6.

³⁵⁴ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan 3rd Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 118.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 119.

³⁵⁶ “Convention between Russia and China for Lease to Russia of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the Adjacent

Waters,” *The American Journal of International Law* 4, no. 4 (October 1910): 289.

³⁵⁷ Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Imperialism in a Nutshell: Conflict and the ‘Concert of Powers’ in the Tripartite Intervention, 1895,” *Japanstudien* 17, no. 1 (February 2006): 58.

authoritarian propaganda to mobilize the populace.³⁵⁸ This propaganda machine helped to engender a militaristic zeitgeist throughout Imperial Japan. Shortly after the Triple Intervention of 1898, a flood of jingoistic, anti-Russian articles appeared in the press, and professors at Tokyo Imperial University held impassioned rallies in support of war against Russia.³⁵⁹ Nationalistic organizations, such as the far-right Black Dragon Society, formed in order to publish journal articles and pressure politicians to support military engagement with Russia.³⁶⁰ The Russo-Japanese War had not even officially begun, and yet the conflict galvanized civil society in Meiji Japan. The labor of these individuals and organizations soon yielded results. On the night of February 8th, 1904, ten Japanese ships from the First, Second, and Third Imperial Destroyer Flotillas launched torpedoes at the seven Russian destroyers harbored at Port Arthur—the war had begun.³⁶¹ Although Japan’s far-right clamored in support of the war, not all imperial subjects favored the conflict. On the home fronts of both Russia and Japan, political dissent emerged in civil society.

Intellectualism and Cultural Production in Wartime

Over the course of the Russo-Japanese War, celebrated artists and prominent intellectuals publicly denounced the follies of their imperial government. Political theorists and opinion journalists became influential pundits and a core pillar of civil society. At the same time, literary giants like Leo Tolstoy and Yosano Akiko eschewed the militant policies of their government through art. Tolstoy had suffered the

obscurity and privation of modern warfare himself during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, when the Russian Empire was defeated by the combined might of the British, French, and Ottoman Empires, as well as the Kingdom of Italy. After his personal experience as a soldier, Tolstoy became an ardent pacifist, and believed that war was inherently irrational.³⁶² Tolstoy was greatly disappointed by the foreign policy of Tsar Nicholas II, and chastised the government in his anti-Russo-Japanese War article “Bethink Yourselves!” published in September 1904.³⁶³ Although the war began with a Japanese surprise attack on Port Arthur, Russian intellectuals like Tolstoy blamed Tsar Nicholas II and his bellicose foreign policy for triggering the war. Tolstoy announced that the Christian humanity of Russia was “on the edge of a precipice,” and that the tsarist war effort was “incomprehensible and impossible in its cruelty, falsehood, and stupidity.”³⁶⁴ Even before the Russian military had floundered during the Siege of Port Arthur, the Battle of Mukden, and the Battle of Tsushima, Tolstoy’s pacifistic ideology called into question the entire desideratum of the government’s war effort. As the horrors of industrialized warfare cast a pall over the early twentieth century, the pacifist movement took root across the globe.

While the Russo-Japanese War raged throughout Manchuria, a young poetess writing under the pseudonym Yosano Akiko was fomenting change in the Japanese literary community. Specifically, Yosano pioneered both pacifism and feminism in the Japanese literary tradition. Akiko’s previously quiet and privileged life changed forever when her brother Chûzaburô was drafted into the

³⁵⁸ John Dower, “Throwing off Asia II,” *MIT Visual Cultures*, 2008.

³⁵⁹ Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan 3rd Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 119.

³⁶⁰ Jacob Frank, “Secret Societies in Japan and Preparation for the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905),” *Dicariione Studi di Storia Contemporanea* 28, no. 4 (December 2016).

³⁶¹ Warfare History Network, “How Japan Beat Russia: The Siege of Port Arthur Changed History Forever,” *The National Interest*, April 20, 2020.

³⁶² Caryl Emerson, “Leo Tolstoy on Peace and War,” *PMLA* 124, no. 5 (October 2009): 1858.

³⁶³ Leo Tolstoy, “Bethink Yourselves!” *The Advocate of Peace* 66, no. 9 (1904): 164.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

imperial army, and deployed to Manchuria.³⁶⁵ In a 1904 letter to Chûzaburô, Akiko scrawled a dovish *shintaisi* poem titled “Brother, Do Not Give Your Life,” which received both international acclaim and harsh domestic criticism.³⁶⁶ In this work Akiko questioned the rife glorification of combat throughout Meiji Japan. Akiko beseeched Chûzaburô not to participate in the army’s suicide missions against Port Arthur, for which many Imperial soldiers willingly volunteered.³⁶⁷ When Akiko asked her brother “for you, what does it matter / Whether Port Arthur fortress falls or not?” she suggested apprehension about the overarching legitimacy and importance of the war effort.³⁶⁸ The publication of this poem in the magazine *Myôjô* represented a public rebuke against the hawkish imperial government. In the third stanza of the poem, Akiko pleaded “brother, do not give your life. / His Majesty the Emperor / Goes not himself into the battle.”³⁶⁹ The juxtaposition of Akiko’s brother, a mere foot soldier, with the Meiji Emperor, a ruler lionized as the divine descendant of the Shinto sun goddess Amaterasu, constituted an attack on the social hierarchy and mores of Imperial Japan. In contrast to the wartime augmentation of government control that is described by Porter, the home fronts of both Russia and Japan proved to be breeding grounds for artistic dissent against the entrenched status quo.

At this time in both Saint Petersburg and Tokyo, newspapers were a key component of civil society. Over the course of the war from 1904 to 1905, a growing

number of journals and newspapers materialized throughout Russia.³⁷⁰ These publications frequently served as outlets to criticize the Romanov autocracy. When the siege of Port Arthur ended in a Japanese victory on January 2nd, 1905, Russian media coverage became increasingly negative towards the imperial regime, and critical information was broadcast even to the furthest and most provincial outposts in the hinterlands of the Russian Empire.³⁷¹ For example, a columnist of the daily newspaper *Russkoe Slovo*, Vasilii Ivanovich Nemirovich-Danchenko, wrote a string of censorious articles collectively titled “The Blind War” after witnessing the fall of Port Arthur firsthand as a media correspondent.³⁷² Nemirovich-Danchenko recorded the strategic failures that led to the catastrophic defeat at Port Arthur, and publicized the technicalities of the poor-decision making by the Russian government.³⁷³ In wake of this defeat, conservative editor and journalist Aleksei Sergeevich Suvorin questioned whether the Russians could even still be considered “a great people” on the world stage.³⁷⁴ Suvorin’s denunciation of the war effort demonstrates that at this time, public discontent stirred even in the segments of the population that were overwhelmingly traditionalist and supportive of the monarchy. The flurry of newspaper activity during the wartime created a widespread medium for political commentators to voice their concerns with the warring government.

As the Russo-Japanese War unfolded in the East, the iconic political theorist

³⁶⁵ Steve Rabson, “Yosano Akiko on War: To Give One’s Life or Not: A Question of Which War,” *The Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese* 25, no. 1 (April 1991): 45.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 45-46.

³⁶⁷ Tadayoshi Sakurai, *Human Bullets: A Soldier’s Story of the Russo-Japanese War* (Lincoln: Bison Books, 1999).

³⁶⁸ Rabson, “Yosano Akiko on War,” 45-46.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ Theodore Weeks, *Across the Revolutionary Divide: Russia and the USSR 1861-1945* (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 66.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² Zachary Hoffman, “Orienting the Empire, Russian Identity and East Asian Imperialism in the Conservative Press, 1894-1905” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2006), 19.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991* (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 67.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin used newspaper articles to garner increasing influence and readership. Like many Russian intellectuals, Lenin believed that the surrender of Port Arthur signified a monumental symbolic defeat for the imperial government. On January 14th, 1905, Lenin published “The Fall of Port Arthur” in the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*. In this piece, Lenin argued that the Russian Empire’s acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula from China constituted an attempt by the Tsar to “rob Japan of the best fruits of her victory” from the preceding Sino-Japanese War.³⁷⁵ In the eyes of political critics like Lenin, Russian participation in the 1895 Triple Intervention was unwarranted and flew in the face of a truly equitable international system. Throughout this article, Lenin portrays the foreign policy of Tsar Nicholas II as illogical, unjustifiable, and needlessly aggressive. The famed revolutionary laments the unnecessary bloodshed of the Russo-Japanese War, but Lenin also noted a “great attribute of war, namely, that it opens the eyes of millions to the disparity between the people and the government.”³⁷⁶ This fundamental characteristic of warfare stoked Russian civil society, and hastened the political ascendancy of the Bolshevik movement. Lenin argued that “[t]he incompatibility of the autocracy with the interests of social development . . . became evident as soon as the people actually had to pay for the autocracy with their life blood.” Lenin stated bluntly that “tsarism has proved to be a hindrance to the organization of up-to-date efficient warfare.”³⁷⁷ Thus, the Russo-Japanese War provided a strong argument in support of Russia’s budding left-wing civil society, namely that the antiquated Romanov regime could not guarantee the

safety of everyday Russians from military encroachments by neighboring states.

Moreover, Lenin’s article capitalized on a growing fear throughout the Russian public: the imperial regime could not defend its homeland from an enemy it had derided and racialized as being inferior. This widely-circulated socialist polemic tapped into popular discontent with the war effort, just eight days before thousands of protestors would plainly showcase their resentment in the Bloody Sunday march. As Lenin publicized the shortcomings of autocratic governance, many intellectuals on the Japanese home front were doing the same.

Over the course of the conflict, a prominent anti-war lobby developed in Meiji Japan. In October of 1903, mounting antagonisms between Russia and Japan became a subject of great debate in the press. That month, three of Japan’s most prominent journalists, Uchimura Kanzō, Sakai Toshihiko, and Kotōku Shūsui, quit their jobs at the popular newspaper *Yorozu Chōbō*. In an editorial, Uchimura wrote that “supporting war with Russia was tantamount to supporting the destruction of Japan.”³⁷⁸ Together Sakai and Kotōku founded *Heimin Newspaper*, which became Japan’s first socialist newspaper. Although the readership of *Heimin Newspaper* was not particularly large, the agitational publication quickly gained notoriety for accusing the Meiji government of instigating the war.³⁷⁹ *Heimin Newspaper* disrupted the wartime status quo, and demonstrated the transnational nature of the Socialist movement. The revolutionary newspaper helped usher a culture of popular protest into Imperial Japan. According to historian Robert Tierney, the publication “articulated a vision of a society free from war that has continued

³⁷⁵ Vladimir Lenin, “The Fall of Port Arthur,” *Vperyod*, January 14, 1905, 47-55.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ James Huffman “Covering a Bigger War: 1903 to 1905,” in *Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 271-272.

³⁷⁹ Robert Tierney, “Heiminism and the Russo-Japanese War,” *Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kotoku Shusui and Japan's First Anti-Imperialist Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 99.

to influence Japanese political and cultural life until the present.”³⁸⁰ Although the newspaper was suppressed by the Meiji government, popular discontent with the conflict sparked an anti-war movement that would grow to permeate every level of civil society.

When the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty were announced in September of 1905, a myriad of public intellectuals in Japan sought to voice their concerns with the government. The overwhelming majority of Tokyo-based newspapers were not pleased with the deal.³⁸¹ Many press buildings prominently displayed flags adorned with a mourning crepe. A surge of editorials criticized the government for failing to fully remove the Russian threat from Korea and Manchuria.³⁸² Shortly after Akiko introduced the literary movement of pacifism to Japan, prominent figures on the opposite end of the political spectrum formed an anti-peace treaty movement. A coalition of eight nationalist organizations (including the Black Dragon Society) formed the advocacy group Kōwa Mondai Dōshi Rengōkai to influence public perception of the treaty. The Rengōkai was predominantly composed of lawyers and journalists, and counted twelve former or incumbent Diet members among its ranks.³⁸³ The formation of the Rengōkai institution evinces the popular mobilization of conservative civil society at this time. Members of this organization believed that a prominent display of public discontent could inspire the imperial government to reject the Portsmouth Treaty.³⁸⁴ On September 2nd, the Rengōkai executive board held a secret meeting to plan a national assembly that would take place in Hibiya Park on September 5th. The Rengōkai then sent telegrams across the nation to urge volunteers to travel to Tokyo and participate in the assembly.³⁸⁵ This

organization sparked the bloody and chaotic Hibiya Incendiary incident that occurred after the national assembly. Thus, prominent figures in the Rengōkai first set the stage for public unrest in Meiji Japan.

Governance and Popular Support

As anti-war sentiment manifested throughout the two burgeoning civil societies, citizens expressed discontent with their governments by condemning the public officials who were perceived to be most culpable for the underwhelming war effort. In Russia, the Tsar acted as both head of state and head of government, and, as a result, the military defeat directly undermined the political legitimacy of Nicholas II. In contrast, Emperor Meiji acted as head of state but not the head of government, so the onus of lackluster policymaking was deflected unto other officials such as the Prime Minister. This is not to say that Russian politicians avoided public ire; the legitimacy of the Tsar was challenged at the same time that other government officials were scrutinized by the public. In Russia, the entire autocratic system was publicly arraigned. This phenomenon accords with Porter’s concept of “the audit of war,” in which international conflict causes “a large number of individuals to see and ‘inspect’ the flaws of the state.”³⁸⁶ However, Porter ignores the connection between the audit of the state and the development of civil society in wartime communities. In both Russia and Japan, civil society mobilized to decry the war effort.

Public favor for government officials fell rapidly as the war became less popular on each home front. As a direct result of the Russo-Japanese War, appointed officials in the Russian government became so widely detested that when the Minister of Interior

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Shumpei Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York: Columbia University Press), 167-168.

³⁸² Ibid., 168.

³⁸³ Ibid., 196-198.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., 205.

³⁸⁶ Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, 17.

Viacheslav von Plehve was blown apart by a terrorist bomber in 1904, there was no expression of public remorse.³⁸⁷ On the contrary, citizens in Poland and Lithuania celebrated the assassination. In the words of historian Orlando Figes, members of the public “looked upon these terrorists as champions of freedom.”³⁸⁸ Still, the government did not redress the dire situation of the war. The Russian Orthodox Church proved itself to be a vital component of civil society when Father Georgy Gapon orchestrated a protest march in January of 1905. The protestors sought to improve the conditions of industrial workers in Saint Petersburg, but key among Gapon’s demands was the immediate cessation of the war against Japan.³⁸⁹ On January 9th, protestors peacefully assembled in front of the Winter Palace to address the Tsar. In response, Nicholas II ordered the Imperial Guard to fire into the crowd, and roughly 200 protestors were killed.³⁹⁰ In response to the slaughter, outrage spread to other sectors of civil society. Popular support for the Tsar cratered. In 1905, students in urban centers such as Saint Petersburg and Moscow went on strike, and almost every institution of higher learning was shut down by the government from February through the conclusion of the school year.³⁹¹ As a direct result of the war, Russia’s most prominent social institutions like the church and universities found themselves in direct opposition to tsarist foreign policies.

After the utter destruction of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima Strait in May of 1905, the Russian government began to look for viable diplomatic options to end the war.³⁹²

Tsar Nicholas II appointed his economic adviser Sergei Witte to act as plenipotentiary in the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Although Witte proved to be an exceptionally savvy diplomat and even protected Russia from ceding mainland territory or paying any form of war reparations, his association with the Romanov regime incurred widespread hatred towards the official.³⁹³ The Treaty of Portsmouth forced Russia to relinquish its claim over the lower half of Sakhalin island to Japan. This territorial loss, however minor, was widely perceived to be an embarrassment for the Russian people. In common parlance, Witte received the disparaging nickname “Count *Polusakhalinsky*,” or the Count of half of Sakhalin.³⁹⁴ Popular discontent with Witte undermined his later attempts to reform the imperial government. During the postwar fallout, Witte helped draft the October Manifesto of 1905 and the Russian Constitution of 1906, which created the Imperial Duma as a consultative body. Witte was charged with assembling the first government cabinet, but his efforts were stymied because no liberals trusted Witte enough to join the institution.³⁹⁵ Leftist civil society had turned against Witte, and the broader machinations of the tsarist government that he came to represent.

On the streets of Tokyo, Japanese civil society proved to be even more incensed with the Portsmouth Peace Treaty than the defeated Russians. The Meiji government decided that the political demonstration organized by the Rengōkai would not be tolerated, and 350 policemen were deployed to guard the gates of Hibiya park in the morning of September 5th, 1905.³⁹⁶ Skirmishes

³⁸⁷ Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 33.

³⁸⁸ Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 170.

³⁸⁹ Sidney Harcave, *The Russian Revolution of 1905* (Ontario: The Macmillan Company, 1970), 81-88.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

³⁹¹ Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 35.

³⁹² Eugene Trani, *The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy* (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 80.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, 158.

³⁹⁴ “Portsmouth Treaty Signed With Japan,” Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, accessed January 14, 2021, <https://www.prlib.ru/history/619512>.

³⁹⁵ Figes, *A People’s Tragedy*, 178.

³⁹⁶ Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, 208.

erupted between the public and the police, and eventually an immense crowd numbering roughly 30,000 individuals broke the barricade and entered the park.³⁹⁷ There was much fanfare: a brass band played anthems in the background, balloons rose above the crowd, and firecrackers fulminated across the park. The chairman of the assembly was Kōno Hironake, a former diet member. In a rousing speech, Kōno declared to the crowd that “we are determined to reject the humiliating treaty with national unity.”³⁹⁸ After the assembly concluded, Kōno led the crowd to the Imperial palace, and then to Shintomi Theater in Kyōbashi to listen to more anti-war polemics. Scuffles between the protestors and police erupted once more when the police troops began confiscating the band’s instruments, and a riot broke out after police ordered the crowd to be dispersed.³⁹⁹ The crowd directed its destructive impulses towards institutions and individuals who were associated with the imperial government and the war. Nearby was located the headquarters of the *Kokumin Shimbun*, a newspaper regarded by many to be an official organ of the state after its owner Tokutomi Sohō publicized his support for the treaty.⁴⁰⁰ An impassioned mob of over 1,000 rioters hurled stones through the windows of the building and destroyed the printing machines.⁴⁰¹ Next, the tumultuous crowd turned its fury towards official members of the government.

In all this excitement, a rumor spread throughout the crowd that the prime minister Katsura Tarō was taking refuge in the nearby house of the minister of public affairs, Viscount Yoshikawa Akimasa. The rioters blamed Prime Minister Tarō for the failures of the war effort, and Yoshikawa for suppressing the anti-treaty demonstration with police

troops. The crowd swelled again to roughly 30,000 rioters, and set the guard house of the mansion ablaze. As the horde of protestors besieged the government residence, the crowd chanted “burn them up!”⁴⁰² The government deployed military regiments into the area to finally dispel the crowd. By the end of the riot, the Japanese public had clearly demonstrated its discontent with imperial authority: more than 70 percent of Tokyo’s police boxes had been destroyed.⁴⁰³ Although some scholars contend that the Hibiya Incendiary Incident should be regarded as an act of protest against the Meiji police force rather than the government as a whole, it remains that public discontent with the Russo-Japanese War was the spark that first incited this violent display. The Hibiya Incendiary Incident was the largest act of public protest since the People’s Rights Movement of the 1870s and 1880s.⁴⁰⁴ Japanese civil society had emerged from hibernation with fury. After the riot broke out in Tokyo, similar uprisings materialized in Kobe and Yokohama, and non-violent rallies were held in villages in forty of the nation’s forty-four prefectures.⁴⁰⁵ The public’s trust in the government had been shaken.

The Effects and Future of Wartime Civil Resistance

Upheaval surrounding the Russo-Japanese War established a model for future demonstrations of public resistance. In Russia, wartime proved to be a hotbed for organized civic activity. One consequential effect of the Bloody Sunday march, which was inherently anti-war and anti-tsar in nature, was that a growing number of lower-class industrial workers, who previously venerated Nicholas II, now turned against the imperial

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 209.

⁴⁰⁰ Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War*, 210.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid., 210

⁴⁰³ Andrew Gordon, “*The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan: Tokyo 1905-1918*,” *Past & Present* 121, no. 1 (November 1988): 141.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 142.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., 142.

regime.⁴⁰⁶ In addition to the aforementioned university students who took a public stand against state violence, workers flocked to a new civic institution: the Saint Petersburg Soviet. The word “soviet” translates as “council,” and according to revolutionary Leon Trotsky, the Saint Petersburg Soviet eventually grew into a colossal organization. 500 workers’ deputies were elected to foment and oversee strikes carried out by roughly 200,000 industrial workers.⁴⁰⁷ This organization was suppressed by the imperial regime, and on December 3rd, 1905 its leaders, including Trotsky, were arrested. However, the Tsar did not fully succeed in stamping out this movement: during the 1917 Revolution, dissidents drew from their wartime experience to establish the Petrograd Soviet.⁴⁰⁸ In this regard, the strengthening of civil society during the Russo-Japanese War provided a groundwork and organizational structure for future public resistance.

Shortly after the conclusion of the war, civil unrest forced the Tsar to fundamentally alter the structure of the regime. After Nicholas II signed the October Manifesto of 1905, Sergei Witte spearheaded the establishment of a consultative legislative body: the Imperial Duma. Although the liberal party refused to join the organization, the Duma grew to encompass a vast array of the various ethnicities in the Russian Empire. For the first time in Russian history, the Duma gave a voice to Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews, Letts, Estonians, Tatars, Bashkirs, and other ethnicities in the government.⁴⁰⁹ The Duma was only a consultative body, and the Tsar thus retained ultimate veto power, but the organization successfully established a means of communication between minority groups and

the autocracy. However, the institution proved to be short lived. Political parties within the Duma-- in particular the Constitutional Democratic Party—sought to further liberalize the government at every turn, and in response, Nicholas II dissolved the Duma on July 22nd, 1906.⁴¹⁰ Although the First Imperial Duma existed for only half a year, mounting social pressure soon forced the Tsar to create a Second, Third, and Fourth Duma, and these organizations eventually provided the structural basis for the Russian Provisional Government that was established after the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917.⁴¹¹ The Imperial Duma provided an elected governmental body through which Russian civil society could communicate its grievances to the Tsar, and furthermore, it provided a structural basis for future revolutionary changes.

Similarly, in Japan the anti-peace treaty movement pioneered an effective methodology for subsequent acts of public protest. The Hibiya Incendiary Incident was the first event in a chain of uprisings commonly referred to by contemporary historians as the Era of Popular Violence, which lasted until 1918. As the prefatory movement of this period, the anti-treaty riot set important precedents in place that would be echoed by future dissidents. According to historian Andrew Gordon, the 1905 riot established a “three stage pattern of mobilization:” first, educated individuals like lawyers, journalists, and businessmen formed an organization.⁴¹² Second, members of the general public would become involved in the movement when the organization held an open event. Third, order would eventually break down at this event, and the crowd would devolve into violence.⁴¹³ This exact

⁴⁰⁶ Harcave, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, 88.

⁴⁰⁷ Trotsky, *Our Revolution: The Soviet and the Revolution*, 1907.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Wallace, *Russia: On the Eve of War and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 49.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., 62.

⁴¹² Gordon, “The Crowd and Politics in Imperial Japan,” 148-149.

⁴¹³ Ibid., 149.

pattern repeated itself in eight separate Tokyo riots throughout the Era of Popular Violence.⁴¹⁴ In the case of the Hibiya Incendiary Incident, intellectuals first coalesced into the Rengōkai, then a public gathering was held at Hibiya Park, and finally, a riot erupted. In the wake of this event, Hibiya Park emerged to become an important locus for civic action and popular violence. Rallies held inside Hibiya Park devolved into riots in 1905, 1906, 1908, and 1913.⁴¹⁵ The Era of Popular Violence was a time of civic engagement and widespread protest; some scholars argue that the 1905 riot marked the true genesis of Taishō Democracy, a period of political liberalism and representative governance, even though Emperor Taishō would not succeed his father's throne until 1912.⁴¹⁶ In effect, the Hibiya Incendiary Incident was an awakening of civil society that undermined the order and altered the status quo of the Japanese Empire for years to come.

The wartime narrative described by Porter in *War and the Rise of the State* contrasts with Gordon's examination of the Era of Popular Violence. Although Porter concedes that "a prolonged period of political and social crisis often follows defeat in war," this cursory explanation does not account for the popular protest that followed Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War.⁴¹⁷ This research argues that the strengthening of civil society during the war helped engender an ensuing period of social unrest in both Russia and Japan. Porter does not acknowledge the fact that a national war effort may buttress a civil society in which individuals can express either support for or opposition to the belligerent government. By introducing this one specific caveat, Porter's argument becomes far more salient. Indeed, many of Porter's other theories prove to be clearly showcased in the

Russo-Japanese War. For example, one facet of Porter's "ratchet effect" of war maintains that government taxation will be high during the postwar period.⁴¹⁸ This phenomenon manifested itself in both the Russian and Japanese experience, although the Russian financial system was ultimately less successful in wringing taxes from the populace than its Japanese counterpart.⁴¹⁹ This paper accords with the crux of Porter's reasoning, namely that there is a tendency for war to stimulate government centralization and foster legal tactics to control the masses. However, there is no guarantee that wartime civil society will acquiesce to this newfound authority.

War itself is not an engine for social progress. On the contrary, it is the domestic uproar that spawns in response to war that can accelerate the development of civil society. During the Russo-Japanese War, citizens on both sides of the conflict abandoned the traditional role of subservient imperial subjects by banding together into like-minded groups and voicing discontent through civil society. In Russia, seminal figures like Vladimir Lenin and Leo Tolstoy declared their vehement disapproval of tsarist governance. Popular support for the government dwindled further when Tsar Nicholas II brutally repressed a demonstration march in the capital, and when Russia was officially declared defeated in September of 1905. In response to the growing crisis, the development of institutions like the Saint Petersburg Soviet and the Imperial Duma provided a medium for citizens to communicate their grievances to the Tsar. In Japan, the renowned poetess Yosano Akiko pioneered the national literary movement of pacifism as a direct response to the war. Intellectuals on both ends of the political spectrum formed organizations in reaction to the war, like the socialist

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Huffman, "Covering a Bigger War," 308.

⁴¹⁷ Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, 16.

⁴¹⁸ Porter, *War and the Rise of the State*, 16.

⁴¹⁹ Rosella Zielinski, *How States Pay for Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 96.

publication *Heimin Newspaper*, or the staunchly nationalist Rengōkai. The anti-peace treaty riot known as the Hibiya Incendiary Incident set a formalistic pattern for future episodes of public resistance to follow in the Era of Popular Violence. This vast array of individuals, organizations, and public events constituted the burgeoning civil societies in the warring Empires of Russia and Japan. By the end of the conflict, civil society in Saint Petersburg and Tokyo emerged stronger than ever.

James Baldwin in Paris: Liberation, Alienation, and Existentialism

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Introduction

Captured in images of cafés dotting Saint-Germain-des-Prés and stone bridges traversing the Seine, a romantic vision of Paris is deeply ingrained in the American imagination. Paris has long beckoned generations of Americans, from New York socialites to students and artists. Black Americans were among the earliest expatriates, beginning in antebellum Louisiana, when wealthy mulatto families sent their free sons to the “City of Light” to receive an education and gain social mobility. While African Americans continued to explore France throughout the ensuing century, the decade following World War II marked a transformation in Black expatriation. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Black American writers flocked to Paris, imbuing expatriation with both political and intellectual significance. In contrast to earlier generations of emigrants, these writers expressly chose exile to protest racism in America. With its monumental literary history and reputed racially-tolerant climate, Paris beckoned to frustrated Black American intellectuals seeking a creative environment uninhibited by the constraints of discrimination. Among them was James Baldwin, regarded today as one of the greatest literary voices of the 20th Century.

Historiography

Baldwin’s life and intellectual trajectory have long fascinated historians and literary scholars alike, resulting in the production of extensive academic work. Most Baldwin scholars acknowledge the influence

of expatriation on the young writer’s development. However, academics generally seem to define Baldwin’s literary progress in personal terms, focusing on how expatriation impacted his private emotional growth. As Robert Tomlinson, a French professor and former director of Emory University’s African American Studies program, points out, the role of expatriation, “curiously, has been neglected in Baldwin studies.”⁴²⁰ The tendency to portray Baldwin’s Parisian years as a personal journey is manifested in most literary analyses of *Giovanni’s Room*. Critics often depict the novel as a representation of Baldwin’s reckoning with his “demons,” Tomlinson notes.⁴²¹ Moreover, since Baldwin’s relationship with Parisian existentialists was ambiguous, scholars have paid little attention to the impact existentialism exerted on his writing.⁴²² Thus, existing scholarly work has minimized the influence of Paris on Baldwin’s treatment of racial, sexual, and national identities.

By separating the personal and intellectual dimensions of Baldwin’s expatriation, critics have overlooked how essential the experience proved to be for his literary coming-of-age. Rather than serving solely as a sojourn for a young man paralyzed by internal turmoil, expatriation allowed Baldwin to develop themes central to the works that would garner him international acclaim. This paper will examine the influence of largely unexplored facets of expatriation on Baldwin’s self-conception and literary development. Baldwin’s lived experience of expatriation as both a form of liberation and alienation, coupled with his immersion in the existentialism that characterized post-war Paris, allowed him to represent racial, sexual, and national identities within a new thematic framework.

⁴²⁰ Robert Tomlinson, “‘Payin’ One’s Dues’”: Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin.” *African American Review* 33, no. 1 (1999): 135-48. doi:10.2307/2901316. 135.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Molly Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the ‘New Vocabulary’ of Existentialist Ethics,” in *Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 96, no. 2 (2013): 173.

Biographical Context

The circumstances of James Baldwin's birth became a central feature of both his personal identity and literary treatment of race and nationality. Born in New York City's Harlem Hospital on August 2, 1924, he entered the world without a father. This sense of a ruptured heritage is heavily reflected in Baldwin's writing, particularly in his analysis of the relationship of Black Americans to the history of their country. However, James Baldwin did not grow up fatherless. His mother, Berdis Jones, married David Baldwin, a preacher from New Orleans, when James was two years old. Although David Baldwin accepted James as his own, he was a hard and unaffectionate man. Debilitating poverty paired with puritanical discipline characterized the early life of James and his eight younger siblings, born over the next sixteen years. Yet amongst the rusted radiators and sinking stoops of Harlem, images the writer often returned to when describing his childhood home, James found refuge in classrooms, and later, at the public library on 135th street.⁴²³

Baldwin's formative years in Harlem were defined by his growing awareness of the agony caused by racism in America, and the tensions in his own racial and sexual identities. Baldwin witnessed firsthand the legacy of slavery in his childhood home. His stepfather's mother, Barbara, had been enslaved, and she spent the last years of her life bedridden in the Baldwin home. As David Leeming, Baldwin's authoritative biographer writes, "inevitably, his grandmother was a link to the whispered horrors of what to a child must have seemed like the ancient past."⁴²⁴ Additionally, Baldwin's stepfather suffered from the crippling effects of a lifetime of racial discrimination. His rage at what he referred to as the sins of the "white devil" initially enabled him to become a powerful

preacher, imbuing his sermons with an impassioned religious fervor and righteous moral anger.⁴²⁵ In time, though, he began to lose hope in the God he believed would bring white Americans to their reckoning, and Black Americans to their deliverance. Despite having an estranged relationship with his stepfather, who died in a mental hospital in 1943, Baldwin eventually understood him as a victim, tormented by attempting to reconcile his faith with the continued suffering of Black Americans.

From an early age on, Baldwin's life was punctuated by witnessing and personally experiencing devastating racism. At nine, Baldwin learned that a young Black neighbor had shot himself in the head after being told he was too dark to marry the daughter of a lighter couple.⁴²⁶ At ten, Baldwin was roughed up by white policemen, who made demeaning remarks about his body.⁴²⁷ Years of racial slurs and being denied service at restaurants resulted in a rage that bordered on hatred. Struggling to earn a living as a writer, Baldwin bounced from one odd job to another, washing dishes and working in the garment district.⁴²⁸

The pain resulting from the inhumanity Baldwin faced as a Black man in America coincided with his struggle to accept his sexuality. In Greenwich Village, Baldwin fell in love with another young Black man, his close friend Eugene Worth. However, he felt unable to express his true sexual and romantic feelings for Worth.⁴²⁹ In 1945, Worth committed suicide by jumping off the George Washington Bridge. Baldwin perceived Worth's death as inextricable from the toll caused by America's racism, noting in 1961: "I felt then, and, to tell the truth, I feel now that he would not have died in such a way and certainly not so soon, if he had not been

⁴²³ David Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 3-31.

⁴²⁴ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 4.

⁴²⁵ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 5.

⁴²⁶ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 12.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid*, 24.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid*, 42.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid*, 46.

black.”⁴³⁰ Haunted by Worth’s death, obsessed with seemingly unanswerable questions of his own identity, and paralyzed by a sense of racial and sexual shame, Baldwin experienced an encroaching psychological chaos over the next two years. Fearing he would eventually meet the same fate as his stepfather or close friend, Baldwin realized he needed to escape the country in which his pain was rooted. In a later interview with *The Paris Review*, Baldwin described his decision to leave America, stating: “I knew what it meant to be white and I knew what it meant to be [black], and I knew what was going to happen to me. My luck was running out. I was going to go to jail, I was going to kill somebody or be killed.”⁴³¹ Consequently, at age 24, with just forty dollars in his pocket, James Baldwin crossed the Atlantic and arrived in Paris in November of 1948.⁴³²

Expatriation as Liberation

Since Baldwin saw his flight from America as critical to his survival, both as a Black man and an artist, he initially experienced expatriation as liberation. Paris provided the young writer with the distance necessary to better understand the pervasive American suppression of minority identities. As Baldwin explained in his essay “The New Lost Generation,” published by *Esquire* in 1961, Europe offered Americans “the sanction, if one can accept it, to become oneself.”⁴³³ Baldwin found it very difficult to write about the racial realities in America, or the American obsession with maintaining specific categories of sexual identity, at the

same time he was actively dealing with them. Although Paris was certainly not free from racial tensions, particularly those fueled by France’s colonialism, the city served as a respite from the overt racism and violent targeting of Black Americans in the U.S. Consequently, as Leeming states, Baldwin “could relax somewhat in the absence of obvious bigotry in his new surroundings.”⁴³⁴ Baldwin’s newfound freedom allowed him to reimagine the relationship between Black and white Americans. As Tomlinson argues, from a distance, Black expatriates could see America as “a box whose walls were black and white.” In contrast, Paris provided Black Americans with “liberation from the box of color,” which, in the end, “delivered them to themselves.”⁴³⁵ This perceived liberation from rigid categories of identity enforced in his home country helped Baldwin cultivate a deeper understanding of American history and identity, which eventually came to define his later works of fiction.

Expatriation as Alienation

If expatriation freed Baldwin from America’s manifest and wide-ranging racial discrimination, it nevertheless proved alienating. In his first years in Paris, Baldwin felt unable to connect with others and struggled with alcohol use. As Leeming writes, though Baldwin had a few social contacts in Paris, “he did miss the language, the style, the food, the general ambience of the world in which he had grown up.”⁴³⁶ Baldwin acknowledges his lack of companionship in Paris in several of his works, including his

⁴³⁰ Colm Tóibín, “The Henry James of Harlem: James Baldwin’s Struggles,” *The Guardian*. September 14, 2001. <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/sep/14/jamesbaldwin>.

⁴³¹ James Baldwin, “James Baldwin, The Art of Fiction No. 78,” in *The Paris Review Interviews*, vol. 2, edited by Philip Gourevitch, 237–71, (New York: Macmillan).

⁴³² Lloyd Kramer, “James Baldwin in Paris: Exile, Multiculturalism and the Public Intellectual,” *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 27 (2001): 27-47. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41299193>.

⁴³³ James Baldwin, “The New Lost Generation | *Esquire* | JULY, 1961.” *Esquire* | The Complete Archive. <https://classic.esquire.com/article/1961/7/1/the-new-lost-generation>.

⁴³⁴ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 62.

⁴³⁵ Tomlinson, ““Payin’ One’s Dues”: Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin,” 136.

⁴³⁶ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 62.

autobiographical essay “Equal in Paris,” published in *Notes of a Native Son*. Baldwin laments: “In those days in Paris, though I floated, so to speak, on a sea of acquaintances, I knew almost no one...there were many evenings when I sat in my room, knowing that I couldn’t work there, and not knowing what to do, or whom to see.”⁴³⁷ His dejected spirits undoubtedly influenced his portrayal of the Black American expatriate. In Baldwin’s 1950 essays, the young author “was expressing his own sense of loneliness” as he “meditated on his roots and on his identity as an African-American and as an American.”⁴³⁸ However, authors’ personal experiences often lead them to develop a distinct voice and help shape their literary framing of certain events. Hence, it would be a mistake to shortchange Baldwin’s broader conclusions about race and identity by seeing them only as an expression of personal loneliness.

In his 1950 essays, Baldwin conceptualizes his sense of alienation in Paris within a broader racial, geographic, and cultural framework. This allowed the young author to articulate a comprehensive appraisal of race relations in America that proved critical to his most renowned work. Describing the isolation of the Black American in Paris, Baldwin argues that expatriation forcefully spurs a reckoning with the historical forces that shape relationships and identity. According to Tomlinson, “the sense of alienation which Baldwin would distill from his private experience of the expatriate condition was already placed in an historical context.”⁴³⁹ *Notes of a Native Son* embody Baldwin’s recognition that his isolation as an expatriate was not merely personal, but a reflection of inexorable

historical influences on different ethnic and national groups. It is this understanding of the power of history that allowed Baldwin to harness and transform his personal reality into a paradigm for Black Americans both abroad and at home.

In seeking to understand Black expatriates’ isolation in Paris, Baldwin points out that it may be impossible for any American overseas to become truly integrated into French society. Describing American efforts to adapt to the French way of life, Baldwin observes: “no American *can* live as the French live.”⁴⁴⁰ The inevitability of Americans’ separation from their French counterparts stems from their lack of a shared history. While the American may read all of Proust, speak French with a perfect inflection, and frequent dimly-lit cafés, he cannot truly claim a place within these traditions. As Baldwin argues, Americans “are charmed by the reflection that Paris is more than two thousand years old, but it escapes them that the Parisian has been in the making just about that long, and that one does not, therefore, become Parisian by virtue of a Parisian address.”⁴⁴¹ National cultures are developed over time, and preserved by their population’s collective memory. Even though Americans may embrace French society, they can never truly identify as French, for they are removed from the historical traditions, rituals, and symbols which give meaning to a culture.

As James Miller, a professor of literature at King’s College, London, writes in “What Does It Mean to Be an American? The Dialectics of Self-Discovery in Baldwin’s ‘Paris Essays,’” Baldwin considered all Americans to be “divorced from Parisian society.”⁴⁴² However, Black expatriates

⁴³⁷ James Baldwin, “Equal in Paris”, in *Notes of a Native Son*, 117-135, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 120.

⁴³⁸ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 63.

⁴³⁹ Tomlinson, “‘Payin’ One’s Dues’: Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin,” 135.

⁴⁴⁰ James Baldwin, “A Question of Identity”, in *Notes of a Native Son*, 105-116, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955),

111-112.

⁴⁴¹ Baldwin, “A Question of Identity”, 114.

⁴⁴² James Miller, “What Does It Mean to Be an American? The Dialectics of Self-Discovery in Baldwin’s ‘Paris Essays’ (1950—1961).” *Journal of American Studies* 42, no. 1 (2008). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4046423>, 56.

inevitably experienced this alienation to a much greater extent, as Europeans live with authority derived from a white, colonial history. Recognizing that they are explicitly denied this authority, Black expatriates often found it harder to escape the contempt that can arise in interacting with Europeans. Baldwin evokes this kind of tension in "Stranger in the Village," a depiction of his encounters with a white Swiss small town.

Arriving at the village, Baldwin, as the narrator, quickly realizes that "no black man had ever set foot in this tiny Swiss village."⁴⁴³ Although the villagers appear friendly, their unabashed amazement at Baldwin elicits anger in him at the evident gap in their positions in the world. As primitive as the villagers may be, they have inherited a power enabling them to live in comfortable ignorance of the suffering of Black Americans, which stems from the slave trade their ancestors helped to orchestrate. Considering the roots of his rage, Baldwin states that:

"This village...is the West, the West onto which I have been so strangely grafted. These people cannot be, from the point of view of power, strangers anywhere in the world; they have made the modern world, even if they do not know it...Go back a few centuries and they are in their full glory -- but I am in Africa, watching the conquerors arrive."⁴⁴⁴

Baldwin does not seek to blame the people in a remote mountain town for the disparities between white and Black in the world. He "knows that no individual can be taken to task for what history is doing, or has done."⁴⁴⁵ However, Baldwin also recognizes the implications of past ancestors' actions. Turning to James Joyce, an author he

admired, Baldwin concludes: "Joyce is right about history being a nightmare -- but it may be the nightmare from which no one *can* awake. People are trapped in history and history is trapped in them."⁴⁴⁶ Baldwin's switch from the indefinite "a" to "the" indicates his view that history is the overarching structure defining human relationships. To claim to be French, a Black expatriate would have to ignore the country's colonial history, or accept a historical role as conquered.

While divergent histories separate Black expatriates and Europeans, attempts to evade the reality of a shared history hinders the relationships of white and Black American expatriates. In "A Question of Identity," Baldwin characterizes white Americans' typical response to the questions of national identity that arise with expatriation. According to Baldwin, white Americans generally respond in one of two ways: either they leave Paris to return to a place that poses fewer difficult questions, or they completely abdicate their American identity.⁴⁴⁷ Though Baldwin does not specify the race of the American expatriate he describes in "A Question of Identity," he strongly implies that these are white responses, as neither resolution is realistic for Black Americans. As those trying to avoid uncertainty return home, the remaining white expatriates with whom the Black Americans interact are those who have attempted to negate their national past.

Both white and Black expatriates are aware of the racial discrimination which permeates their nation. However, white Americans in Paris seeking to escape their heritage avoid acknowledging the racial oppression they have witnessed, or participated in, back home. In "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown," Baldwin describes how this creates a sense of

⁴⁴³ James Baldwin, "Stranger in the Village", in *Notes of a Native Son*, 135-149, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 135.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 140.

⁴⁴⁵ Baldwin, "Stranger in the Village", 139.

⁴⁴⁶ Baldwin, "Stranger in the Village", 138.

⁴⁴⁷ Baldwin, "A Question of Identity", 113.

foreboding that distorts even simple conversations. He notes, there is always “in the encounter of white Americans and Negro Americans the high potential of an awkward or ugly situation.”⁴⁴⁸ It becomes difficult for a Black expatriate to communicate freely with fellow white Americans in Paris, since they are likely to willfully ignore the responsibility implied by their nationality. Hence, white and Black Americans in Paris do not “discuss the past, except in considerably guarded snatches.”⁴⁴⁹ Baldwin’s perception of how conversational barriers prevent deeper connections between Black and white Americans is reinforced in his interview with Nabile Farès for *Jeune Afrique* in 1970. Asked about the divides in American society, Baldwin stated: “there is a great distance between the language of an American black and an American white -- a tragic distance.”⁴⁵⁰ By refusing to engage in an open dialogue about their country, white Americans dismiss their participation in racial oppression. The sense of shame evoked by America’s history thus prevents white and black expatriates from developing meaningful relationships in Paris.

The final source of alienation which renders Black Americans “incomparably more isolated” than any other group in Paris is encounters with French Africans.⁴⁵¹ In engaging with French Africans, Black Americans witness their own lack of connection to a continuous, geographic, historical memory. While Baldwin acknowledges that Africans in Paris often live with a certain anger, they direct it toward an external opponent, France. As Baldwin depicts in “Encounter on the Seine,” French

Africans are unified in their resolve of reclaiming authority over their colonized countries; they have a “homeland to which [their] responsibility is overwhelmingly clear.”⁴⁵² In contrast, Black Americans’ relationship to their homeland is painfully uncertain. Facing the French African, the Black American recognizes “the gulf of three hundred years,” a separation caused by forcible removal from Africa and subsequently dehumanized through slavery.⁴⁵³ The shame wrought by dislocation and centuries of immersion in myths of white supremacy is largely foreign to Africans. As Baldwin writes, the French African’s “mother did not sing ‘Sometimes I feel Like a Motherless Child,’ and he has not, all his life long, ached for acceptance in a culture which pronounced straight hair and white skin the only acceptable beauty.”⁴⁵⁴ As depicted in “Encounter on the Seine”, there was little common ground Black expatriates could find with French Africans.

Although a lonely experience, Baldwin notes in his 1950s essays that expatriation provides a powerful incentive for Black expatriates to reconsider their past, and explore their racial and national identities. Black Americans’ alienation from French Africans figures as particularly critical in spurring a journey toward greater self-realization. As Tomlinson argues, “the tension between opposites evoked by this encounter with members of his ancestral culture caused all of Baldwin’s ambivalence about color to surface.”⁴⁵⁵ This interaction allowed Baldwin to realize that it was not the shade of his skin but the way white Americans characterized it that impacted his identity. In his interview

⁴⁴⁸ James Baldwin, "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown", in *Notes of a Native Son*, 99-104. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 100.

⁴⁴⁹ Baldwin, "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown", 101.

⁴⁵⁰ Nabile Farès and Peter Thompson, "James Baldwin: A 1970 Interview," in *Transition*, no. 105 (2011): 62-73. doi:10.2979/transition.105.62, 71.

⁴⁵¹ Baldwin, "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets

Brown", 99.

⁴⁵²Baldwin, "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown", 103.

⁴⁵³ Ibid, 103.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid, 103.

⁴⁵⁵ Tomlinson, "'Payin' One's Dues": Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin," 143.

with Farès, Baldwin explains: “I was darkened long ago by the sun; but that’s not what makes me ‘black.’ It’s the role I play in the world.”⁴⁵⁶ In “A Question of Identity,” Baldwin argues that the Black expatriate is forced to ultimately consider not just his personal, but national history, and “from the vantage point of Europe he discovers his own country.”⁴⁵⁷

The importance of Baldwin’s alienation during his Parisian years for his personal and literary trajectory cannot be overstated. In his 1950 essays, Baldwin conceptualizes his personal experience of isolation within a broader racial, geographic and cultural framework. Ultimately, Baldwin’s suggests that a history defined by racial imbalances of power cannot be separated from human identities and relationships. Leeming writes that these essays constitute “an overture to the story he was to tell during the rest of his life. Each of the major Baldwin themes is touched on here: the search for identity in a world that because of its racial myths cannot recognize reality, the acceptance of one’s inheritance...the loneliness of the artist’s quest.”⁴⁵⁸ Since they explore the themes characterizing all of Baldwin’s major works, his 1950 essays are a testament to the intensely formative nature of his lived experience of expatriation as alienation.

French Existentialism and the Influence of Existentialism in Baldwin’s Writing

Even though he expressed a sense of estrangement from Parisian society, Baldwin could not escape the influence of the existential movement that dominated the city’s intellectual, philosophical and literary scene. Molly Farneth, an Assistant Professor

of Religion at Haverford College, notes: “existentialism was simply ubiquitous in the intellectual discussions and debates in Paris in the late 1940s, when Baldwin began writing and publishing there, and, at least during the first year of his stay in Paris, Baldwin was an active participant in that intellectual life.”⁴⁵⁹ Merely by his status as a writer, Baldwin was inevitably immersed in Paris’ post-war existentialism. When viewed through an existentialist lens, Baldwin’s literary work exhibits striking parallels to concepts developed by some of the most important existential thinkers, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Indeed, Baldwin’s analysis of America’s pervasive discrimination is steeped in Beauvoir’s expansion on Sartre’s existentialist notion of “bad faith.”⁴⁶⁰

While existentialism derives from a philosophical thinking ranging from René Descartes and Martin Heidegger, the modern literary and intellectual movement was truly defined in 1940s Paris.⁴⁶¹ Existentialism provided a new framework for understanding human existence, resting upon the assertion that a person is ultimately free to create himself and his meaning in the universe. Sartre captured this central tenet in his slogan: “existence precedes essence,” first coined in his 1945 lecture “L’existentialisme est un Humanisme.”⁴⁶² As Farneth explains, Sartre’s assertion signifies that “the choices and actions of human individuals create identities, values, and norms; in other words, the ‘essences’ of human individuals and of objects in the social world are produced by the meaning-making activities of existing human individuals.”⁴⁶³ Humans create their identities both by their interpretation of characteristics, such as race or nationality, and by their

⁴⁵⁶ Farès and Thompson, “James Baldwin: A 1970 Interview,” 65.

⁴⁵⁷ Baldwin, “A Question of Identity,” 116.

⁴⁵⁸ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 100.

⁴⁵⁹ Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 172-173.

⁴⁶⁰ Crowell, Steven Crowell, “Existentialism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, March 09, 2015.

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/>.

⁴⁶¹ Bakewell, *At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails*, 1-35.

⁴⁶² Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 175.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

construction of the world around them. History, then, can be seen not as the result of an abstract divine will but of human choices. The freedom of human existence entails immense responsibility. As Flynn writes: “we are challenged to own up to our self-defining choices; to make them our own and consequently to become selves by acknowledging what we are.”⁴⁶⁴ However, the recognition of this simultaneous freedom and responsibility can elicit anxiety, as it strips humans of the security of a predetermined order in life.

Simone de Beauvoir’s conception of the broader social and historical consequences of Sartre’s notion of “bad faith” clearly influenced Baldwin’s writing. A prolific author and feminist, Beauvoir was a well-established Parisian intellect by the 1940s, publishing *The Ethics of Ambiguity* in 1947, shortly before Baldwin’s arrival.⁴⁶⁵ In *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Beauvoir sought to clarify the moral implications that occur when humans refuse to accept their agency in creating or perpetuating the unfree conditions of others’ existence. When humans live in “bad faith,” they deny their personal sense of responsibility and “cling to external authorities and inherited norms,” notes Shannon Mussett, a Professor of History of Philosophy at Utah Valley University. Consequently, people “‘project a closed future that seeks to silence those who question’ the world, and thereby ‘contribute to the domination of others.’”⁴⁶⁶ In rejecting their role in shaping the past and present, humans not only preserve hierarchical structures but perpetuate the marginalization of those who challenge a “fixed” order.

In *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Beauvoir employs a coming-of-age metaphor later

echoed by Baldwin. Children, she writes, accept the guarantees and models provided by the world around them. However, during adolescence, a crisis occurs when children realize their environment and even their identities are neither fixed nor immutable. In this moment, adolescents confront a moral choice. They “may recognize themselves and their world as the products of human decisions and actions,” and thus, “recognize their responsibility for deciding and acting in ways that create the conditions under which others will recognize their own freedom.”⁴⁶⁷ However, the more common instinct is to evade responsibility by “living under the unquestioned authority of others,” or “actively propping up those authorities in order to guard the given world against assault.”⁴⁶⁸ People prefer to see this as a “natural” world order. As Beauvoir writes: “one of the ruses of oppression is to camouflage itself behind a natural situation.”⁴⁶⁹

Baldwin’s analysis of white America’s determination to oppress Blacks, as well as other minorities such as homosexuals, clearly parallels Beauvoir’s depiction of the consequences of “bad faith.” Throughout his essay “Stranger in the Village,” Baldwin draws heavily upon Beauvoir’s arguments to examine white Americans’ refusal to recognize the integral role of Black Americans in their nation. Because they believe themselves to be both the architects and defenders of civilization, whites cannot “accept the black man as one of themselves, for to do so was to jeopardize their status as white men.”⁴⁷⁰ Moreover, while white Americans recognize the subservient position Black Americans are forced into, they refuse to acknowledge their responsibility for creating and sustaining this

⁴⁶⁴ Flynn, *Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction*, 64.

⁴⁶⁵ Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 175.

⁴⁶⁶ Shannon Mussett, “Simone De Beauvoir,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed May 07, 2019, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/beauvoir/>.

⁴⁶⁷ Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and

the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 176.

⁴⁶⁸ Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 176.

⁴⁶⁹ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Philosophical Library/Open Road, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, 83.

⁴⁷⁰ Baldwin, “Stranger in the Village,” 141.

position. Baldwin writes that “the white man prefers to keep the black man at a certain human remove because it is easier for him thus to preserve his simplicity and avoid being called to account for crimes committed by his forefathers, or his neighbors.”⁴⁷¹ By attempting to deny the existence of Black Americans as their co-patriots, white Americans strain their own concept of humanity, ignoring the Black man’s “human weight and complexity,” a reality that is “overwhelmingly undeniable.”⁴⁷² Faced with this contradiction, white Americans follow Beauvoir’s equation, denying their responsibility for racial injustices and retreating to rationalizations that revolve around “natural” or divine fixed orders.

Baldwin recognizes that the white man “can scarcely avoid having recourse to those legends which white men have created about black men, the most usual effect of which is that the white man finds himself enmeshed, so to speak, in his own language which describes hell, as well as the attributes which lead one to hell, as being black as night.”⁴⁷³ This attempt to explain the conditions of human existence as the product of a divine system, rather than human choices, directly reflects existential notions of bad faith. When faced with their responsibility, humans who live in bad faith often “flee that condition by appeal to an abstract system of reason or divine will.”⁴⁷⁴ Unable to accept the role of the Black man in their national identity or take responsibility for racial discrimination, white Americans, as depicted by Baldwin, create myths that assign Black Americans to the inferior role within a divine order. By doing so, white Americans not only flee responsibility but also uphold structures of

oppression, following the pattern outlined by Beauvoir.

Even more than in “Stranger in the Village,” Beauvoir’s existential arguments clearly influenced Baldwin’s analysis of homophobia in “Preservation of Innocence.” Published in *Zero* just a few months after his arrival in Paris, Baldwin’s essay harshly critiques America’s embrace of limited sexual categories.⁴⁷⁵ Like Beauvoir, Baldwin advances his argument through a coming-of-age metaphor, depicting adolescence as the time during which one must face the ambiguities of constructed identities in order to be free. Toward the end of the first section of “Preservation of Innocence,” Baldwin states: “the recognition of this complexity is the signal of maturity; it marks the death of the child and the birth of the man.”⁴⁷⁶

Echoing *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Baldwin rejects the notion of given categories and a “natural” order. In the essay, he refutes the notion that homosexuality is “unnatural,” pointing out that “not only is a natural state perversely indefinable outside of the womb or before the grave, but that it is not on the whole a state which is altogether desirable.”⁴⁷⁷ Homophobia takes on violent dimensions as people attempt to preserve concepts of manhood and womanhood which they deem “natural.” Baldwin writes that this violence against homosexuals is the response of “immature” Americans, who “shun this metamorphosis,” or the transition from childhood to adulthood.⁴⁷⁸ This brutality is a “strident and dreadful testimony to our renowned and cherished innocence.”⁴⁷⁹ Within this framework, to be innocent signifies a rejection of the existential crisis posted by Beauvoir. Baldwin applies the

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Ibid, 142.

⁴⁷³ Baldwin, “Stranger in the Village”, 142.

⁴⁷⁴ Crowell, Steven Crowell, “Existentialism,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, March 09, 2015.

Accessed May 07, 2019.

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/>.

⁴⁷⁵ Farneth, “James Baldwin, Simone De Beauvoir, and the “New Vocabulary” of Existentialist Ethics,” 181.

⁴⁷⁶ James Baldwin, “Preservation of Innocence,” in *Collected Essays*, 594–600. (New York: Library of America, 1998), 598.

⁴⁷⁷ Baldwin, “Preservation of Innocence,” 594.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid, 597.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, 599.

concept of “bad faith” to sexual repression in “Preservation of Innocence,” and racial oppression in “Stranger in the Village,” to illustrate how American discrimination stems from a refusal to accept personal and historical responsibility for the identities and authorities of the world.

The Culmination of the Expatriate Experience: *Giovanni's Room*

The narrative that unfolds in *Giovanni's Room* epitomizes the intersection between Baldwin's immersion in existential philosophy and his lived experiences of expatriation as liberation and alienation. Published in 1956, *Giovanni's Room* hauntingly depicts a search for identity in a bleak Parisian landscape. David, the novel's speaker, is a white American man who refuses love because he cannot accept his sexuality. Consequently, David's behavior is the epitome of existential bad faith. While all of the characters are white, and the novel's central confrontation revolves around sexuality, prominent scholars from Leeming to Tomlinson agree that the relationship David shares with an Italian bartender Giovanni serves as an archetype of the relationship between Black and white Americans. Within this framework, sexuality functions as a metaphor for race. Leeming writes: “David is representative of the outlook and the failure of white America, and Giovanni is just as clearly the embodiment of what Baldwin sees as the outlook of the black man.”⁴⁸⁰ Tomlinson agrees: “It is not difficult to see the struggle of the European, Giovanni, and the American, David, as a narrative paradigm for the relationship of Black and White in America.”⁴⁸¹

Baldwin links sexual and racial identities by continually evoking images of

darkness when referring to homosexuality. Recounting his first sexual experience in America with another male, Joey, David at once remembers, “Joey's body was brown.”⁴⁸² Moreover, following this sexual encounter, David experiences paralyzing fear: “a cavern opened in my mind, black.”⁴⁸³ Later, when David encounters Giovanni for the first time, he describes him as “insolent and dark and leonine.”⁴⁸⁴ Throughout the rest of the novel, David often describes Giovanni within a framework of darkness. Baldwin's characterization of individuals and experiences associated with homosexuality as “brown,” “black,” or “dark” show the link he perceived between sexual and racial identities exiled from or oppressed in America.

In *Giovanni's Room*, both homosexuality and blackness evoke “the dark side of human nature, and this terror-ridden inability to come to terms with them was not, in Baldwin's view, his problem, but that of White America.”⁴⁸⁵ Try as they might, white Americans can never escape their responsibility in shaping the fates of their Black co-patriots. Baldwin poignantly illustrates this at the end of *Giovanni's Room*, when Giovanni is sentenced to death as the victim of David's bad faith and denial of love. Although David rips up a letter informing him of Giovanni's execution date, the implications of his actions cannot be evaded. Even after he tosses the ripped pieces in the air, David observes, “as I turn and begin walking toward the waiting people, the wind blows some of them back on me.”⁴⁸⁶ The conclusion demonstrates that, by attempting to eschew responsibility, white Americans, like David, will continue to be haunted by their complicity in the unjust fates of other humans.

⁴⁸⁰ Leeming, *James Baldwin: A Biography*, 125.

⁴⁸¹ Tomlinson, ““Payin' One's Dues”: Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin,” 139.

⁴⁸² James Baldwin, *Giovanni's Room* (New York: Vintage International Vintage Books, A Division of Random House LLC, 2013), 8.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁸⁴ Baldwin, *Giovanni's Room*, 28.

⁴⁸⁵ Tomlinson, ““Payin' One's Dues”: Expatriation as Personal Experience and Paradigm in the Works of James Baldwin,” 139

⁴⁸⁶ Baldwin, *Giovanni's Room*, 169.

The imprint of existentialism is salient in Baldwin's depiction of David and Giovanni's relationship, and the novel's central themes of innocence, freedom and responsibility. However, the narrative also reveals the influence of Baldwin's personal, lived experiences of Paris. Like Baldwin, David initially experiences the city as liberating, as he flits from bar to café to hotel. Although he eventually rejects his realization, expatriation does provide David with the distance necessary to engage in self-contemplation. Due to his expatriate experience, David realizes he is the same person in Paris he had tried to flee in America, musing, "If I had had any intimation that the self I was going to find would turn out to be only the same self from which I had spent so much time in flight, I would have stayed at home."⁴⁸⁷

While freeing, expatriation functions as a source of alienation for David as well. Throughout *Giovanni's Room*, Baldwin paints Paris as a lonely city, muted in color and sound. The boulevards, buildings, and people are frequently shaded in grey. David describes a sense of desolation, a morning mist "clinging like a curse to the men who slept beneath the bridges."⁴⁸⁸ Later, walking through the streets, David observes the city is "absolutely silent. There seemed to be almost no one on the street...Behind the walls of the houses I passed, the French nation was clearing away the dishes...Those walls, those shuttered windows held them in and protected them."⁴⁸⁹ For the American in Paris, intimacy appears perpetually evasive. David, like Baldwin, senses a barrier between himself and his European counterparts. Although he often finds himself in the "company" of others, David cannot forge true connections in Paris. The conversations he engages in hold little significance, and the city is as socially isolating for the young fictional American as it was for Baldwin. Ultimately, the power of

Giovanni's Room derives from Baldwin's interweaving of his personal, emotional response to expatriation with an existential framing of Americans' responsibility in upholding repressive racial and sexual mores. These moments of authentic emotion, rooted in Baldwin's own realities, allow the broader messages of *Giovanni's Room* to touch the reader.

Conclusion

Baldwin's lived experience of expatriation as liberation and alienation, coupled with his immersion in French existentialism, allowed him to conceive of new and multidimensional racial, national, and sexual identities. The crucial role of expatriation in the author's literary development is most clearly manifested in the essays contained in *Notes of a Native Son*, "Preservation of Innocence," and *Giovanni's Room*. The influence of Baldwin's experience during expatriation yields significant implications for understanding the intellectual development of individuals in diverse cultural settings, as well as the relationship between Black and white Americans. First, the importance of expatriation in Baldwin's growth as an author demonstrates the interconnected nature of public intellectual spheres and private, emotional realms. In serving as an impetus for an investigation of his past, Baldwin's sense of himself as a stranger overseas resulted in the creation of a comprehensive portrait of race relations in America. Second, Baldwin's use of existential themes to describe racial realities allowed him to paint a vivid portrait of America's potential to progress as a nation. Baldwin seems to suggest that if white Americans accepted the unfixed nature of essentialist categories, and acknowledged their historical and present responsibility in oppressing minority groups, they could subsequently recognize Beauvoir's

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid, 21.

⁴⁸⁸ Baldwin, *Giovanni's Room*, 45.

⁴⁸⁹ Baldwin, *Giovanni's Room*, 104.

assertion that freedom depends upon advancing the liberty of others.

Vignettes of this hope appear throughout Baldwin's work, particularly in his depiction of love. In his autobiographical book *No Name in the Street*, Baldwin states that love "began to pry open for me the trap of color, for people do not fall in love according to their color."⁴⁹⁰ Throughout his short stories and novels, love alone appears to have the power to bridge racial divides shaped by centuries of scarred history. However, Baldwin also portrays this love as inherently ephemeral, a temporary bridge lacking secure foundations. As a result, Baldwin appears doubtful that Americans will embrace human love to the extent necessary to break down entrenched barriers. In *No Name in the Street*, Baldwin remarks: "I have always been struck, in America, by an emotional poverty so bottomless, and a terror of human life, of human touch, so deep, that virtually no American appears able to achieve any viable, organic connection between his public stance and his private life."⁴⁹¹ Baldwin's vision of America's destiny is clearly ambiguous. Nonetheless, "Encounter on the Seine" is imbued with a certain optimism. In its conclusion, the young Baldwin declares, "what time will bring Americans is at last their own identity. It is on this dangerous voyage and in the same boat that the American Negro will make peace with himself and with the voiceless many thousands gone before him."⁴⁹² The most Parisian of Baldwin's essays, "Encounter on the Seine" suggests that the selfhood of America and Black Americans is intrinsically linked in a still-evolving history.

⁴⁹⁰ James Baldwin, *The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction, 1948-1985*, (New York: St. Martins/Marek, 1985), 460.

⁴⁹¹ Baldwin, *The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction*,

1948-1985, 477.

⁴⁹² Baldwin, "Encounter on the Seine: Black Meets Brown," 104.